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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Constitutional Law
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - PENNSYLVANIA
FOREIGN ATTACHMENT SUMMARY PROCEDURES VIOLATE DUE PROCESS
IN FAILING TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS TO
PROTECT THE PROSPECTIVE DEFENDANT AGAINST WRONGFUL SEIZURE.
Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank (1976)
Plaintiffs,' residents of Pennsylvania, filed a complaint 2 in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against
Dollar Savings Bank of the City of New York (Dollar), alleging wrongful
failure to honor a mortgage commitment for $1,100,000. :1 Since Dollar was
not registered to do business in Pennsylvania, plaintiffs then caused the
United States Clerk of Court 4 to issue writs of foreign attachment5 for
service on two garnishees which were indebted to Dollar for a total of
$1,300,000.6 After the garnishees complied with the foreign attachment by
withholding their next monthly installment payments, Dollar moved to
dissolve the attachment upon substitution of United States treasury notes as
security. 7 Some months later, Dollar moved to dismiss the action,
1. Plaintiffs were Elmer J. Jonnet, Jonnet Development Corporation, and Jonnel
Enterprises Incorporated. Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1225 (3d Cir.
1976).
2. Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 392 F. Supp. 1385,1391 (W.D. Pa. 1975). Although
the complaint in assumpsit with foreign attachment was filed July 2, 1973, the filing
of the praecipe for writs of foreign attachment and the actual issuance by the clerk did
not occur until July 5, 1973. Id.
3. 530 F.2d at 1125.
4. Under the Pennsylvania foreign attachment provisions, which are outlined in
note 5 infra, the prothonotary (clerk of the civil court) is empowered to issue writs of
foreign attachment. PA. R. Clv. P. 1255. Since, under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the federal courts sitting in Pennsylvania "borrow" the attachment
procedures of the state, the analogous authority to issue federal writs is vested in the
United States Clerk of Court. FED. R. CIv. P. 64; see 530 F.2d at 1125 n.4.
5. For the text of the Pennsylvania foreign attachment provisions, see PA. R.
Civ. P. 1251-1279. Attachment is limited to property of nonresident corporations,
partnerships, individuals, and unincorporated associations which do not have regular
places of business in the commonwealth. Id. rule 1252. The action is commenced by
filing a praecipe, which is an order addressed to the prothonotary requesting the
issuance of a writ of foreign attachment directing the sheriff to attach the stated
property. Id. rule 1255. The garnishee is charged with forwarding a copy of the writ to
the defendant and filing a report with the prothonotary setting forth the property of
defendant in the garnishee's possession. Id. rules 1266(a), 1267(a).
The attachment can be dissolved upon the filing of a bond in double the
amount of plaintiffs claim, or such lesser amount as the court may direct, or upon
depositing security in the amount of plaintiff s claim plus probable interest and costs.
Id. rule 1272(a)-(c). The attachment may also be dissolved if the plaintiff fails to
prosecute the action with due diligence. Id. rule 1272(f). Part of the attached property
may be released if the court, after notice and hearing, determines that its value is
excessive compared to the amount in controversy. Id. rule 1272(h).
6. 392 F. Supp. at 1391. Both garnishees were Pennsylvania corporations with
offices in Allegheny County. Id.
7. Id. at 1391-92. The substituted security consisted of $50,000 worth of six
percent notes. Id.
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maintaining that the Pennsylvania foreign attachment procedures were
unconstitutional." The district court granted Dollar's motions," and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit'"' affirmed, holding that
the Pennsylvania summary procedures for foreign attachment were
unconstitutional and lacking in fundamental fairness in that they failed to
provide sufficient procedural safeguards, such as notice to the defendant
prior to the attachment and an opportunity for a prompt hearing to
challenge the attachment, to protect a prospective defendent against
wrongful seizure. Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123 (3d. Cir.
1976).
Foreign attachment is the process used to obtain jurisdiction over in-
state property of an out-of-state debtor in order to adjudicate a claim or to
obtain satisfaction of a debt.1' It has been said that the original purpose of
foreign attachment, which gives the court jurisdiction over the property but
not the debtor, was to compel the defendant to appear and submit to the
court's jurisdiction in order to defend his property. '2 Foreign attachment is
to be distinguished from the typical "long-arm" statute,'' which is designed
8. 530 F.2d at 1125 n.5.
9. 392 F. Supp. at 1393.
10. The case was heard by Chief Judge Seitz and Judges Gibbons and Rosenn.
Judge Rosenn wrote the majority opinion and Judge Gibbons filed a concurring
opinion.
11. 392 F. Supp. at 1386. The origin of foreign attachment can be traced through
early colonial statutes to that part of the law merchant known as the Custom of
London. See Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1921); Comment, Creditors
Remedies: Foreign Attachment Held to Meet Due Process Requirements, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 396, 397 & n.4 (1972).
12. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 107-08 (1921). Jurisdiction obtained through
attachment is characterized as "quasi in rem" - that is, a state has jurisdiction over
property within its borders, regardless of the residence or presence of the owner. Id.
Quasi in rem jurisdiction extends to tangible and intangible property alike.
Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271 (1917). "Foreign attachment is a
proceeding quasi in rem .... The only essentials to the exercise of the state's power
are presence of the res within its borders, the seizure at the commencement of
proceedings, and the opportunity of the owner to be heard." Id. at 271-72 (citations
omitted).
Prior to 1963 the federal courts had no original quasi in rem jurisdiction,
although an action commenced by attachment was often removed from state to
federal court. See Rorick v. Devon Syndicate, Ltd., 307 U.S. 299 (1939). A 1963
amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure corrected this deficiency. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 4(e). For a thorough discussion of the concept of quasi in rem jurisdiction,
see Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARv. L. REV.
303 (1962).
13. Long-arm statutes generally provide for substituted service of process on
nonresident defendants whose contacts with the forum state meet the requirements of
the statute. These contacts may include causing tortious injury within state borders,
e.g., VA. CODE § 8-81.2 (Supp. 1975), or contracting to supply services or things in the
forum state, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 223A, § 3 (West Supp. 1976-77), or
producing, manufacturing, or distributing goods with a reasonable expectation of
consumption in the forum state, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §33-411(c)(3) (West
Supp. 1976).
The Pennsylvania long-arm statute provides that any foreign corporation
doing business in the commonwealth without registering with the Department of
State is conclusively presumed to have designated the Department as its attorney to
accept service of process in any action arising in the commonwealth. 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. app. 2 § 8302(a) (Supp. 1974). "Doing business" is defined as the commission of
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to obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who has sufficient contact
with the forum state to justify other than personal service of process.14
Foreign attachment is a summary procedure, providing the defendant-debtor
with no notice or opportunity to be heard before his property is seized or
attached.15
Although other prejudgment summary procedures in the debtor-creditor
context, such as garnishment of wages 6 and replevin of household goods,17
have, in recent years, been successfully attacked on procedural due process 18
grounds because they failed to provide adequate safeguards against
a single act or a series of similar acts for the purpose of realizing pecuniary benefit,
the shipping of merchandise directly or indirectly into or through the commonwealth,
engaging in any business or profession within Pennsylvania, and owning, using or
possessing real property located in the commonwealth. Id. § 8309(a).
Service of process is effected by sending a copy of the complaint to the
Department of State and to the defendant by registered or certified mail; service is
deemed sufficient even if defendant refuses to sign the receipt or cannot be found at
his last known address. Id. § 8307.
In Jonnet, Dollar was not amenable to service of process under the long-arm
statute because obtaining mortgages on real property is expressly excepted from the
definition of "doing business." Id. § 8309(c). See also Trachtman v. T.M.S. Realty &
Financial Servs., 393 F. Supp. 1342 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (since mortgage exception was
intended to facilitate flow of capital into Pennsylvania, exception held inapplicable to
acquisition of mortgage financing in Pennsylvania for purchase of New Jersey real
estate).
14. The Pennsylvania provisions, outlined in note 13 supra, have been upheld as
not offending traditional concepts of fair play and substantial justice. Miller v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 394 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Keene v. Multicore Solders,
Ltd., 379 F. Supp. 1279 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
15. In Pennsylvania, the attachment process is initiated by the filing of a
praecipe (see note 5 supra), which need only specify the property to be seized. PA. R.
Civ. P. 1255. Indeed, the praecipe may be filed up to five days prior to the filing of the
complaint in the action. Id. rule 1265.
16. Sniadich v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969). For a discussion of
Sniadach, see note 25 infra.17. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-91 (1972). For a discussion of Fuentes, see
notes 26 & 27 infra.
18. The concept of procedural due process, as distinguished from substantive due
process, is derived from the fifth amendment guarantee that "[nlo person shall ... be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
V; Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272(1856). The fourteenth amendment makes this guarantee applicable to the states. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The content of procedural due process has been sensitive to the flux of history.
In 1863, the Supreme Court noted that "[p]arties whose rights are to be affected- are
entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be
notified." Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863). That central meaning of
procedural due process has been flexible enough to apply in a variety of contexts. See,
e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (due process requires informal hearing before
suspension of high school students is effected); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778(1973) (due process requires hearing in probation revocation proceedings); In re
Witship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (due process requires that guilt of juvenile accused of a
crime be proved beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a preponderance of the
evidence); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (due process requires a hearing prior
to termination of welfare benefits); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (due
process requires states to recognize right to trial by jury in criminal cases in which the
right would have existed were they to be tried in federal court).
Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized the flexible nature of procedural
due process protection: "The very nature of due process negates any concept of
[Vol. 22
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wrongful deprivation of the debtor's property, the constitutionality of the
Pennsylvania foreign attachment procedures was upheld by the Tlird
Circuit as recently as 1972 in Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Finance Corp.19
Although it described the foreign attachment statute as "authoriz[ing] the
issuance of a writ without notice to the defendant, without any hearing,
without an affidavit of meritorious action, without the posting of a bond,
and without intervention by a judicial officer," 20 the Lebowitz court
supported its result by relying upon Ownbey v. Morgan,2' a 1921 case in
which the Supreme Court 'upheld a foreign attachment statute which
prevented the entry of an appearance by a defendant except upon posting a
special bail. 22 Thus the Jonnet court was requested to reconsider the validity
inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation." Cafeteria
& Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). However, the Court
has pointed out that flexibility "does not mean that judges are at large to apply it to
any and all relationships .... [Niot all situations calling for procedural safeguards
call for the same kind of procedure." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).The fundamental fairness content of procedural due process has been traced
from the Magna Charta through this country's conception of general public good
based upon principles of liberty and justice. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 537(1884). However, the fundamental fairness standard has not been without its critics,
notably Mr. Justice Black, who voiced his antagonism in a series of classic dissents.
For example, in his dissent in Goldberg v. Kelly, Justice Black stated:
To realize how uncertain a standard of "fundamental fairness" would be, one has
only to reflect for a moment on the possible disagreement if the "fairness" of the
procedure in this case were propounded to the head of the National Welfare
Rights Organization, the president of the national Chamber of Commerce, and
the chairman of the John Birch Society.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 277 n.7 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black
also noted:
This decision is thus only another variant of the view often expressed by
some members of this Court that the Due Process Clause forbids any conduct that
a majority of the Court believes "unfair," "indecent," or "shocking to their
consciences." Neither these words nor any like them appear anywhere in the Due
Process Clause.
Id. at 276 (citations omitted). Notwithstanding the opinion of Justice Black, the
prevailing view appears to be that expressed by the trial court in Jonnet: "[W]hat is
not fair is not due process." 392 F. Supp. at 1392-93 n.6.
19. 456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972). Lebowitz involved an
attachment of the defendant-foreign corporation's bank accounts by a former
employee, a Pennsylvania resident, who alleged wrongful discharge. 456 F.2d at 980.
Although recognizing that the corporation might be critically impaired in its ability to
defend the lawsuit since 40% of its assets were tied up by the attachment, the Third
Circuit concluded that preseizure notice would defeat the primary purpose of the
attachment, i.e., to compel the appearance of a nonresident defendant. The court
reasoned that, if given notice, the defendant could remove the property from thejurisdiction before the seizure could be effected. Id. at 981. Further, the court
considered the case to be controlled by Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), noting
that "[any reexamination of [Ownbey's] continuing vitality ... must come from the
Supreme Court." 456 F.2d at 982. For a discussion of Ownbey v. Morgan, see note 22
and accompanying text infra.
20. 456 F.2d at 980. Notably, Lebowitz was decided before Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972), which is discussed at notes 26 & 27 infra.
21. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
22. Id. at 107. Although the attachment procedure itself was not attacked in
Ownbey, the Court approved it in dictum, stating:
A procedure customarily employed, long before the [American] Revolution, in the
commercial metropolis of England, and generally adopted by the States . ..
cannot be deemed inconsistent with due process of law, even if it be taken with its
1976-1977]
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of Pennsylvania's foreign attachment procedures in light of the Supreme
Court decisions since Lebowitz.
The Third Circuit began its analysis with an examination of the Supreme
Court's most recent excursions into the area of due process.23 After discussing
the rule announced in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.24 that a debtor must
be given notice and a hearing before his wages can be garnished by a creditor, 25
the court examined Sniadach's progeny, including Fuentes v. Shevin,26 which
set forth the rule that, except in extraordinary situations, 27 notice and a
hearing must precede any deprivation of property; 2 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co.,29 in which the dissenters in Fuentes rallied a new majority which applied
its own balancing of interests analysis 30 and found that the sequestration
ancient incident of requiring security from a defendant who after seizure ...
comes within the jurisdiction and seeks to interpose a defense.
Id. at 111.
23. 530 F.2d at 1126.
24. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
25. Id. at 342. In Sniadach, Wisconsin's prejudgment garnishment statute was
declared unconstitutional because it denied procedural due process to the defendant-
debtor. One-half of Sniadach's wages had been garnished to satisfy a claim of money
owed on a promissory note. Id. at 338. Justice Douglas' majority opinion emphasized
that wages were a specialized type of property, the deprivation of which could impose
tremendous hardship upon the wage earner and his family. Id. at 340-42. Justices
Black (dissenting) and Harlan (concurring) filed separate opinions that continued
their longstanding personal dispute over whether the concept of fundamental fairness
should be a continually evolving doctrine shaped by the judiciary or whether due
process should take its content solely from the specifics of the Constitution. Id. at 342,
344.
26. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). In Fuentes, the prejudgment replevin provisions of Florida
and Pennsylvania, used to regain possession of household goods sold under
conditional sales contracts, were held unconstitutional. The four-man majority
determined that in the -absence of a strong governmental reason requiring prompt
action, notice and a hearing should precede such a seizure. Id. at 90-91; see note 27
infra.
27. The Fuentes Court enumerated the elements present in extraordinary
situations that justify the postponement of notice and an opportunity to be heard as
follows: "First . . . the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important
governmental or general public interest. Second, there has been a special need for
very prompt action. Third, the State has kept strict control over its monopoly of
legitimate force." 407 U.S. at 91.
Notably, perhaps, there were two vacancies on the Court at the time Fuentes
was argued on November 9, 1971. Therefore, only seven justices participated in the
decision, three of whom dissented.
28. 407 U.S. at 96-97.
29. 416 U.S. 600 (1974). In Mitchell, the Court upheld a Louisiana trial judge's
order to sequester the household goods of a debtor who had defaulted on an
installment sale contract. Id.
. 30. 416 U.S. at 607-10. The Court's precise language was that the Louisiana
procedures had "reached a constitutional accommodation of the respective interests of
buyer and seller." Id. at 610. The Court determined that the seller's interests were two:
1) preventing the risk that his security interest in the goods would be "steadily and
irretrievably eroded" if possession were delayed until after a full hearing could be held
and 2) preventing the buyer from transferring possession of the goods which would
extinguish the seller's lien under Louisiana law. Id. at 608-09. The buyer's interests
were held to be of less magnitude than the seller's because, even "assuming that there
-is real impact on the debtor from loss of these goods, pending the hearing on
possession, his basic source of income is unimpaired." Id. at 610.
5
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procedures:" under attack adequately protected the debtor from wrongful
attachment;32 and, finally, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,33 in
which the Court, relying heavily upon Fuentes, again struck down a
garnishment statute34 because it failed to include the provisions found
necessary to protect the debtor's interests in Mitchell.35 Thus, the Jonnet court
was faced with a perplexing line of procedural due process cases in an area
closely analogous to foreign attachment.
Before applying these due process precedents to the facts presented in
Jonnet, the court confronted the issue of whether Ownbey v. Morgan 6 was
controlling, conceding that if so, it might be read to mandate the continuing
validity of the Pennsylvania foreign attachment procedures.3" Although the
case had apparently been favorably cited in Sniadach, Fuentes, and
Mitchell, The Third Circuit nonetheless concluded that Ownbey had lost its
31. LA. CODE CIv, PRO. ANN. art. 3501-3576 (West 1961). Sequestration is
available to a plaintiff who claims ownership or right to possession of property and
the defendant has the power "to conceal, dispose or waste the property ... during the
pendency of the action." Id. art. 3571. The process is begun by filing an affidavit
setting forth specific facts. Id. art. 3501. The debtor is entitled to seek immediate
dissolution of the writ, at which time the creditor is put to proof of the grounds for his
claim. Id. art. 3506. Also, the debtor may regain possession by filing his own bond
which must exceed by one fourth the lesser of the property value or the amount of the
claim. Id. art. 3508.
Notably, the statute permits a court clerk to issue the writ in all parishes but
Orleans (where this case arose) where the approval of a judge is required. Id. art. 281-
283; see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 608 (1974). For a discussion of the
uniqueness of Louisiana's sequestration procedures, see Millar, Judicial Sequestration
in Louisiana: Some Account of Its Sources, 30 TUL. L. REv. 201, 233 (1956).
32. 416 U.S. at 618. The Court concluded that there was "far less danger here that
the seizure will be mistaken" and that the "system seeks to minimize the risk of error
of wrongful ... possession" and "protects the debtor's interest in every conceivable
way." Id.
33. 419 U.S. 601 (1975). Here the plaintiff-creditor garnished the corporate
defendant's sizable bank account, alleging an indebtedness due and owing for goods
sold and delivered. Id. at 603-04. The Court rejected plaintiffs characterization of
Fuentes and Mitchell as cases turning on the presence of consumers who were victims
of adhesion contracts and who might be irreparably damaged by the deprivation of
necessities, thus refusing to distinguish among different kinds of property in applying
due process standards. Id. at 608.
34. GA. CODE §§ 46-101 to -703 (repealed 1976). The statute provided that the
plaintiff or his attorney must file with the court clerk an affidavit stating the amount
claimed and that there is reason to apprehend the loss of the property unless it is
garnished. Id. § 46-102. The defendant could dissolve the garnishment by filing a
bond. Id. § 46-401. However, wages could not be garnished until after final judgment
in the proceeding was rendered. Id. § 46-101. In 1976, Georgia enacted garnishment
procedures that comported with the Di-Chem mandate. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-101
to -605 (Supp. 1976).
35. 419 U.S. at 607. The Court noted that the Georgia statute failed to require 1)
an affidavit of specific facts showing plaintiffs entitlement to attachment, 2)
approval by a judge, 3) an immediate hearing after seizure, and 4) dissolution of the
writ unless plaintiff proved the grounds on which the attachment issued. Id.
36. 256 U.S. 94 (1921); see note 22 and accompanying text supra.
37. 530 F.2d at 1128.
1976-1977]
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vitality and should be limited to its historical setting. :" The court determined
that the recent citations of Ownbey did not purport to endorse all aspects of
the decision, but rather served only to highlight the proposition that, as a
matter of due process, notice and a hearing need not precede foreign
attachments. : With Ownbey aside, the vitality of the Lebowitz precedent
was easily extinguished by the Court so as to permit a reexamination of'
Pennsylvania's foreign attachment procedures in light of the recent
Supreme Court expositions on due process.
The court then elected to apply the Mitchell-Di-Chem balancing of
interests analysis to the Pennsylvania procedures.40 After purportedly
weighing a plaintiffs interests in establishing jurisdiction in a desired
forum4! and restraining a res within the control of the court for the
satisfaction of the claim42 against a defendant's interests in maintaining
control over his property and defending the lawsuit, 43 the court found that
only the plaintiffs interests were served by the foreign attachment
procedures as drawn, and that insubstantial protection against wrongful
seizure was provided for the defendant.4
Specifically, the court found five deficiencies in the foreign attachment
procedures: 1) a creditor's ability to effect the attachment up to five days
before filing a complaint, with no requirement to specify supporting facts,
afforded no protection against frivolous claims;4 5 2) since the statute
permitted the writ of foreign attachment to be issued by the prothonotary,
there was no exercise of judgment by an official of professional competence
38. Id., citing Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969). The court
further explained that "[tihe citation in Fuentes and Mitchell [was] no more than an
example of a situation in which pre-seizure hearing is not required." 530 F.2d at 1128;
see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600,613 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,
91 n.23 (1972).
39. 530 F.2d at 1128.
40. The Third Circuit did not apply the Fuentes extraordinary situation analysis,
but noted that whether the "strict governmental control over the use of force" theory
of Fuentes or the balancing of interests approach from Mitchell and Di-Chem was
applied, the analysis would be the same. 530 F.2d at 1129 n.13. Other cases have held
that all seizures of property incident to the establishment of quasi in rem jurisdiction
meet the Fuentes extraordinary situation requirements. Tucker v. Burton, 319 F. Supp.
567 (D.D.C. 1970); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42
(1971). But see Tucker v. Burton, 319 F. Supp. 567, 572 (D.D.C. 1970) (Wright, J.,
dissenting). The district court in Jonnet applied the Fuentes analysis and found that
the strict control element was not satisfied. 392 F. Supp. at 1392-93; see note 27 supra.
41. 530 F.2d at 1129. For a further discussion of jurisdictional attachment when
alternative means of acquiring jurisdiction over the defendant exist, see note 69 and
accompanying text infra.
42. 530 F.2d at 1129.
43. Id. The court noted that the necessity of contesting in an "inconvenient
forum" might weaken a defendant's ability to seek dismissal, summary judgment, or
settlement. Id. It has been argued that the only situation where attachment without
notice is constitutionally justified is where the sole objection of the prospective
defendant is forum non conveniens and no other means of acquiring jurisdiction exist.
See Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements, 82 YALE L.J.
1023, 1035-36 (1973).
44. 530 F.2d at 1129.
45. Id. The court stated that due process requires that the complainant file an
affidavit setting forth the facts of the underlying claim and its amount and that the
defendant be a nonresident owning specific property in the state. Id.
[Vol. 22
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to determine if a valid claim had been pleaded;46 3) since there was no
provision for indemnity for wrongful attachment, a defendant was unable to
recover damages if, in fact, he was a resident or if the claim was frivolous or
perjurious;47 4) although a defendant could be harmed by an attachment,
there was no early post-attachment opportunity provided to contest its basis
in a proceeding short of a full trial;48 and 5) there were no means provided
for a defendant to'dissolve the attachment.49
Judge Gibbons filed a concurring opinion in which he asserted that due
process required that a nonresident debtor have certain minimum contacts
with the forum state before a court became empowered to exercise
jurisdiction over his property.5 0 Reasoning that the Supreme Court had
made clear that these minimum contacts were necessary to enable a state to
assert jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident,5 1 Judge Gibbons would
have taken the next logical step and held that these same minimum contacts
were required in order to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident's property.52
It is submitted that both the Third Circuit's declaration that Pennsylva-
nia's foreign attachment procedures do not comport with present notions of
due process and its repudiation of the Lebowitz decision were long overdue.
Lebowitz had been roundly criticized for its reading of Sniadach's citation of
Ownbey to justify quasi in rem seizure in all situations;5 3 indeed, Ownbey
46. Id. at 1129-30. The court specified that, in order to satisfy due process, an
official with some degree of discretionary power - not mere ministerial power - must
review the affidavit and approve the issuance of any writ. The court did not mandate
judicial participation in the process, even though Mitchell and Di-Chem might be read
to require such participation. Id. at 1130 n.15. Indeed, the Third Circuit noted that
"[tihe concern clearly is that the official making the required determinations exercise
some discretion and possess the necessary professional competence." Id.
47. Id. The court required that such protection be afforded by bond or otherwise.
48. Id. The court read Mitchell and Di-Chem as requiring a prompt post-
attachment hearing, in which the plaintiff must show both the probable validity of
his claim and that the defendant is a nonresident. Id.
49, Id. Although declining to endorse a specific procedure for dissolving the
attachment, the court did suggest such alternatives as the filing of a reasonable bond,
the substitution of other property as security, and the entry of a general appearance.
Id. The court specified that the procedure adopted should not prejudice the plaintiff's
interests. Id.
50. Id. at 1139-42 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 1137, citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Judge Gibbons asserted that the search for a fictional situs of intangibles, as
evidenced in Steele v. G.D. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 958 (1974), and Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969), was no substitute for minimum contacts analysis in a
quasi in rem case. 530 F.2d at 1137-38. Indeed, he unequivocally stated that the due
process clause required minimum contacts analysis as a basis for justifying the
exercise of raw judicial power. Id. at 1139.
52. 530 F.2d at 1139-42. Judge Gibbons further argued that since Pennsylvania
had abolished general attachment of residents' property, the foreign attachment
device discriminated against nonresidents in violation of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. Id. at 1142-43.
Judge Gibbons raised this same concern in his concurring opinion in
Lebowitz, but there he felt bound by the Ownbey precedent. See 456 F.2d at 982-83.
53. See, e.g., Comment, Creditors Remedies: Foreign Attachment Held to Meet
Due Process Requirements, 57 MINN. L. REV. 396 (1972); Note, Quasi in Rem
Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements, 82 YALE L.J. 1023, 1026 (1973).
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had been called "one of the more egregious injustices of modern times." 54
Certainly, the growing reach of procedural due process logically embraces
the Jonnet result because
as the influence of government in modern society becomes increasingly
pervasive and essential, and as the role of the individual becomes
increasingly impersonal and powerless, the need to maintain effective
limits upon the power of the state also increases.
The due process clause is one such limit. The constitutional ideal of
due process of law should cherish fair treatment for the individual more
than incremental accretions of group welfare. 55
While it is this bright line between emphasis on what is fair to the
individual and emphasis on what is in the public or state interest that the
Jonnet court consciously but cautiously crossed, the process employed is
analytically troublesome.
First, since the court did not consider applicable the Fuentes rule
requiring preseizure notice and hearing, the result of postponing notice and
hearing until after seizure appears to tacitly assume that the facts present
an extraordinary situation as defined in Fuentes.5 6 Despite the fact that the
district court in Jonnet, in a well-reasoned opinion, had held that the
extraordinary situation criteria were not met,57 the Third Circuit instead
looked to Mitchell for its analytic framework and overlooked the fact that
the result in Mitchell was reached only after the Supreme Court distin-
guished Fuentes on the following basis: Fuentes involved creditors with no
rights in the seized goods, but the Mitchell creditors held vendors' liens in
the sequestered property which were present rights recognized under state
law as concurrent with the debtors' interests.58 Arguably, Mitchell was
improperly applied by the Third Circuit since the Jonnet fact situation was
more closely analogous to Fuentes and fitted the distinction drawn in
Mitchell. 9
Second, it is submitted that the Third Circuit should have distinguished
foreign attachment from any other prejudgment summary procedure and
applied the Fuentes requirement of preseizure notice and hearing. 60 The
54. Currie, Attachment and Garnishment in the Federal Courts, 59 MICH. L. REV.
337, 379 (1961).
55. Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on
the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1543 (1975).
56. See note 27 supra.
57. 392 F. Supp. 1392-93; see note 27 supra.
58. 416 U.S. at 604. In Fuentes, the creditors garnished wages in which they had
no security interest comparable to the vendors' liens in Mitchell.
59. The Jonnet plaintiffs had no security interest in the debts owed to Dollar
comparable to the vendors' liens in Mitchell. See 530 F.2d at 1125.
60. It is suggested that to apply instead the Mitchell analysis in Jonnet further
perpetuates the case-by-cape evaluation of creditor's summary remedies in a field
that raises serious questions of raw judicial power to exercise jurisdiction. In view of
the relative ease of providing that jurisdictional attachment be preceded by notice and
hearing under Fuentes, it is submitted that the Third Circuit has unnecessarily
opened itself to the kind of criticism levelled at Mitchell. Indeed, one commentator
has analyzed the Mitchell case and its progeny as follows: "The Burger Court's
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obstacle to that result evidently was that instead of disregarding Ownbey
altogether, the court read the recent citations to it, particularly in Mitchell,
as the Supreme Court's imprimatur that preseizure notice and hearing are
not necessary in jurisdictional attachment.6' Such an interpretation is
undermined by the Mitchell court's rationale for postponement of a hearing
until after seizure: the issues raised at the post-seizure hearing were
uncomplicated matters susceptible of documentary proof. 62 In the instant
case, however, as in many foreign attachment prcIceedings, the issues were
widely variant from those attending a simple debtor-creditor relationship.
For example, the Jonnet plaintiffs had the burden of proving not only their
contractual relationship with Dollar, but also the debts due Dollar from the
third party garnishees. Also, something more than delinquency in payment
was involved in that legal questions spanning breach of contract and
unliquidated damages were raised by the alleged failure to honor the
mortgage commitment. Thus, those complex issues are likely to increase the
risk that a writ of foreign attachment will be issued wrongfully, at least by
comparison with the questions attendant to the sequestration procedures
approved in Mitchell.63
Third, although the Jonnet court identified the competing interests at
stake in jurisdictional attachments, the process by which the balance was
struck was not articulated. 64 Despite its arguable consistency with the Di-
Chem checklist approach,6 5 Judge Rosenn's opinion leaves many unans-
wered questions because of its failure to examine the relative merits of the
interests advanced. For example, there was no discussion of the weight
accorded the plaintiffs' asserted interest in having available a fund out of
which the plaintiffs could collect a judgment. 66 Providing such security in a
quasi in rem action seems inconsistent with the practice in a case where the
court has personal jurisdiction. There the plaintiff must normally obtain a
judgment before he is permitted to exercise any control over the defendant's
performance .. .has been technically inadequate and indeed, to the extent that the
Court has been relying on essentially untutored, quasi-legislative judgments of what
is proper in particular settings, evokes memories of what was deficient in the days of
substantive due process." Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival of
Substantive Due Process, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 261, 288. For a discussion of substantive
due process theories, see G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 548-57 (9th ed. 1975).
61. See notes 22 & 38 and text accompanying notes 22, 38 & 39 supra.
62. 416 U.S. at 609. The matters to be proved were the existence of the debt, the
vendor's lien, and the debtor's delinquency in payment. Id.
63. The Third Circuit did attempt to delimit the issues to be adjudicated at the
post-attachment hearing in much the same way as the Mitchell Court had. See notes
48 & 62 supra. Arguably, proof of the probable validity of plaintiffs claim would go
beyond matters susceptible of documentary proof.
64. 530 F.2d at 1129. The court merely concluded that the defendant's interests
were not sufficiently protected. Id.
65. 419 U.S. at 607. The majority in Di-Chem compared the statutory provisions
under attack there with those upheld in Mitchell on an item by item basis. Id. Only
Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Di-Chem weighed the interests of the
parties and found that lack of a prompt and adequate post-attachment hearing was
the most compelling deficiency in the statutory scheme. Id. at 610, 613-14.
66. 530 F.2d at 1129.
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property.67 To allow seizure of a fund without prior notice and a hearing to
satisfy a possible judgment in one type of action and not the other seems
anomalous. Furthermore, the court suggests, but does not develop, the idea
that substantial weight should be given to the defendant's interest in
defending the lawsuit in his home forum68 since being forced to defend in an
inconvenient forum might significantly weaken his position. It is submitted
that mandating a post-seizure hearing on the probable validity of the
plaintiffs claim does not accurately reflect the weight of the true interests
identified by the court. To the contrary, it would seem that, based on
Fuentes, only preseizure notice and hearing would provide fundamental
fairness for the respective interests of creditor and debtor alike.
Finally, the court did not reach an important issue raised in Lebowitz,
namely whether foreign attachment is unconstitutional when an alternative
method of acquiring jurisdiction is available.6 9 Instead, the court carefully
limited its holding to the conclusion that, in the case of foreign attachment,
due process can be satisfied only by a statutory scheme that embodies
certain safeguards against wrongful seizures.70 Thus, even if the state
legislature reworks the statute to conform with Jonnet, it may be faced with
a subsequent judicial mandate to prohibit use of the procedures if another
basis for jurisdiction exists.7
The impact of Jonnet is immediate in that use of the foreign attachment
device in Pennsylvania must be discontinued until procedural safeguards
-67. See DeBeers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 218, 220-21
(1945) (sequestration order to prevent antitrust defendants from removing property
from jurisdiction prior to judgment denied). Certainly, since there appeared to be little
risk of removal of the property from the jurisdiction in Jonnet, the fact that Dollar
was not amenable to process under the long-arm statute and therefore plaintiff would
have had to bring suit in New York arguably did not outweigh the potential harm to
Dollar caused by the attachment and loss of control over its property.
68. 530 F.2d at 1129. It has been suggested that a court, in order to improve the
interest balancing approach, should analyze the functional characteristics of each
procedure required by due process and should abandon the-balancing approach where
the government cannot demonstrate that withholding procedural safeguards is
necessary to protect the rights of others. Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by
Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1510,
1542 (1975).
69. See 456 F.2d at 981-82. Stating that the issue of whether foreign attachment
is unconstitutional when an alternative basis of jurisdiction is available was not
presented, the Jonnet court intimated no view as to the merits of the argument. 530
F.2d at 1129 n.14. That this issue is likely to require early resolution seems clear from
at least one recent case. In Simkins Indus., Inc. v. Fuld, 392 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Pa.
1975), decided less than two months prior to the district court decision in Jonnet, the
defendant counterclaimed for malicious prosecution citing plaintiff's wrongful use of
foreign attachment when service of process could have been effected under the long-
arm statute. Id. at 128. Judge Bechtle rejected the argument and declined to hold the
foreign attachment procedures unconstitutional in view of Lebowitz. Id.
70. 530 F.2d at 1130. Only Judge Gibbons, in his concurring opinion, advocated
holling, as an alternative basis for the decision, that ex parte foreign attachment
procedures were per se unconstitutional. Id. at 1131 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
71. Furthermore, it is possible that statutory procedures conforming with Jonnet
might be later held unconstitutional in light of the Fuentes rule requiring preseizure
notice and hearing. Also, it is possible that the Pennsylvania legislature might-go
beyond the Jonnet mandate and require notice and hearing to precede jurisdictional
attachment.
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are written into the statute. It also seems likely that Jonnet will provide the
impetus for invalidations of other summary attachment procedures that do
not provide for a prompt post-attachment hearing or for issuance of the writ
by a professionally competent official. Specifically, the Third Circuit's break
from the Ownbey precedent may spur challenges to foreign attachment
statutes of other states. However, without guidance from the Supreme Court,
the outcome of future challenges to the procedure will depend upon case-by-
case adjudication, particularly since the troublesome underlying question of
whether jurisdictional attachment is consistent with current notions of due
process remains unanswered. 72
In conclusion, although the Jonnet court followed the impetus provided
by analogous Supreme Court cases involving summary procedures other
than foreign attachment, it is arguable that it did not go far enough.
However, that the Third Circuit would so readily reverse its view of the
constitutionality of procedures it upheld a mere four years ago is consistent
with the dynamic and subjective nature of the concept of fundamental
fairness embodied in procedural due process.
Gary L. Bragg
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - COMMERCIAL SPEECH.- MUNICIPALITY'S
INTEREST IN PRESERVING RACIALLY STABLE NEIGHBORHOOD IS
SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION FOR OVERRIDING ANY INCIDENTAL
INFRINGEMENT ON FREE SPEECH BY ORDINANCE PROHIBITING "FOR
SALE" AND "SOLD" SIGNS.
Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro (1976)
The township council of Willingboro, New Jersey, adopted an ordinance
barring the erection of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs on residential
properties.1 Plaintiffs, Linmark Associates, Inc., a New Jersey corporation
owning residential property in Willingboro, and Linmark's real estate
broker, filed suit alleging, inter alia, that the ordinance violated their right
to free speech under the first amendment to the United States Constitution.2
72. See note 18 supra. For a discussion of the argument that seizure is not
necessary to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction when service of process can be
effected under a long-arm statute, see Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court
Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241, 268-69, 277.
1. Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786 (3d Cir.), cert.
granted, 97 S. Ct. 351 (1976). The passage of the ordinance was stimulated by a "fear
psychology" developing among the Willingboro residents that a number of "For Sale"
or "Sold" signs in an area would create a negative impression upon potential
purchasers, thus affecting the value of property and leading to a major change in the
racial make-up of the community. 535 F.2d at 789-91; see note 38 infra.
2. 535 F.2d at 789. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
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The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey invalidated
the ordinance 3 on the ground that it was violative of the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and the right to travel.4 On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit5 reversed, holding that the
prohibition of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs on residential property does
not violate first amendment rights of free speech where the prohibition
promotes the valid state interest of maintaining racially integrated
neighborhoods and forestalling "panic" selling. 6 Linmark Associates v.
Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 351
(1976).
The "privileged position" of freedoms guaranteed by the first amend-
ment is well settled.7 Accordingly, a statute or ordinance which impinges
upon the first amendment right to free speech cannot stand unless the
government can prove an overriding interest in maintaining the restriction."
Certain categories of speech, however, have been accorded lesser degrees of
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The constitutionality of the ordinance was also attacked on the grounds
that it violated the fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments. 535 F.2d at 789.
3. 535 F.2d at 792 n.5. The text of the district court decision, although not
reported, was reprinted in full in the circuit court opinion. Id.
4. Id. at 789. The district court found that the ordinance brought about a
"serious denial" of an owner's right to "freely and reasonably express to others [his]
desire to sell" his property. Id. at 792 n.5. Although plaintiffs did not challenge the
ordinance as an infringement of the right to travel, the lower court nonetheless found
such an infringement because it believed that, without the signs to guide them to
available property, potential buyers would be at the mercy of realtors who could
promote segregation by "steering" blacks to predominantly black neighborhoods and
whites to predominantly white neighborhoods. Id. The Third Circuit, however, held
that the ordinance did not infringe upon the right to travel. Id. at 804.
5. The case'was argued on October 31, 1975, before Judge Markey, Chief Judge,
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (sitting by designation), and Judges Gibbons
and Weis. Judge Markey wrote the majority opinion, and Judge Gibbons authored the
dissent.
6. Although the court did not define panic selling, one court has characterized it
as selling which occurs "when a resident who is otherwise disposed to remain in a
neighborhood succumbs to any one or more of a number of pressures to move out
when it appears that a minority racial group is beginning to enter." Barrick Realty,
Inc. v. City of Gary, 354 F. Supp. 126, 135 (N.D. Ind. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir.
1974).
7. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). In Schneider, the Court, in
invalidating municipal ordinances forbidding the distribution of literature in the
streets, characterized freedom of speech and of the press as "fundamental personal
rights and liberties." Id. at 161.
8. The Supreme Court has "consistently held that only a compelling state
interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to
regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms." NAACP v. Buttons, 371
U.S. 415, 438 (1963). However, it has long been settled that first amendment rights are
not absolute. See, e.g., Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (upholding
ordinance forbidding door-to-door solicitation of magazine subscriptions); Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (defendant convicted of criminal anarchy for
publication and distribution of a "Manifesto" teaching that organized government
should be overthrown). For a discussion of the various tests applied by the Court in
measuring the extent of permissible governmental control, see Brennan, The Supreme
Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1965).
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protection and have been deemed to require less of an overriding interest on
the part of the governing body to be abridged. 9 Thus, in determining
whether and to what extent specific speech may be regulated the Supreme
Court has distinguished "pure speech" from conduct combining "speech"
and "nonspeech" elements, holding that, in the latter case, a sufficient
governmental interest in restraining prohibited conduct will justify an
incidental impingement upon the speech element of the conduct.10 The Court
has also held that even though speech in a public area may be protected by
the first amendment, a valid governmental interest in the public health,
safety, and welfare may justify regulation of the time, place, and manner of
the expression. 1
Speech characterized as "commercial" was' apparently placed in a
separate, less protected category in 1942 when the Court decided Valentine
v. Chrestensen.1 2 In that case, the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting
the public distribution of advertising handbills on the ground that speech
contained in "purely commerical advertising," as opposed to speech
"communicating information and disseminating opinion,"1 3 was not
9. In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), the Court
stated: "The question whether speech is, or is not, protected by the First Amendment
often depends upon the content of the speech.. . . Even within the area of protected
speech, a difference in content may require a different governmental response." Id. at
66. For categories of speech held to be unprotected, see, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (libel); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (incitement); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words). See generally Shaman, Revitalizing
the Clear-and-Present-Danger Test: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 22 VILL. L. REV. 60 (1976).
10. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), the Court, in reversing a conviction
for disturbing the peace and obstructing public passages during a protest march,
distinguished between the communication of ideas by "pure speech" and by "conduct
such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways." Id. at 555.
Perhaps the clearest analysis of the distinction appears in United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968). In that case, defendant burned his draft card in a gesture of
protest and was subsequently convicted of violating a law prohibiting such
destruction. Id. at 369-70. Upholding the conviction, the court found that the
government had a substantial interest in regulating the conduct, which was unrelated
to the supression of free expression of ideas. Id.; see Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576,
581-83 (1967) (flag-burning conviction set aside since it could have been based upon
his words as well as his acts).
11. In Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1948), which upheld a New Jersey ordinance
prohibiting the use of amplification devices on public streets, Justice Reed, while
recognizing that city streets are "a normal place for the exchange of ideas by speech
or by paper," cautioned that "this does not mean the freedom is beyond all control."
Id. at 87. The governmental justification for the restriction was found to be "the need
for reasonable protection in the homes or business houses from the distracting noises
of vehicles equipped with such sound amplifying devices." Id. at 89; see Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding ban on willful making of any noise,
on ground adjacent to a school, which disturbs the good order of school session); Cox
v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1940) (state law requiring licensing of parades or
processions on public streets held not to deny the right of assembly or communication
oT thought).
12. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
13. Id. at 54. Ordinances restricting or regulating the means of distributing
commercial advertisements had previously been upheld as a valid exercise of the
state's police power. See Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. City of New York, 221 U.S. 467 (1911);
Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
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forbidden by the Constitution.' 4 Later decisions, however, have narrowed
the commercial-noncommercial distinction1 5 and have focused instead upon
the nature of the message contained in the advertising. Thus, while not
disputing Chrestensen's validity, the Court held in New York Times v.
Sullivan'6 that an allegedly libelous advertisement seeking support for a
civil rights organization was protected by the first amendment.1 7 Although
conceding that the placing of the advertisement in the newspaper was
clearly a commercial transaction, the Court found the message to be
sufficiently different from that in Chrestensen"' to merit first amendment
protections. 9
Applying the Sullivan test in Bigelow v. Virginia," the Court found a
newspaper advertisement for out-of-state abortions to contain protected
speech because it was not "purely" commercial.2I The Court distinguished
14. 316 U.S. at 54.
15. In Cammarino v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959), Justice Douglas, a
member of the Court which unanimously decided Chrestensen, observed: "The
[Chrestensen] ruling was casual, almost offhand. And it has not survived reflection."
Id. at 514 (Douglas, J., concurring). Similarly, in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,
418 U.S. 298 (1974), Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and
Powell, stated: "There is some doubt concerning whether the 'commercial speech'
distinction announced in Valentine v. Chrestensen . . . retains continuing validity."
Id. at 314 n.6. (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a critical discussion of the commercial
speech doctrine, see Gardner, Free Speech in Public Places, 36 B.U. L. REV. 239 (1956).
See generally Redish, The First Amendment in the Market Place: Commercial Speech
and Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971); Note, Freedom of
Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARV L. REV. 1191 (1965).
16. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Sullivan, the Court reversed a judgment awarded to a
public official of Montgomery, Alabama, who brought a libel action against endorsers
of a full-page advertisement attacking police action allegedly directed against
students who participated in a civil rights demonstration. Id.
17. Id. at 265-66.
18. Unlike Chrestensen's handbill, which advertised a submarine tour, the
Sullivan advertisement "communicated information, expressed opinion, recited
grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a
movement whose existence and objectives are matters of highest public interest and
concern." Id. at 266.
19. Id. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's analysis of the Chrestensen
doctrine up to Sullivan, see 60 VA. L. REV. 154, 156-58 (1974). Nearly 10 years after
Sullivan, the Court demonstrated that the commercial speech doctrine still had
vitality. In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376 (1973), newspaper help-wanted advertisements in sex-designated columns were
attacked as violative of a local ordinance prohibiting sex-based discrimination in
employment. Id. at 379-81. The Court labeled the advertisements "classic examples of
commercial speech," as that term was used in Christensen and expanded in Sullivan,
and thus not protected under the first amendment. Id. at 385. Dicta in Pittsburgh
Press suggests" the erosion of the commercial speech doctrine, culminating in Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (see note
24 infra). The Court in Pittsburgh Press conceded the possible weakness in the
commercial speech doctrine, but characterized the defendant's suggestion that it be
abrogated as "unpersuasive in this case," thus revealing perhaps the true basis of
decision - that "[d]iscrimination in employment is not only commercial activity, it is
illegal commercial activity under the Ordinance." 413 U.S. at 388 (emphasis in
original). For a critical analysis of the Pittsburgh Press decision, see 38 ALB. L. REV.
847 (1974).
20. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
21. Id. at 822. In Bigelow, The Court overturned the conviction of the editor of a
Virginia weekly newspaper which had published an advertisement offering abortions
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Chrestensen as merely upholding a "reasonable regulation of the manner in
which commercial advertising could be distributed"22 and concluded that
while commercial speech may be regulated, the public interest underlying
such regulation must still be found by a court to outweigh the harm caused
by the restriction on a constitutionally protected right in order for the
regulation to be valid.23
The Supreme Court's most recent formulation of the commercial speech
doctrine is contained in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council,24 a case which was decided after the instant
case and which made explicit the rejection, implied in Bigelow, of the notion
of unprotected commercial speech. 25 Although specifically rejecting any
contention that commercial speech lies outside first amendment protec-
tions,2 the Court nevertheless suggested that some form of regulation,
particularly time, place, and manner restrictions, might still be valid in
appropriate cases .
27
In determining whether the ordinance challenged in Linmark impinged
upon a constitutionally protected right, the Third Circuit examined the
nature of the message in the prohibited signs, the purpose and effect of the
prohibition, and its relation to the public welfare. 2 Beginning with the
general proposition that statements contained in signs are subject to a
in New York City. Id. at 829. The editor had been charged with violation of a state
statute making it a misdemeanor to encourage the procurement of an abortion. Id. at
811-15. The Court stated: "To the extent that commercial activity is subject to
regulation, the relationship of speech to that activity may be one factor, among
others, to be considered in weighing the First Amendment interest against the
governmental interest alleged. Advertising is not thereby stripped of all First
Amendment protection." Id. at 826.
22. Id. at 842. The Court stated that Chrestensen "obviously does not support any
sweeping proposition that advertising is unprotected per se." Id.
23. Id. at 826. The Bigelow Court declined to decide the extent of constitutional
protection afforded the "varying degrees" of commercial advertising "under all
circumstances and in the face of all kinds of regulation." Id; see Note, Free Speech
and the Regulation of Labeling and Advertising, 30 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 512, 518-
19 (1975); 24 EMORY L.J. 1165 (1975); 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 852 (1975); 60 VA L. REV. 154
(1974).
24. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In that case, the Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's declaration of invalidity, under the first and fourteenth amendments, of a
Virginia statute forbidding any advertisement of prices of prescription drugs by
licensed pharmacists. Id. at 770.
25. Id. at 760. The Court explained: "Some fragment of hope for the continuing
validity of a 'commercial speech' exception arguably might have persisted because of
the subject matter of the advertisement in Bigelow. . . . Here, in contrast, the question
whether there is a First Amendment exception for 'commercial speech' is squarely
before us." Id.
26. Id. at 770. While agreeing that first amendment protection extends to
commercial speech, the Court suggested that a "different degree of protection" is
appropriate because of the "greater objectivity and hardiness" of advertising. Id. at
771 n.24.
27. Id. at 770-71. Indeed, the Court explicitly approved time, place, and manner
restrictions "provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, that they serve a significant governmental interest, and that in so
doing they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information." Id; see note 11 and accompanying text supra.
28. 535 F.2d at 786.
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commercial speech-pure speech analysis,2 9 the court determined that,
although signs normally consist of pure speech which conveys a message or
thought,30 the message contained in the Linmark signs was primarily
commercial in nature in that each sign did no more than propose a
commercial transaction. 31 Deeming this commercial aspect to be "non-
speech," the court discussed the applicability of United States v. O'Brien,32
which held that a governmental interest sufficient to regulate the nonspeech
element of conduct will justify incidental limitations upon pure speech.33
However, the court rejected that approach and returned to its consideration
of the line of cases dealing. with commercial speech, 34 reasoning that
Willingboro was not regulating the nonspeech but was forbidding the signs
altogether. 35 The court concluded, after discussing the commercial speech
precedents, 36 that commercial speech, while accorded some measure of first
amendment protection, could validly be restricted if outweighed by a
legitimate public interest. 37
Examining the nature of the township's interest, the court defined the
purpose of the ordinance as being to "nip panic selling in the bud" thus
preventing the resultant rapid resegregation and establishment of ghetto
areas. 38 In endorsing the validity of this purpose, the court relied upon
29. Id. at 794-95. According to the court, pure speech consists of "the
advertisement of opinion, information and ideas." Id. at 794.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 795. A "For Sale" sign was said to state "the owner's and the realtor's
commercial desire to sell that residence" and a "Sold" sign, to state "the commercial
fact that the residence has been sold." Id. These "visible messages" were construed by
the court to be analogous to the handbills prohibited in Chrestensen. Id. at 796.
The court also considered additional messages conveyed by the "For Sale"
sign - that "the owner is leaving this residence" - and the "Sold" sign - "the owner
has left this residence," id. at 795, but treated them as incidental to the primarily
commercial impact conveyed. Id.
32. 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see note 10 and accompanying text supra.
33. 535 F.2d at 795.
34. For an analysis of the development of the commercial speech doctrine, see
notes 12-27 and accompanying text supra.
35. 535 F.2d at 795.
36. Id. at 795-96.
37. Id. at 796.
38. Id. at 798. The purported purpose of the ordinance was to enhance "racial
stability" by preventing "panic selling," which would lead to resegregation in
Willingboro, a "racially open community" of 45,000 residents. Id. at 789-90. Although
the number of nonwhite residents increased from approximately 12% to 18% of the
population between 1970 and 1973, the increase did not result in the formation of any
racially segregated areas. Id. at 789. Because of its location near several military
installations, Willingboro's population tended to be transient, and at the time of suit
82 realtors were competing for business there. Id. at 790. Thus, a large number of
realtors' signs were often concentrated in a limited area, tending "to create the
impression that many people were leaving the community." Id. This, in turn,
allegedly fostered a "fear psychology" among Willingboro's residents which resulted
in panic selling. Id. Therefore, in response to complaints about "the 'forest' of signs,
which created the impression that 'there was something wrong with the commun-
ity,'" the township council adopted the ordinance. Id. at 791.
In Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969), the court
traced the development of fear psychology which led to panic selling on a single-
family residential street in suburban Atlanta. Id. at 1237-38. In Brown, the spread of
panic was forestalled and the block "stabilized" by the efforts of the plaintiffs. Id. at
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Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary,39 in which the Seventh Circuit
recognized as a valid public interest the avoidance of a panic-selling
psychology and its resegregative effects. 40 According to the Third Circuit,
the existence of such a motive in the instant case was evidenced by the fact
that the township council had carefully investigated the need for and effects
of the ordinance prior to its passage.4 1
With regard to the effects of the ordinance, the lower court had
concluded that potential purchasers would be unapprised of available
housing and would thus be forced to use real estate brokers, who in turn
would "steer" blacks from white neighborhoods; 42 the Third Circuit rejected
this conclusion as "unsupported," because alternative means, such as
newspaper ads, were available.43 Finally, the district court's concern for the
1238. For a description of the effects of panic selling on a community, see note 40
infra.
39. 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974). As did Willingboro, the city of Gary adopted an
ordinance banning residential "For Sale" signs in response to a panic selling
psychology which was causing the social and economic breakdown of the affected
neighborhoods. Id. at 163-64. As evidence of the similarity of the situations, Judge
Markey, in Linmark, quoted the following language from Barrick:
The history of the ordinance banning "For Sale" signs shows that it was aimed at
panic selling and that its purpose was to halt resegregation. . . . Plaintiffs' signs
proposed a commercial transaction that is part of a pattern of transactions, all of
which taken together lead to a result that the City of Gary can properly try to
prevent.
535 F.2d at 799, quoting Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d at 163-64.
40. 491 F.2d at 163-64. The detrimental effects of panic selling by white residents
were already being felt in Gary at the time its ordinance was passed, 491 F.2d at 162,
whereas the Willingboro ordinance was purportedly passed in an attempt to halt the
resegregative effect of "white flight" before it became irreversible. 535 F.2d at 798. The
district court found this factual distinction to be controlling. Id. at 792 n.5. The Third
Circuit, however, found this distinction immaterial, partly because of the recently
passed Federal Fair Housing Act, which prohibits, inter alia, the mere attempt to
encourage "white flight," and partly because of the desirability of preventing
segregation rather than remedying segregation once it has developed. Id. at 800,
citing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (Supp. V 1975).
A narrower concept, closely related to panic selling, is blockbusting, defined
as "the practice of directly inducing or persuading an individual to sell his home by
representation as to the entry into his neighborhood of blacks or other minority
groups." Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 354 F. Supp. 126, 134-35 (N.D. Ind.
1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974).
The various social harms caused by blockbusting and panic selling, such as
depressed property values, crime, and overcrowding, are well documented. See Note,
Blockbusting: Judicial and Legislative Response to Real Estate Dealers' Excesses, 22
DE PAUL L. REV. 818 (1973); Note, Blockbusting, 59 GEO. L. J. 170 (1970).
41. 535 F.2d at 799. The court found:
[T]he Township Council did not act rapidly or capriciously or arbitrarily herein. It
waited two years to act. It investigated. It consulted. It held two public meetings.
It exercised its unanimous judgment, in carrying out its prescribed duty, on the
basis of its experience with the panic-selling threat to the community.
Id.
42. Id. at 802-03. As the Third Circuit pointed out, however, signs posted by
brokers do not offer alternative channels of information directing purchasers away
from brokers. Id. at 802. No evidence was offered comparing the percentage of homes
sold through brokers prior to or after the ordinance, so the actual effect on purchasers'
reliance upon brokers was unknown. Id. at 792.
43. Id. at 802. Testimony revealed that approximately 30% of the inquiries to
realtors resulted from "For Sale" signs. Id. at 792. Thus, concluded the Third Circuit,
18
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"possibility of collusive racial discrimination in the sales process" w~ls
criticized as "speculative" and "premature." 44
On balance, then, the township's interest in maintaining a stable,
integrated community was found by the Third Circuit to outweigh the
realtors' right to disseminate their commercial message, thus legitimizing the
manner and place limitations upon the message in issue.45 However, Judge
Gibbons, dissenting strongly, found it unnecessary to reach the commercial
speech issue because of his conclusion that the sign prohibition violated the
fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws.46
the effect of banning the signs was, "at most, to slow the pace of sales on the 30% of
inquiries received from signs to that of the other 70% received from other sources." Id.
at 797. The court stressed that "newspaper ads, in-town window displays, or other
possible means of conveying the desire to sell remain fully available to all." Id. The
district court had found, however, that "one who wishes to purchase a home in
Willingboro has no way of learning what is available." Id. at 792 n.5.
44. Id. at 803. Noting the absence of any evidence of discrimination or of a
"black" section to which black purchasers might be "steered," the Third Circuit
refused to recognize "steering" as an immediate threat. Id. at 803-04. The fact that
Willingboro homes were listed with 82 Multiple Listing Service realtors, some of
whom were black, required, in order to effectuate the district court's fears of collusive
racial discrimination, a "massive conspiracy" which the Third Circuit would not
accept as more than a remote possibility "so unlikely as to require strong evidence
before acceptance." Id.
45. Id. at 805. Although the district court opined that Willingboro's goals could be
"more narrowly achieved," id. at 792 n.5., it offered no specific suggestions as to
possible means. Whether a narrower remedy could be validly construed is at least
questionable in light of decisions such as DeKalb Real Estate Bd., Inc. v. Chairman &
Bd. of Comm'rs, 372 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Ga. 1973), in which an ordinance prohibiting
the posting of "For Sale" signs by brokers, while permitting such posting by
homeowners, was held to violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of
the laws. Id. at 754-55. But see Burk v. Municipal Ct., 229 Cal. App. 2d 696, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 425 (1964) (ordinance proscribing erection of "For Sale" signs by realty
companies if they identified themselves on the sign was a valid exercise of police
power). In the instant case, "For Sale" and "Sold" signs were permissible on model
homes, because the "invisible message" - that the neighborhood was undergoing a
change - was not present in such signs. 535 F.2d at 800.
46. 535 F.2d at 811-13. Concluding that the legislative purpose and the likely
impact of the ordinance were "to discriminate against racial minorities by
'stabilizing' the non-white population of Willingboro at not more than 20 percent," the
dissent characterized its adoption as "invidious discrimination of the most pernicious
sort, against a discrete and insular minority." Id. at 811.
Subsequent to Judge Gibbons' analysis, the United States Supreme Court, in
Arlington Heights. v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977), established
that evidence of racially discriminatory motivation is required to prove violation of
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. Id. at 563. The Court suggested
that evidence of such an invidious discriminatory purpose could be found in the
impact of the official action and the historical background of the legislative decision.
Id. 564-65. In finding a discriminatory purpose and effect in passage of the
Willingboro ordinance, therefore, Judge Gibbons' conclusion would survive the
stricter test of Arlington.
An additional criticism by Judge Gibbons was that first amendment rights
cannot be impinged by a community's zoning power. 535 F.2d at 814. This line of
reasoning, however, has questionable vitality since the Supreme Court's decision of
Young v. American Movie Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), which held that regulation of
the place where adult movies may be exhibited does not offend first amendment
rights. Id. at 71-73.
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Nevertheless, he criticized the majority for misapplying the facts4 7 and
confusing the "commercial speech" and "speech-nonspeech" doctrines. 48
In holding that commercial speech is accorded some degree of first
amendment protection, the Linmark decision was consistent not only with
existing precedent but also with the Supreme Court's subsequent disposition
of the commercial speech doctrine in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy.49 It
is submitted, however, that the dissent was correct in asserting that the
majority, in reaching its own conclusion, blurred "the salient differences"50
between various doctrines of free speech regulation. A careful analysis of the
Linmark opinion reveals that the court's reliance upon the "speech-
nonspeech" line of cases 51 was misplaced, because that line of authority
holds that conduct may be restricted, where appropriate, even though the
restriction necessarily results in an incidental limitation upon speech.5 2 In
the instant case, however, after the limitation upon noncommercial speech
was deemed "incidental,"5 3 the majority posited that the purpose of the
ordinance was actually to censor the unspoken messages in the signs, i.e.,
"the owner is leaving his house," 54 and not to halt the conduct involved in
displaying the sign. It could, of course, be suggested - although the court
did not do so - that the conduct restricted by the ordinance was an
incitement to panic selling, and that the township's interest in restricting
this conduct justified an incidental limitation upon the advertising
contained in the signs.
47. 535 F.2d at 805. The dissent agreed with the district court's conclusion that
the primary motivation behind the ordinance was to "perpetuate existing racial
balance and arrest the growth of Willingboro's non-white population," which had
grown to approximately 20% of the total Willingboro population by the time the
ordinance was enacted. Id. at 806. In addition, the dissent argued that the
municipality's stated purpose of "preserving stability" in the neighborhood was a
transparent effort to prevent the migration of minorities into the community and
thereby to preserve the existing racial balance. Id. The majority, however, explicitly
rejected this proj~osition and defined "stability" as the "diminution of the number of
neighbors leaving on the basis of fear alone," and not "the maintenance of a given
numerical ratio of white to non-white persons in the community." Id. at 797.
48. Id. at 813-16. In disagreeing with the majority, Judge Gibbons argued that
the cases involving "incidental limitations" on speech mixed with conduct (see note
10 supra) were "not at all apposite to the fdcts at hand." 535 F.2d at 813.
Characterizing those cases as permitting an incidental restriction on "speech" where
justified by a "paramount governmental interest in regulating non-speech," he
sharply distinguished the instant case as one in which "the shackle upon speech can
hardly be dignified as incidental." Id. Furthermore, Judge Gibbons read Bigelow (see
notes 20-23 and accompanying text supra), as laying to rest "once and for all the
notion that Valentine v. Chrestensen placed commercial advertising in the category
of unprotected speech." Id. at 815.
49. 425 U.S. 748 (1976); see notes 24 & 25 and accompanying text supra.
50. 535 F.2d at 813 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); see note 48 and accompanying text
supra.
51. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
52. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); note 10 supra.
53. 535 F.2d at 795.
54. Id. at 800. Thus, while asserting that regulation of commercial speech resulted
in only incidental limitations upon any noncommercial message, the court neverthe-
less recognized that the ordinance was purposefully directed at limiting the "invisible
message" that people were leaving. Id.
1976-1977] 625
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Although the court's initial construction of the Willingboro ordinance as
primarily limiting the commercial, nonspeech element in the signs5 5 may
have validity, the court seemed to be on firmer ground when it turned for
support to the line of authority which holds that, given a weighty
governmental interest, the state may regulate the time, place, and manner of
public expression.5 6 Whatever may be the status of the commercial speech
doctrine after Virginia State Board of Pharmacy,5 7 the right of a city to
regulate the manner of distribution of advertising, if a valid interest in the
regulation can be demonstrated, is not in doubt.58
Additional support for the Linmark court's conclusion may be found in
the seemingly well-settled right of a community to restrict the forum of
advertising, given a sufficient governmental interest.59 In Packer Corp. v.
Utah,60 which upheld an ordinance forbidding billboard and street car
advertising of cigarettes while permitting the same in newspapers and
periodicals, the Supreme Court stated: "In the case of newspapers and
magazines, there must be some seeking by the one who is to see and read the
advertisement. The radio can be turned off, but not so the street car
placard." 6'
Although a residential front yard is not a "public forum" in the sense of
being open to all members of the community, it would seem that the Packer
rationale would apply in that a "captive" audience of passers-by cannot
"turn off' the message forced upon it by a sign posted in the yard. Nor does
it seem likely that a Linmark regulation would be forbidden under the
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy6 2 decision, since the regulation struck
down in that case was totally exclusionary, prohibiting advertising of
pharmaceutical products in any forum.
6 3
55. Id. at 795.
56. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
57. 425 U.S. 748 (1976); see notes 24-27 and accompanying text supra.
58. In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, the Court stated: "Whatever may be the
proper bounds of time, place, and manner restrictions on commercial speech, they are
plainly exceeded by this Virginia statute, which singles out speech of a particular
content and seeks to prevent its dissemination completely." 425 U.S. at 771.
59. In this connection, the Supreme Court, in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1938),
noted that the communication of opinions and views in public places may be
subordinated "to the general comfort and convenience" but must not "be abridged or
denied." Id. at 516. However, the absence of reasonable and effective alternative
channels of communication may lead to the finding of a first amendment violation.
See, e.g., Terry v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1975)
(California statute prohibiting media advertising of prescription drug prices violated
first amendment despite other means of access, such as viewing posted prices at
various stores and telephone calls, since they would be significantly less effective).
See generally Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup.
CT. REV. 1.
60. 285 U.S. 105 (1932).
61. Id. at 110. One commentator has posited that "the liberty to control the
direction of one's own attention without importunate interference by others is perhaps
the most essential of all possible liberties." Gardner, supra note 15, at 240. However,
Packer is possibly distinguishable from the Linmark situation because the Court
upheld the ordinance, at least partly, because of the authority of a state to regulate the
business of selling tobacco products. 285 U.S. at 110.
62. 425 U.S. 748 (1976); see notes 24-27 supra.
63. 425 U.S. at 752.
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Regardless of the Linmark court's approach, it is submitted that its
conclusion, based upon a balancing of the party's interests, is sound. The
plaintiffs, out-of-town realtors and a corporation holding rental property in
Willingboro, 64 were clearly interested in benefiting their own business
objectives. It is difficult to impute segregative motive to Willingboro, which
could boast of actively encouraging a racially balanced community for over
ten years.6 5 In light of Barrick,66 in which the attempts of Gary, Indiana to
reverse the rapid resegregation which accompanied a "panic selling
psychology" occurred after the effects were extant,67 Willingboro should not
be faulted for foreseeing and acting to prevent the potential resegregative
effects of the "For Sale" and "Sold" signs.68 In addition, in considering the
dissent's equal protection argument that the passage of the ordinance was
"invidious discrimination" against a "discrete and insular minority, '69 it is
not clear how the plaintiffs in Linmark could even assert that they were
among the class of persons discriminated against in order to establish
standing to bring suit.7 0
Thus, Linmark has significant precedential value in its sanctioning of a
community's effort to halt a developing panic-selling psychology among
homeowners by eliminating "For Sale" and "Sold" signs in residential
areas. By deferring to the community's own evaluation of the situation,71 the
Third Circuit recognized the reality that often there are local forces affecting
community life which cannot properly be evaluated in the analytical
atmosphere of a courtroom. Thus, the majority accepted the township's
stated purpose of forestalling panic selling.72 The question remains,
however, as to the disposition of a similar ordinance if its real purpose were
in doubt.
Diane E. Ambler
64. 535 F.2d at 789.
65. 535 F.2d at 789; see note 38 supra.
66. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
67. 491 F.2d at 164-65.
68. See note 40 supra.
69. 535 F.2d at 811; see note 46 supra.
70. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1974), in which the United States
Supreme Court defined the minimal constitutional requirement for a federal court to
invoke its jurisdiction to be that "'plaintiff himself " must have suffered "'some
threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action.'" Id. at 499,
quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973).
71. 535 F.2d at 801. As Judge Markey explained:
When a fact of human experience, such as panic selling, is recognized and acted
against by those on the firing line in the community, we the more cloistered
should not interpose our conjectures regarding motive to stifle such action, in the
absence of clear evidence of violation of fundamental constitutional rights.
Id.
72. Id. at 798-99. The court was particularly impressed with Willingboro's history
of good racial relations and its past affirmative efforts to integrate. Id. at 803.
1976-1977]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - PRIOR RESTRAINT OF FREE SPEECH -
PROTECTIVE ORDER FORBIDDING DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
OBTAINED OUTSIDE THE COURT PROCESSES CONSTITUTES A PRIOR
RESTRAINT IN VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND IS SUBJECT TO
WRIT OF MANDAMUS.
Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp. (1976)
Plaintiffs,' who were black employees of United States Steel Corpora-
tion (U.S. Steel) and members of Local 1397, United Steelworkers of America
(Local), instituted a class action2 in 1971 against U.S. Steel, the Local, and
the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO (Union), alleging racial
discrimination and seeking injunctive relief and back pay under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 3 In January 1976, subsequent to a Third Circuit
decision on a collateral issue, 4 defendants moved for permission to make a
tender of back pay, to members of the class pursuant to two nationwide
1. The action was brought in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania on behalf of more than 1200 black workers at United States
Steel Corporation's Homestead, Pennsylvania plant. Rodgers v. United States Steel
Corp., 508 F.2d 152, 155 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 969 (1975).
2. 508 F.2d at 155. The parties stipulated that the class would be defined as
follows: for purposes of monetary liability, all black persons who had been or would
have been employed at the plant from August 24, 1971 until May 1, 1973 on jobs
represented by Local 1397; for purposes of injunctive relief, all such blacks who
actually worked in the plant at any time after August 24, 1971 on jobs represented by
Local 1397. Id.
3. Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001, 1002 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976).
Plaintiffs' claims were based upon sections 703(a) and 703(c) of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-2(c) (Supp. V 1975). Section 703(a)
prohibits discrimination by an employer in hiring, discharging, compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, as well as segregation or classification of
employees or applicants for employment based upon race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. Id. § 2000e-2(a). Section 703(c) prohibits discrimination by a labor
organization against its members or applicants for membership upon the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. § 2000e-2(c).
Plaintiffs also asserted a claim under section 16 of the Civil Rights Act of
1870, which provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
4. In 1975, the Third Circuit granted plaintiffs a writ of mandamus vacating a
district court order which had required prior judicial approval of communications
between plaintiffs, their attorneys, and third parties. Rodgers v. United State Steel
Corp., 508 F.2d 152 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 969 (1975). For a further discussion
of the holding in the first Rodgers case, see note 26 infra.
5. 536 F.2d at 1003-04. Since the acceptance of back pay would require a release
of the individual class member's claim (see note 7 infra) the district court viewed the
tender as a settlement which required court approval under rule 23(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 536 F.2d at 1004. Rule 23(e) provides: "A class action shall
not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the
proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e); see Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate
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consent decrees 6 filed in the Northern District of Alabama in 19747 which
had resulted from negotiations between the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), the major steel companies, and the Union.8 To prepare
for a he~ring on the fairness and adequacy of the settlement, plaintiffs
soughf to depose the government's chief negotiator 9 concerning the method
used to calculate the back pay fund.'0 Although the deposition was held over
.1
Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974), noted in The Third
Circuit Review, 20 VILL. L. REV. 528 (1975) (court approval of settlement of class
action alleging sex discrimination held not an abuse of discretion even though only a
small percentage of back pay was offered and more than 20% of plaintiff class
objected).
6. A consent decree has been defined as "[a]n agreement of the parties under the
sanction of the court . . . in the nature of a solemn contract." United States v.
Hartford Empire Co., 1 F.R.D. 424, 426 (N.D.,Ohio 1940) (emphasis supplied by court).
It is negotiated in the same manner as a contract, binds both parties, and may be
vacated for similar reasons, such as fraud in its procurement. Swift & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 310, 324 (1928).
A consent decree differs from a contract in that it is treated as a judicial
decree, so that either party may seek modification despite the objection of the other
party if the modification is needed to further the purpose of the decree. See Chrysler
Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556 (1942). Furthermore, a consent decree has a res
judicata effect, barring subsequent suits between the same parties on the same
controversy. See Standard Oil Co. v. Clark, 163 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
333 U.S. 873 (1948).
7. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., No. 74-P-339-S (N.D. Ala.,
filed Apr. 12, 1974); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 63 F.R.D. 1, 3
(N.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd, 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 1684 (1976).
Chronologically, the nationwide consent decrees were filed in Alabama on
April 12, 1974; the first Rodgers petition for mandamus (see note 4 supra) was granted
by the Third Circuit on February 21, 1975; and the petition for mandamus that gave
rise to the opinion in the principal case (see notes 14-21 and accompanying text infra)
was granted on June 3, 1976.
Consent Decree I was in the form of an injunction with respect to matters
previously affected by collective bargaining, while Consent Decree II enjoined those
aspects of employment which were company-controlled and not subject to collective
bargaining. Under the latter, "[t]he companies [were] generally enjoined from any
form of employment discrimination and [were] obligated to institute a program of
affirmative action with respect to hiring, initial assignments, and management
training programs, as well as affirmative recruitment of minorities." 63 F.R.D. at 3.
Furthermore, Consent Decree I provided for the establishment of a potential back pay
fund of $30.9 million, with guidelines for calculation and disbursement to individual
aggrieved employees. Id. It also provided for revamped rules in the seniority system;
for new procedures for transfers, promotions, vacancies, layoffs, and recalls, along
with affirmative action guidelines and goals; and for committee oversight of
implementation and enforcement at both the local and national levels. Id.
The consent decrees did not purport to bind any employee by res judicata, but
as a condition to acceptance of back pay, employees were required to sign releases
waiving any rights to further relief based upon pre-decree practices by defendants. 536
F.2d at 1003.
8. 536 F.2d at 1003. The EEOC is empowered to prevent unlawful employment
practices and is required to investigate charges thereof. In addition, "[i]f the
Commission determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause to
believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such
alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, concilia-
tion, and persuasion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975).
9. Robert T. Moore, an attorney with the Civil Rights Division of the United
States Department of Justice, was the chief negotiator for the EEOC and the
Secretary of Labor in the negotiations that culminated in the consent decrees. 536
F.2d at 1004.
10. Id.
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defendants' objections,1' the district court issued a protective order 12
prohibiting plaintiffs' counsel from disclosing any information contained in
either the transcript of the deposition or a Justice Department memorandum
on the same subject which apparently had been written by the deponent and
which had come into the possession of plaintiffs' attorney. 13
Plaintiffs petitioned the Third Circuit for a writ of mandamus and/or
prohibition arguing, inter alia, that the order violated the first amendment
of the United States Constitution 4 as it amounted to a prior restraint of the
speech of plaintiffs' counsel. 15 Defendants maintained that the order was
not unconstitutional; 16 that the information was privileged;' 7 that even if it
was not privileged, mandamus was not a proper remedy;' 8 and that
disclosure of the information would discourage both frank negotiations and
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1005 n.8. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) empowers the federal
courts to issue orders to protect a party or person from "annoyance, embarassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense," including orders that the discovery not
proceed, that specific matters not be examined, and that "a trade secret or other
confidential research, development or information not be disclosed." FED. R. Civ. P.
26(c).
The order in the principal case provided in pertinent part:
[C]ounsel for the Plaintiffs shall not disclose or disseminate the content of any
information or matters contained in (a) the deposition of Robert T. Moore . . .
which relate to the negotiation of the Consent Decrees entered in U.S. v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., or in (b) the document marked as Exhibit 3 to said
deposition, until further order of court.
536 F.2d at 1005 n.8. Exhibit 3 was a Justice Department memorandum, apparently
written by Moore, containing information similar to that which Moore had given in
his deposition. Id. at 1004-05.
The district court also impounded the transcript and the memorandum. Id. at
1005 & n.8.
13. 536 F.2d at 1005 n.7.
14. Id. at 1005. The free speech clause of the first amendment provides that
Congress shall make no law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
15. 536 F.2d at 1005. Plaintiffs also argued that the order denied them due process
because it prevented their counsel from communicating relevant information to them
and other class members; that it discriminated against them in that it only prevented
their counsel, and not defendants' counsel, from disclosing the information; that it
exceeded the court's jurisdiction since counsel's conduct in other cases was regulated;
and that it was an abuse of discretion because the information was of utmost
importance to the class members in their decision on whether or not to accept
defendants' offer. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. Defendants asserted four privileges: 1) common law negotiation; 2)
attorney-client; 3) attorney's work-product; and 4) statutory privilege. Id. at 1004. The
assertion of statutory privilege was based upon section 706(b) of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which provides:
Nothing said or done during and as a part of such informal endeavors [to
eliminate alleged unlawful employment practices] may be made public by the
[Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission, its officers or employees, or used
as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without the written consent of the persons
concerned.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975).
18. 536 F.2d at 1005. Even though a ruling may be erroneous, mandamus is not a
proper remedy as long as the ruling is within the proper scope of the district court's
jurisdiction. Id. See also Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152, 161 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 969 (1975).
[Vol. 22.
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voluntary settlement.19 The Third Circuit 20 granted plaintiffs' petition, 21
holding that mandamus was a proper remedy to vacate an order which
violated the first amendment rights of plaintiffs' counsel as a prior restraint
of freedom of speech, insofar as the order related to information contained in
the memorandum which was obtained through other than court processes.
Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976).
Historically, mandamus has been used as a prerogative writ granted
only when petitioner's remedy at law is inadequate: that is, the writ is
available only when extraordinary circumstances are present.22 Appellate
courts have been held to possess mandamus power against trial courts in
three situations: to aid a court in its potential appellate jurisdiction, 23 to
confine a trial court to the proper sphere of its lawful power,24 and to correct
a court's clear abuse of discretion. 25 However, the power has not been
exercised to control the decisions of a trial judge, even if erroneous, as long
as these decisions are deemed to lie within the judge's jurisdiction. 26 Thus,
19. 536 F.2d at 1005-06.
20. The case was heard by Associate Justice Clark, United States Supreme Court,
Retired (sitting by designation), and Judges Gibbons and Hunter. Judge Hunter wrote
the opinion.21. 536 F.2d at 1009. The statutory grant of power to the federal courts to issue
writs of mandamus is found in the All Writs Statute, which provides in pertinent part:
"The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970).
22. See Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259-60 (1947). See also CBS, Inc. v. Young,
522 F.2d 234, 237 (6th Cir. 1975) (petitioner met the "exceptional circumstances" test
in that it was not a party to the litigation and therefore was not in a position to seek a
remedy by direct appeal); Albert v. United States Dist. Court, 283 F.2d 61, 62-63 (6th
Cir. 1960) (district court judge's decision not to disqualify himself was not subject to
mandamus, which is to be granted only when there is no other legal remedy).
23. See McClelland v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 280 (1910) (mandamus may issue
where case is within appellate jurisdiction of federal court of appeals and district
court's stay of proceedings until after final state court judgment defeats such
appellate jurisdiction).
24. See Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967) (mandamus inappropriate to
compel government in criminal action to disclose names of persons on whom it relied
for oral statements allegedly made by defendant).
25. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Borda, 383 F.2d 607, 608 (3d Cir. 1967) (denial of leave
to depose 71-year-old plaintiff in civil antitrust suit pending determination of related
criminal antitrust action held abuse of discretion and subject to writ of mandamus).
See also Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970), in which the circuit court, in
granting mandamus, reasoned that defendant should not have to assert that a district
court order was violative of his first amendment rights as a defense in a contempt
proceeding for violation of that order, because its validity could not be raised on
appeal, being unrelated to the merits of the underlying criminal prosecution. Id. at
1062. The circuit court stated, therefore, that the district court's order was an abuse of
discretion and subject to mandamus. Id. For a further discussion of Chase, see notes
37 & 64 infra.
26. Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152, 162 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 969 (1975). In the first Rodgers case, the Third Circuit held that it was
beyond the power of the district court to insist upon compliance with a local court rule
aimed at barratry as a condition to further consideration of the motion to certify the
class action. 508 F.2d at 164. The court stated:
We conclude that Congress never intended Rule 83 or [28 U.S.C.] § 2071 to
empower the district courts, as was attempted in Local Rule 34(d) to require prior
judicial approval of communications between plaintiffs, or their attorneys, and
.1976-1977]
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since mandamus would apparently be available if the district court had
exceeded its lawful power by issuing an unconstitutional order, the primary
question facing the Third Circuit in Rodgers was whether the district court's
order prohibiting the disclosure of information amounted to an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint of speech.
Prior restraints of speech - restrictions imposed upon speech or
expression before publication - have been disfavored in Anglo-American
law.2" The Supreme Court of the United States first invoked the doctrine of
prior restraint in Near v. Minnesota,2 which held unconstitutional a
Minnesota statute29 sanctioning the prior restraint of certain publications
constituting nuisances.30 However, the Near Court recognized that excep-
tional circumstances might arise to justify the imposition of a prior
restraint, 31 and subsequent decisions have articulated the standard that a
prior restraint, while not unconstitutional per se, bears a heavy presumption
against its constitutionality. 32
third parties, when such communications seek to encourage common participa-
tion in a lawsuit. Thus, Local Rule 34(d) as presently drawn was outside the power
granted to the district court and its enforcement may be prevented by this court.
Id. However, the Third Circuit did indicate, citing Landis v. North American Co., that
where the district court was merely exercising its discretionary authority in its
decision to stay proceedings pending the resolution of the suit in the Northern District
of Alabama, mandamus would not be appropriate absent a clear abuse of discretion.
Id. at 162 citing Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936).
27. For an extensive history of prior restraint, see Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior
Restraint, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 648, 650-52 (1955). The Third Circuit has
previously examined the historical roots of the doctrine in Alderman v. Philadelphia
Hous. Auth., 496 F.2d 164, 167-70 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1975), noted in
The Third Circuit Review, 20 VILL L. REV. 409 (1975). See also Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697, 713-19 (1931).
28. 283 U.S. 697, 713-19 (1931).
29. Law of April 20, 1925, ch. 285, 1925 Minn. Laws 358 (held unconstitutional in
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)).
30. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Nuisances were defined to include
actions by persons "engaged in the business of regularly or customarily producing,
publishing or circulating . . . a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper,
magazine or other periodical." Law of April 20, 1925, ch. 285, 1925 Minn. Laws 358
(held unconstitutional in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)).
31. 283 U.S. at 716. The Court noted that prior restraints might be permissible if
necessary to protect military operations during war, to stifle obscene publications,
and to counter incitement to violence and the overthrow of the government. Id.
32. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,..558 (1975);
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Organization for a
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 58, 70, 83 (1963); Near v. Minnegota, 283 U.S. 697, 719-20 (1931); New Jersey
State Lottery Comm'n v. United States, 491 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1974), vacated on other
grounds, 420 U.S. 371 (1975), noted in The Third Circuit Review, 20 VILL. L. REV. 463
(1975).
The presumption has rarely been overcome. See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, in which the Court held that informal censorship by a community group
charged with review of material manifestly tending to corrupt youth was an
unconstitutional prior restraint which operated by persuasion and intimidation and
which did not possess the safeguards of the criminal justice process. 372 U.S. at 67, 69.
In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, the United States Supreme Court
held that the denial of a permit to use the municipal theater for a performance of the
musical "Hair" constituted a prior restraint on expression which did not possess the
632 [Vol. 22__
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Specific exceptions to the prior restraint doctrine have been established
subsequent to Near. In New Jersey State Lottery Commission v. United
States,33 the Third Circuit recognized exceptions for nonprotected speech,
34
for restraints imposed by certain entities exempt from the strictures of the
doctrine,3 and for restraints held to be reasonably incidental to the
effectuation of a valid governmental purpose. 36 Several circuits have
recognized an additional exception when circumstances reveal that
disclosure of certain information would constitute a clear and present
danger to the administration of justice, such as endangering the right to a
fair trial.3
7
constitutionally required minimal procedural safeguards. 420 U.S. at 559. The Court
stated: "In order to be held lawful, [the prior restraint] first, must fit within one of the
narrowly defined exceptions to the prohibition against prior restraints, and, second,
must have been accomplished with procedural safeguards that reduce the danger of
suppressing constitutionally protected speech." Id.
In New Jersey State Lottery Commission v. United States, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) had issued a declaratory ruling that the weekly
broadcast of the winning number in the New Jersey lottery violated the Communica-
tions Act. 491 F.2d at 220. The Third Circuit overruled the FCC, holding that the
information was news protected by the first amendment, and that the prohibition was
not within any established exception to the rule against prior restraints. Id. at 222-23.
For a discussion of the exceptions to the prior restraint rule, see notes 34-37 and
accompanying text infra.
33. 491 F.2d 219, 222 (3d Cir. 1974).
34. Id. The obscenity cases are the most obvious examples. In Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973), the Supreme Court, after tracing the history of its own inability to
agree upon a standard for determining what constituted obscene and pornographic
material, stated: "This much has been categorically settled by the Court, that obscene
material is unprotected by the First Amendment." Id. at 23. The sharply divided Court
proceeded to uphold California's criminal obscenity statute as applied to the situation
where sexually explicit materials were thrust upon unwilling recipients. The Court
emphasized that "[t]he First Amendment protects works which, taken as a whole,
have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value regardless of whether the
government or a majority of the people approve of the ideas these works represent."
Id. at 34.
35. 491 F.2d at 222. The substance of this exception includes the state action-
private action definitional dilemma. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972),
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, noted that free speech guarantees are
"limitations on state action, not on action by the owner of private property used
nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only." Id. at 567 (emphasis supplied by the
Court).
36. 491 F.2d at 222. A prime example of this exception is Veterans & Reservists
for Peace in Vietnam v. Regional Comm'r. of Customs, 459 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 933 (1972), in which an unsolicited shipment of literature from North
Vietnam was detained until the addressee obtained a license to trade with the
"enemy." 459 F.2d at 678-79. The Court rejected plaintiffs first amendment claim,
holding that the regulation's impact upon speech was merely incidental to the
program of controlling those property transactions in which the enemy had an
economic interest. Id. at 681.
37. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 240-41 (6th Cir. 1975) (order
restraining parties, relatives, close friends, and associates from discussing case with
news media held not supported by substantial evidence of clear and imminent danger
and petition for mandamus by network granted); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059,
1062 (7th Cir. 1970) (order forbidding counsel for both the government and defendant
draft board raiders from making statements regarding the case held to be an
impermissible prior restraint and a clear abuse of discretion) (see note 25 supra);
United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969)
(contempt conviction for violation of an order forbidding extrajudicial discussion of
28
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With regard to prior restraint based upon court-imposed protective
orders, only the Second Circuit had previously focused upon the judicial-
extrajudicial source problem. In International Products Corp. v. Koons,38 the
court, while recognizing a distinction between information obtained through
court processes and information obtained otherwise, merely suggested that
the failure of a district court to modify its order to reflect that distinction
would constitute grounds for granting a writ of mandamus. 39 Thus, the issue
faced by the Rodgers court of whether an order forbidding disclosure of
information obtained extrajudicially is unconstitutional and thus subject to
the appellate power of mandamus was a matter of first impression.
At the threshold of its analysis, the Third Circuit found that the district
court had apparently accepted the defendants' argument that the informa-
tion sought by the plaintiffs was privileged' 0 and had issued a protective
order which did not distinguish between matters contained in the deposition
the case affirmed on the basis that a reasonable likelihood of a serious and imminent
threat to the administration of justice existed).
It should also be noted that there is some authority to suggest that prior
restraint cases are to be decided by balancing the interests sought to be protected by
the restraint and the individual interest in freedom of expression. See, e.g., the opinion
of Chief Justice, then Circuit Judge, Burger in Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390
F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1968). In Liberty Lobby the court denied an injunction against
publication in a syndicated newspaper column of embarassing letters allegedly stolen
from the files of the appellant lobby organization. Id. at 491. The court stated: "Any
claim which seeks prior restraint on publication bears a heavy burden. The validity of
any such claim depends on a balance of the interests sought to be protected by the
limitation against the injury to free utterance." Id. at 490-91.
The Third Circuit applied a balancing test in Alderman v. Philadelphia Hous.
Auth., 496 F.2d 164 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974), noted in The Third
Circuit Review, 20 VILL. L. REV. 409 (1975), where a public agency's prior restraint on
the speech of its employees was at issue. The Court held that the balance favored free
speech when matched against the government's interest in its public image of
political impartiality. 496 F.2d at 173-74. But cf. United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d
661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969) (right to a fair trial outweighed right to
free speech).
The propriety of a balancing approach to prior restraint problems has been
questioned, however. See Emerson, supra note 27, at 648, where the author notes that
the doctrine of prior restraint "does not require the same degree of judicial balancing
that the courts have held to be necessary in the use of the clear and present danger
test, the rule against vagueness, the doctrine that a statute must be narrowly drawn,
or the various formulae of reasonableness." Id.
38. 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963). For a discussion of the facts in Koons, see note 44
infra.
39. 325 F.2d at 409.
40. 536 F.2d at 1005. Initially, the district court was not impressed with
defendants' privilege argument. Noting specifically that the method used to compute
the back pay offer was neither a lawyer's work product nor privileged negotiations,
the court refused to approve the tender of back pay until the government's chief
negotiator had been deposed. Id. at 1004. After the deposition, however, the court
seemingly acknowledged that the information was in fact privileged, and the
protective order was issued preventing its disclosure. Id. at 1005.
Of the asserted privileges, it would seem that only the attorney-client and the
statutory privileges could have been relied upon by the district court to justify its
order. For a discussion of defendants' privilege argument, see note 17 supra. Based
upon the facts in the record, the Third Circuit concluded that the district court seemed
to have accepted the position that the information concerning the back pay
methodology was privileged. Id. at 1008.
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and those contained in the memorandum.4 Because the district court failed
to distinguish the sources of the information, the Third Circuit refused to
find that petitioners had waived any right to use the information contained
in the memorandum,42 even though the right to use the deposition may have
been waived by participating in the discovery processes.43 The court
specifically declined to decide whether an order prohibiting disclosure of
information obtained solely through court processes was ever subject to
first amendment prohibitions; 44 rather, it focused only upon the prior
restraint of information obtained through other than court processes. 45
The Third Circuit explained that the constitutional question raised by
this prior restraint had to be determined initially because there would
probably be no basis for issuing a writ of mandamus unless the order was
found unconstitutional. 46 The court began its constitutional analysis by
41. Id. at 1006. For the text of the order, see note 12 supra.
42. 536 F.2d at 1006-07.
43. Id. at 1007 n.14. The court drew a distinction between plaintiffs' counsel's
disclosure of the memorandum itself and of the information contained therein,
stating:
Petitioners and their counsel may have waived any rights they might have
had to use the actual document ... by not objecting to the impoundment of the
document below or before this court. . . . [W]e decline to construe that apparent
waiver to extend to the information and matters contained in the memorandum.
... [A] waiver of a constitutional right will not be lightly inferred and every
reasonable presumption against waiver must be indulged.
Id. (citations omitted).
44. Id. at 1006. The court's distinction was based upon International Prods. Corp.
v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963), in which the Second Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of a ban on pretrial publication of information obtained by one party
from another through court processes. Id. at 407. Koons involved a deposition where
questions were asked concerning payments by corporate officers to officials of a South
American government that, if disclosed, allegedly would have been extremely
embarrassing and contrary to the best interests of the United States' foreign policy.
Id. at 404-05. The court issued a protective order which provided in pertinent part:
ORDERED, that the defendants, their attorney, . . . their counsel .... the Bar
Association Reporting Service, and any of their representatives or employees, be
enjoined from publishing or disclosing to any third party any of the testimony,
documents or writing contained or referred to in any of the depositions in the
action or documents or writings produced or submitted to this Court, concerning
payments to officials of any South American Government, but not restricting the
defendants in the use of discovered information, documents or writing, for trial
preparation....
Id. at 404 n.1.
After refusing to review the order as an appeal from an interlocutory
injunction, the Koons court treated the question as a ruling on a motion for leave to
file a petition for mandamus, and expressed its views on the issues by suggesting that
the district court modify its order to exclude any restrictions on the use of information
and writings not filed in court which had come into the parties' possession other than
through the court's processes. Id. at 409.
45. 536 F.2d at 1006. The court assumed arguendo that, had the district court's
protective order pertained solely to information derived from discovery processes, the
order would have been constitutional. Therefore, it focused solely on the order as it
pertained to the memorandum. Id. at 1007.
46. Id. at 1006 n.12. The Third Circuit recognized that a district court possesses a
great deal of discretion to issue protective orders under rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules
1976-1977]
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noting the various exceptions to the prior restraint doctrine 47 articulated in
New Jersey State Lottery.48 The exceptions were summarily rejected as
inapplicable to the principal case.49 The court then dismissed the defend-
ants' privilege argument, stating that it was doubtful that the information
was privileged, but even if it were, the privilege alone would not justify the
prior restraint.50 Finally, the court found that the circumstances surround-
ing the case were not of "such an extraordinary nature" that disclosure of
the information contained in the memorandum would undermine the public
policy favoring informal settlement of such disputes. 51
After this somewhat cursory disposal of defendants' arguments, the
court reached its conclusion through an apparently simple two-step
analysis. To the extent that the order prohibited disclosure of information
obtained outside the court processes, it had to fit within one of the
recognized exceptions to the prior restraint doctrine. Since it did not, the
order was in effect an unconstitutional prior restraint, and as such, was
beyond the power of the district court and subject to the appellate power of
mandamus. 52
of Civil Procedure. Id. For a discussion of rule 26(c), see note 12 supra. Regarding its
need to reach the constitutional issues, the Third Circuit remarked:
[E]ven if the court erred in its ruling on privilege, and we have reservations as to
the correctness of that ruling .... the protective order . . . would clearly have
been within the jurisdiction of that court. And although we consider that order
unnecessarily to deprive petitioners and members of their class of important
information . .. , we doubt that the order, again assuming its constitutionality,
would constitute such a clear cut abuse of discretion or usurpation of power as to
permit issuance of a writ of mandamus.
536 F.2d at 1006 n.12.
47. 536 F.2d at 1007-08. For a discussion of these exceptions, see notes 34-37 and
accompanying text supra.
48. 491 F.2d at 224. For a discussion of New Jersey Lottery, see note 32 supra.
Subsequent to the briefing and argument of the New Jersey Lottery case in
the Supreme Court, but prior to decision, the Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1304
(1970), was amended to exclude broadcasts of information concerning a state-
sponsored lottery; therefore, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded to the
Third Circuit to consider whether the case had become moot. 420 U.S. at 374.
49. 536 F.2d at 1008. In rejecting the exceptions as inapplicable to the facts of
Rodgers, the court merely stated: "In our view, the instant protective order ... does
not fall within any of these exceptions." Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. Indeed, after reviewing the information, the court concluded that it was
not novel and probably was already known or could be developed by those experts in
the area of employment discrimination law. Id.
52. Id. at 1006. The court also stayed the tender of back pay and solicitation of
waivers for 30 days in order to give plaintiffs' counsel time to advise and consult with
the plaintiff class members in evaluating the fairness of the compromise with respect
to the government's back pay methodology and the individual employees' personal
employment history. Id. at 1009. The court expressed concern that without such a
provision the employees would be deprived of the effective use of the information
contained in the memorandum because of the court's unconstitutional order and the
time constraints of the tender. Id. Such a course was adopted after determining that it
would not unfairly burden the defendants. Id.
While defendants also contended that the memorandum had been stolen, the
court stated that a different result would not have been obtained even if that had been
the case. Id. at 1008 n.16.
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Although the Third Circuit's holding appears to follow logically from
the precedents cited, it is submitted that the prior restraint doctrine is not as
precisely defined as the Rodgers decision suggests.5 3 While the historic
underpinnings of the doctrine reach back to 1501 and the concept of
licensing of the press,5 4 the interpretation of first amendment rights vis-A-vis
prior restraint did not commence until relatively recently in Near v.
Minnesota.55 In the short period of time since Near was decided, the doctrine
has developed in a series of spurts given impetus by the exceptions
suggested therein;5 6 indeed, the prior restraint doctrine is a dynamic
concept, not the static, checklist formula applied by the Third Circuit in
Rodgers.57 Although the court looked to New Jersey State Lottery as its own
most recent pronouncement on the prior restraint issue and adopted the
exceptions58 listed therein, the court offered no discussion of why they were
inapplicable to the facts in Rodgers.59 While the nonprotected speech and
private action exceptions were apparently irrelevant to the Rodgers
situation,60 no rationale was given for ignoring the valid governmental
purpose exception, despite defendants' argument that the policy of frank
negotiation and settlement of employment discrimination cases would be
jeopardized by the disclosure of the information.6'
Since the Rodgers court evidently encountered no difficulty in finding
these exceptions inapplicable, the only other avenue to holding the order
constitutional would have been if the disclosure of the extrajudicially
obtained information could have been cast as a threat to the administration
of justice.6 2 However, the court summarily rejected this exception, neither
discussing nor distinguishing the cases cited on this point.63 The court
stated simply that since the trial court had not made a finding that such a
53. For examples of the prior restraint doctrine's broad application, see G.
GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1320-76 (9th ed. 1975).
54. Emerson, supra note 27, at 650-52.
55. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). For a discussion of the Near decision, see notes 28-31 and
accompanying text supra.
56. 283 U.S. at 716.
57. See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957); Freund, The
Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REV. 533, 539 (1951).
58. 491 F.2d at 222. For a discussion of the exceptions to the prior restraint
prohibition, see notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
59. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
60. No obscenity or language presenting a "clear and present danger" was
involved in Rodgers. In addition, it seems clear that since a federal district court
issued the order, the first amendment prohibitions would operate directly upon the
tribunal without the need to invoke the fourteenth amendment, thereby rendering any
state action/private action analysis inapposite. For a discussion of these exceptions,
see notes 34 & 35 supra.
61. Although the valid governmental purpose exception has arisen in cases
involving legislative enactments or executive pronouncements, the Third Circuit did
not indicate whether the weighing of policy interests in such cases could also be used
to test nonappealable judicial orders in cases such as Rodgers. The lack of discussion
of this exception places in doubt the power of a district court to consider policy
arguments in forbidding disclosure of information obtained outside the court
processes.
62. For a discussion of this point, see note 37 and accompanying text supra.
63. 536 F.2d at 1008.
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threat existed, and since a review of the record revealed no threat, the
exception was not apposite. 64
Although offering a dearth of reasoning to support its conclusions, 65 the
court drew an apparently precise line circumscribing the district court's
'power to issue protective orders restraining disclosure of information
germane to pending litigation. However, it is submitted that the difficulty of
the question was substantially reduced by the existence of two different
sources of the same information -- one of which was judicial, and one which
was nonjudicial.66 It is further submitted that in the absence of the latter
source, the court's task might have been much more problematical since it
would have had to choose either to uphold the order, and thereby deny
plaintiffs important information, or to develop an alternate rationale for
permitting, disclosure.
It is for this reason that the future significance of Rodgers is uncertain.
The Third Circuit's precision in delineating judicial and nonjudicial sources
of information is misleading because it provided no guidelines for
determining when a court order prohibiting disclosure of extrajudicial
information would fit within one of the exceptions to the prior restraint
doctrine.67 Certainly, Rodgers offers no guidance to district courts that are
not presented with two sources of the same information and provides no
indication as to what type of case would so seriously undermine public
policy that disclosure of information could justifiably be restrained. In any
event, with only negative reasoning to serve as a guide, the effect may be to
unduly constrict the district court's perception of its power to control the
flow of information concerning pending litigation obtained outside court
processes. 6
Perhaps if the Rodgers court had articulated why the New Jersey State
Lottery Commission exceptions were inapplicable, practitioners and trial
64. Id. This procedure can be contrasted with that employed in Chase v. Robson,
435 F.2d 1059, 1061 (7th Cir. 1970), where the Seventh Circuit held that before first
amendment rights can be limited, the record must contain sufficient specific findings
that the conduct is a serious and imminent threat to justice. The Rodgers court
proceeded to review the record even though the trial court declined to make specific
findings as to these points. 536 F.2d at 1008.
65. 536 F.2d at 1008. The court tipped its hand the first time the Rodgers case was
before it. See Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 969 (1975); note 4 supra. The issue in that case was the propriety of a local
court rule which forbade communication between attorneys for the class and the
plaintiffs and third parties. 508 F.2d at 162. The rationale employed by Judge Gibbons
for striking down the rule as drawn in that case was that
the interest of the judiciary in the proper administration of justice does not
authorize any blanket exception to the first amendment. Whatever may be the
limits of a court's power in this respect, it seems clear that they diminish in
strength as the expressions and associations sought to be controlled move from
the courtroom to the outside world.
Id. at 163 (citations omitted). Although the court was also faced with a mandamus
issue, the first amendment question was not reached since a statutory ground for
decision was available. Id. at 163-64.
66. See notes 44 & 45 and accompanying text supra.
67. See notes 49-51 and accompanying text supra.
68. Although the court attempted to draw a precise line between judicial and
extrajudicial sources of information, detailed reasoning to reach that position would
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judges would have some basis for deciding when, if ever, the heavy
presumption against the constitutionality of prior restraints might be
overcome when the facts do not neatly fit one of the recognized exceptions to
the doctrine. Given the absence of a detailed rationale, it would seem that, in
the future, courts will have as much difficulty in drawing the line between
valid and invalid prior restraints as did the district court in the principal
case.
Gary L. Bragg
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEARCH AND SEIZURE - THIRD PARTY
CONSENT - GRATUITOUS BAILEE MAY CONSENT TO SEIZURE OF LOCKED
CONTAINER SUSPECTED OF CONTAINING CONTRABAND, BUT A
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF THE INTERIOR OF THE CONTAINER VIOLATES
THE BAILOR'S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS, UNLESS THE SEARCH Is A
VALID INVENTORY SEARCH.
United States v. Diggs (1976)
Following a bank robbery in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, defendant,
Alfred Diggs, and his common law wife, Christine Mahone, traveled to New
Bern, North Carolina, and gave to Mahone's uncle and aunt, the Reverend
and Mrs. Andrew T. Bradley, a small, locked metal box for safekeeping.' The
defendant and Mahone then retuned to Harrisburg, and shortly thereafter
the Bradleys learned that Diggs had been arrested.2 The Bradleys became
increasingly concerned about their niece's possible involvement in the
robbery and the possibility that the box in their possession contained stolen
have been of greater assistance to district courts presented with a request that
disclosure of nonprivileged, prejudicial information obtained outside the court
processes be forbidden. As a result, courts may tend to seize upon the simple source
distinction when in fact the circumstances may be extraordinary enough to warrant a
prior restraint.
1. United States v. Diggs, 544 F.2d 116, 117 (3d Cir. 1976). Mahone stated to Mrs.
Bradley that the box contained "'stocks and bonds and silver paper and important
papers that they had saved up for the children' and she asked her to keep it for them
'so they wouldn't be tempted to spend it.'" Id. at 117, quoting Transcript of
Suppression Hearing at 75 (footnote omitted). The Bradleys were not given a key to
the box, and they received no further instructions concerning it or its contents. 544
F.2d at 117.
2. 544 F.2d at 117. Reverend Bradley had telephoned his niece, and upon
questioning, she eventually told him of the defendant's arrest. Id. She further stated
that she had been interrogated in Harrisburg by agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, had told them of her visit to North Carolina, but had denied having left
anything there. Id.
1976-1977]
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property.' Finally, Reverend Bradley contacted his attorney who, in turn,
contacted the local agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).'
When the FBI agents telephoned Reverend Bradley, the Reverend insisted
that they come to his home immediately so that the box could be opened in
their presence.5 Although a search warrant could have been obtained in
approximately two hours, the agents did not procure one.6 Instead, one of
the agents unlocked the box with his desk key and allowed Reverend
Bradley to raise the lid, revealing a large sum of money, including "bait"
bills from the robbed bank.7 The agents removed, counted and separated the
bills, replaced the money in the box, and took custody of the, box and its
contents.
8
Before trial, 9 defendant filed a motion in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to suppress the box and its
contents.'0 The district court held that since the Bradleys did not have joint
access to or control over the metal box, they could not consent to its opening
on behalf of Diggs; therefore, the search, having been accomplished without
a warrant, violated the fourth amendment" and rendered the seized
3. Id. at 117-18. The district court's findings indicated that the Bradleys were
not concerned primarily about their implication in the crime, but rather about their
niece's possible complicity. Id. at 127 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting), quoting Transcript
of Suppression Hearing at 102-03; see United States v. Diggs, 396 F. Supp. 610, 612
(M.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded, 544 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1976).
4. 544 F.2d at 118.
5. Id. When the FBI agents arrived at the Bradleys' residence, Reverend Bradley
related to the agents the relevant facts and circumstances. Id. The agents then
telephoned the FBI in Harrisburg and corroborated the Harrisburg robbery, the
defendant's arrest, the fact that the stolen money had not yet been recovered, and the
fact that Mahone had denied leaving anything in North Carolina. Id.
6. Id. at 117-18.
7. Id. at 118. The district court found that despite Reverend Bradley's insistence
that the box be opened, the Bradleys did not give the agents the impression either that
they had authority to open the box or that they would tamper with the box if the
agents decided to obtain a search warrant. 396 F. Supp. at 612. On appeal, this
finding was not disputed by the Third Circuit. 544 F.2d at 127-28. (Van Dusen, J.,
dissenting).
8. 544 F.2d at 118.
9. Diggs was indicted for his alleged participation in the Harrisburg bank
robbery. Id. at 117. The two-count indictment charged Diggs with violations of
sections 924(c) (unlawful possession of firearms) and 2113(a) (bank robbery) of the
Federal Criminal Code of 1948, 18 U.S.C. §§924(c), 2113(a) (1970). United States v.
Diggs, No. 75-1547, slip op. at 2 n.2 (3d. Cir., filed Nov. 28, 1975) (Maris,Van Dusen &
Hunter, JJ.)
10. 396 F. Supp. at 610. Diggs' first motion to suppress was denied as untimely,
but the initial trial resulted in a mistrial, and Diggs' renewed motion was thereafter
granted. United States v. Diggs, No. 75-1547, slip op. at 2 n.3 (3d Cir., filed Nov. 28,
1975).
11. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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property inadmissible against the defendant.12 On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc,13 held that the mere
seizure of the box by the agents did not violate the fourth amendment, but
the judges disagreed as to whether the search of the contents of the box
violated Diggs' constitutional rights. While a plurality of the judges felt that
the consent by the Bradleys was sufficient justification for not obtaining a
search warrant, the case was nevertheless remanded at the insistence of a
concurring judge who concluded that although the Bradleys could not
consent to the search of the contents, once the box was lawfully in the
agents' possession, a search of the contents might be justified as an
inventory search, for which a warrant need not be obtained. 1 United States
v. Diggs, 544 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1976) (en banc).
A warrantless search and seizure ordinarily is held to be unreasonable
unless it falls within one of the well-defined exceptions to the warrant
requirement. 15 Two of the major exceptions - the search incident to a lawful
arrest 16 and the search of a movable vehicle when there is probable cause to
12. 396 F. Supp. at 615. The district court also rejected the Government's
contention that there was insufficient federal involvement in the search and seizure to
bring the search within the strictures of the fourth amendment. Id. at 614.
13. United States v. Diggs, No. 75-1547 (3d Cir., filed Nov. 28, 1975). Judge Van
Dusen, writing for the majority, affirmed the district court's holding that the
warrantless search was not within any of the recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Id- at 13. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Maris concluded that the
defendant had assumed the risk that the Bradleys would reveal the contents of the
box in order to exculpate themselves. Id. at 13-14. Under these circumstances, Judge
Maris held that the Bradleys had a "sufficient relationship" to the box and its content
to allow them to give a valid consent. Id., quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
164, 171 -(1974). Upon rehearing en banc, all three judges adhered to their initial
positions. See notes 35-42 & 45-50 and accompanying text infra.
14. Although Judge Gibbons was alone in concluding that the case should be
remanded to determine whether a valid inventory search was made, the plurality felt
"constrained" to join him in his opinion, since "six judges [did] not concur in [the
plurality's] disposition and [the plurality did] not favor affirmance." 544 F.2d at 122,
124.
15. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261 (1960).
Traditionally, courts have approached the analysis of furth amendment cases from
the position that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, "subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions [which must be] jealously and
carefully drawn." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 554-55 (1971).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the "[b]elief, however well
founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house furnishes no
justification for a search of that place without a warrant. And such searches are ...
unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause." Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925); accord, Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610,
613 (1961); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 n.4 (1948).
16. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Under this exception, law
enforcement officers have the right to conduct a warrantless search of arrestees'
persons and the area within their immediate control. See id. at 762-63. In United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), the Supreme Court expanded this exception by
allowing police officers to conduct a full search of the arrestee's person incident to a
lawful custodial arrest for traffic violations. Id. at 235-36. Moreover, the Robinson
Court concluded that since the search was undertaken pursuant to a legal custodial
arrest, no additional justification was required to authorize the warrentless search. Id.
at 235; see 25 MERCER L. REV. 943, 954-55 (1974); 14 WASHBURN L.J. 158 (1975).
A similar exception exists in the "stop and frisk" situation, first expounded
upon in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Under the "stop and frisk" situation, the
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believe that it contains the fruits or instrumentalities of a crime17 - have
been created primarily out of necessity.18 However, the third principal
exception, the consent search, requires neither the existence of exigent
circumstances nor probable cause to validate the warrantless search.1 9
Absent joint access to and control over the premises or effects sought to
be searched, third party consent generally has not been deemed sufficient to
justify warrantless searches by the police.20 In Chapman v. United States, 21
the United States Supreme Court was confronted with a situation similar to
that in Diggs. In Chapman, the defendant's landlord initially contacted the
state police after he had detected a strong odor of whiskey mash emanating
from the defendant's premises.22 The Court held that in the absence of
exigent circumstances the landlord's consent to enter the premises was
search is not conducted pursuant to a full custodial arrest, and thus, the scope of the
search is limited to a "pat-down" of the suspect's outer clothing. Id. at 30; see Brodsky,
Terry and the Pirates: Constitutionality of Airport Searches and Seizures, 62 Ky. L.J.
624, 630-32 (1974); Lafave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron,
Peters and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 40 (1968).
17. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925). The moving vehicle exception allows law enforcement officers to
stop and search an automobile when they have probable cause to believe it contains
evidence or contraband. Id. at 153-54; see Comment, Warrantless Searches and
Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARv. L. REV. 835 (1974). A related exception exists for
inventory searches of automobiles in police custody. E.g., Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58 (1967); Comment, The Automobile Inventory Search and Cady v. Dombrowski,
20 VILL. L. REV. 147 (1974). For a discussion of Cooper, see note 52 infra.
18. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948); United States ex
rel. Cabrey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839, 841-42 (3d Cir. 1970). The rule allowing
contemporaneous searches incident to a lawful arrest is justified by the need to protect
the arresting officer and by the need to prevent both the destruction of evidence and
the escape of the arrestee. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764 (1969). The
rationale for validating the warrantless search of a motor vehicle when there is
probable cause to believe it contains contraband is based upon the recognition that a
mobile vehicle can be quickly moved out of the jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be obtained. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
19. United States ex rel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839, 843 (3d Cir. 1970).
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973), the validity of consent searches was based upon the longstanding rule that one
could knowingly and intelligently waive the right to be free from a warrantless
search. See Amos V. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Comment, Third Party
Consent to Search and Seizure, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 800 (1966). Thus, the validity of
third party consent searches was difficult to explain since the general rule would seem
to prevent one from waiving another's constitutional rights. See id. at 801.
However, in Schneckloth, the Court explicitly held that while the prosecution
had the burden of proving' that the subject's consent was not coerced, the prosecution
was not required to prove that the individual knew he or she had a right to refuse to
consent. 412 U.S. at 233, 248-49. Consequently, by excluding the requirement of
knowledge of the right to refuse from the "knowing" element of the waiver theory, the
Court provided at least a partial theoretical explanation for its prior decisions which
had impliedly approved of third party consent searches. See id. at 245. For an example
of such a prior decision, see Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 n.11 (1968).
For an excellent discussion of Schneckloth and its impact in the area of consent
searches, see Wefing & Miles, Consent Searches and the Fourth Amendment:
Voluntariness and Third Party Problems, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 211, 240-53 (1974).
20. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Chapman v. United States, 365
U.S. 610 (1961).
21. 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
22. Id. at 611. Upon the officers' arrival, the landlord, who did not have a key,
told them "to go in the window and see what [is] in there." Id. at 612.
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insufficient to validate a warrantless search. 23 In reaching its conclusion,
the Court stated that to uphold such a warrantless search "would reduce the
[Fourth] Amendment to a nullity and leave [tenants'] homes secure only in
the discretion of [landlords]."2 4
It was not until 1974 that the Supreme Court explicitly approved of third
party consent searches when it endorsed the generally accepted doctrine
that one with an equal or superior possessory interest in the premises or
effects sought to be searched may validly consent to such a search. 25 In
United States v. Matlock,28 the defendant's paramour consented to the
search of a bedroom jointly occupied by her and the defendant. 27 The Court
distinguished Chapman by noting that one who possesses joint access and
control has "in his own right ... [authority to] permit the common area to
be searched. ' 28 However, the Matlock Court noted that there may be "other
sufficient relationship[s]" which would serve to justify a third party consent
search and thus left open the possibility that other situations, not involving
joint access and control, might be adequate to validate such a search.29
23. Id. at 615-17. The Court stated:
No reason is offered for not obtaining a search warrant except the inconvenience
to the officers and some slight delay necessary to prepare papers and present the
evidence to a magistrate. These are never very convincing reasons and ...
certainly are not enough to by-pass the constitutional requirement. No suspect
was fleeing or likely to take flight. The search was of permanent premises, not of
a movable vehicle. No evidence or contraband was threatened with removal or
destruction....
Id. at 615, quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
24. 365 U.S. at 617, quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). The
Chapman Court rejected the notion that the use of technical property concepts could
control the procedural protections guaranteed by the fourth amendment. 365 U.S. at
617. Following Chapman, in Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964), a unanimous
Supreme Court refused to apply doctrines of apparent authority to uphold a
warrantless search of the defendant's hotel room where consent had been given by the
hotel desk clerk. Id. at 487-88. In reaching its holding, the Stoner Court noted that
there was nothing in the record to indicate that the police had any basis for believing
that the desk clerk had been authorized by the defendant to consent to the search. Id.
at 489. Thus, Stoner has been read by some commentators as authorizing a third
party consent by one with limited possessory interests only when the third party has
been given express authority to permit such searches. See Note, Third Party Consent
to Search and Seizure: The Need for a New Evaluation, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 82, 88
(1966); Comment, supra note 19, at 802-04.
25. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). Prior to Matlock, the
Court had impliedly accepted the validity of third party consent searches where the
third party had equal or superior possession or control of the objects sought to be
searched. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (cousin consenting to search of a
duffel bag owned by him and used by both parties); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543 (1965) (grandmother consenting to search of a house and seizure of a rifle,
both of which she owned).
26. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
27. Id. at 166.
28. Id. at 171 n.7.
29. Id. at 171. The test enunciated by the Matlock Court was that the consenting
party must possess "common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the
premises or effects sought to be inspected," in order to validate the warrantless search
of another's property. Id. at 171 (emphasis added). However, in a footnote to this
holding, the Court stated:
The authority which justifies the third-party consent does not rest on the law of
property ...but rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally
having joint access and control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to
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Prior to the Third Circuit's plurality opinion in Diggs, only one other
court had framed a test that was substantially different from the "access
and control" test ultimately enunciated in Matlock.3" In a case decided
before Matlock, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
United States v. Botsch,3 1 held that an individual who had been made an
unwitting accomplice in the defendant's scheme had the right to exculpate
himself promptly and voluntarily by establishing that his involvement in
the alleged crime was entirely passive and innocent. 32 In Botsch, the
landlord possessed a key to the defendant-lessee's dwelling and was
expressly authorized by the defendant to use it for the purpose of accepting
certain deliveries which, unknown to the landlord, could have implicated
him in the defendant's illegal activities. 33 Under such circumstances, the
Second Circuit concluded that the government's warrantless search did not
conflict with the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
34
It was against this background that four members of the Third Circuit 3 5
held that a bailee who has reasonable cause to believe that a locked box in
his possession contains contraband has a sufficient personal interest to
recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit inspection in his
own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number
might permit the common area to be searched.
Id. at 171 n.7 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court did not articulate what it meant to
add to the access and control doctrine by the "other sufficient relationship" strand of
the Matlock test.
30. See Marshall v. United States, 352 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 1010 (1966). In Marshall, a case strikingly similar to the facts of Diggs, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a person entrusted with
possession of a briefcase by its owner could validly consent to a search of the
briefcase by FBI agents. 352 F.2d at 1014-15. However, Marshall was subsequently
overruled by the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, as being inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's decision in Stoner. See Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 8 (9th
Cir. 1966). For a discussion of Stoner, see note 24 supra.
31. 364 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 937 (1967).
32. 364 F.2d at 547. In reaching its holding the court relied in part upon Marshall
v. United States, 352 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1010 (1966). 364
F.2d at 548; see note 30 supra.
33. 364 F.2d at 547. In Botsch, the defendant set up a complicated scheme
whereby certain merchandise was ordered and shipped on another's credit. Id. at 545.
The fraudulently obtained goods were delivered to a shanty which the defendant
leased from the landlord, the consenting party. Id. at 544-45. In addition to providing
the premises, the consenting landlord agreed to store the deliveries and sign any
required receipts. Id. at 544.
34. Id. at 547. The court distinguished Chapman by commenting that not only
was the landlord in Botsch given a key to the defendant's dwelling, he was also
expressly authorized by the defendant to enter the premises. Id. Moreover, although
the landlord was innocent, his actions, when objectively viewed, cast suspicion upon
him. Id. at 547-48. Thus, the court reasoned that the combination of these factors
gave the landlord a sufficient interest - that of exonerating himself - to consent to
the warrantless search. Id. For a discussion of Chapman, see notes 21-24 and
accompanying text supra.
35. Judges Aldisert, Rosen, and Weis joined in an opinion written by Judge
Maris. 544 F.2d at 116.
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consent to a warrantless search of the box.3 6 Relying primarily on Botsch,37
the plurality departed from the traditional fourth amendment analysis 38 and
instead focused upon the reasonableness of requiring the agents to obtain a
search warrant. 39 While recognizing that the Bradleys did not have joint
access to or control over the interior of the locked metal box, the plurality
concentrated upon the "other sufficient relationship" strand of the Matlock
test 40 and found that the defendant had "assumed the risk" that the
Bradleys would disclose the contents of the box in order to exculpate
themselves. 4' Thus, the plurality concluded that the Bradleys' interest in not
being falsely implicated in a crime outweighed the defendant's right to be
free from a warrantless search. 42
In a separate, concurring opinion, Judge Adams chose not to rely upon
the plurality's consent theory. While agreeing with the plurality that a
warrantless search under the circumstances of this case should not be per se
illegal, 43 Judge Adams felt that since the police clearly had probable cause
to search, and since the search was initiated by private persons, it was
reasonable for the police to refrain from obtaining a warrant. 44
36. Id. at 121-22. The "personal interest" which entitled the Bradleys to give
permission for the search was their right to exculpate themselves from any possible
implication as accessories after the fact. Id. Thus, the plurality was able to
distinguish Chapman and Stoner on the grounds that in neither of those cases was
the third party an innocent accomplice in illicit activities. Id. at 120.
37. Id. at 120-22. After comparing the facts of Botsch to the instant case, Judge
Maris concluded that the rule enunciated by the Second Circuit was applicable to
Diggs. Id. at 119. The plurality determined that the operative fact in Botsch was not
that the landlord possessed a key to the defendant's premises, but rather that the
landlord was unwittingly involved in the defendant's crime. Id. at 121. Moreover,
Judge Maris felt that application of the Botsch rule was clearly justifiable in light of
the fact that the search in Diggs was conducted at the request of the Bradleys. Id.
Under such circumstances, the plurality concluded that the government search and
seizure was clearly not an unreasonable one under the fourth amendment, even
though it was conducted without a search warrant. Id. at 122. For a discussion of
Botsch, see notes 31-34 and accompanying text supra.
38. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
39. 544 F.2d at 122. Judge Maris concluded that in the exceptional cases, the
courts, by holding that the searches were reasonable, were necessarily holding that
under the circumstances it would be unreasonable to require the procurement of a
search warrant. Id. Thus, the plurality remarked that "the question whether we
should focus on the reasonableness of requiring the procurement of a search warrant
rather than on the reasonableness of the search itself is largely one of semantics." Id.
40. For a discussion of Matlock, see notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra.
41. 544 F.2d at 122. The "assumed the risk" language employed by the Diggs
Court has its origins in Matlock. 415 U.S. at 171 n.7. For the pertinent language of the
Matlock decision, see note 29 supra.
42. 544 F.2d at 122. Moreover, Judge Maris commented that the actions of the FBI
agents, in responding to the urgent request of the Bradleys, clearly could not be
regarded as unreasonable. Id. at 121.
43. Id. at 123. Judge Adams considered the facts and circumstances of the instant
case and agreed with the plurality that suppressing the evidence would not serve the
fundamental purpose of the exclusionary rule, i.e., to deter police misconduct. Id. at
124. Moreover, Judge Adams stated that "[s]trict insistence on technical compliance
- and here the agents could have obtained a warrant had they sought one - would
overlook the confluence of expectations and events impinging upon the agents who
responded to Rev. Bradley's call." Id. at 123-24 (footnotes omitted).
44. Id.
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Judge Van Dusen, writing for the dissent, first took issue with the
plurality's general reasonableness approach to the fourth amendment.4 5 The
dissent observed that the purpose of the fourth amendment was not to test
the reasonableness of searches after the fact, but to interpose a neutral,
judicial determination between the citizen and the police.4 6 Moreover, Judge
Van Dusen asserted that the reasonableness standard endorsed by the
plurality had been expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court.47
Concluding that the search in the instant case would have to be justified
by some well-defined exception, the dissent could not reconcile the plurality's
holding with that of the Supreme Court in Chapman.48 Citing the fact that
Diggs had retained the key to the box, the dissent also rejected the
plurality's suggestion that he had assumed the risk of a search.49 Moreover,
the plurality's conclusion that the Bradleys' interest in exculpating
themselves validated the search was criticized by the dissent for providing
an unworkable and unjustified exception to the warrant requirement. 50
45. Id. at 129-30.
46. See id. 'at 130 & n.18. Furthermore, Judge Van Dusen remarked that the
subjective determination regarding the reasonableness of the police conduct conflicted
with the traditional rule that the exceptions to the warrant requirement are to be
"'specifically established and well-delineated,'" and "'jealously and carefully
drawn.'" Id. at 129, quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Jones v.
United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
47. 544 F.2d at 129, citing'Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The
reasonableness standard was advocated by a majority of the Supreme Court in United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63, 66 (1950). However, in Chimel, which involved
the permissible scope of a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest, the Supreme
Court expressely rejected the "Rabinowitz approach" to fourth amendment analysis.
395 U.S. at 760-61, 764-65.
Along these lines, the dissent questioned the validity of Botsch, which was
cited extensively by the plurality in Diggs. See 544 F.2d at 119-21; notes 31-34 and
accompanying text supra. The dissent noted that Botsch had relied upon Rabinowitz
and had derived its exculpation theory from Marshall. 544 F.2d at 129, 133 n.24; see
notes 30-34 and accompanying text supra. The dissent went on to point out that after
Botsch, Marshall was overruled by the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, in Corngold v.
United States, 367 F.2d 1, 8 (9th Cir. 1966). 544 F.2d at 132, 133 n.24; see note 30 supra.
Thus, the dissent argued that these intervening decisions in Chimel and Corngold
weakened the significance of Botsch, which, in turn, weakened the plurality's opinion
in Diggs. See 544 F.2d at 129, 133 & n.24.
48. 544 F.2d at 132. For a discussion of Chapman, see notes 21-24 and
accompanying text supra.
49. 544 F.2d at 131. As was pointed out in both the dissenting opinion of Judge
Van Dusen and the concurring opinion of Judge Gibbons, the fourth amendment
clearly protects both property and privacy interests. Id. at 124, 131. The dissent also
mentioned that the cases have uniformly held that if an area has been "set aside for
the exclusive use of another," the consenting party does not have the right to permit a
search of that area. Id. at 131 n.19, citing United States v. Bussey, 507 F.2d 1096, 1097
(9th Cir. 1974), United States v. Pravato, 505 F.2d 703, 704 (2d Cir. 1974), United
States v. Heisman, 503 F.2d 1284, 1288-89 (8th Cir. 1974), United States ex rel. Cabey
v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839, 842-43 n.20 (3d Cir. 1970), and Gurleski v. United
States, 405 F.2d 253, 262 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 981 (1969).
50. 544 F.2d at 132. Judge Van Dusen could not envision how the plurality's rule
could be limited. Id. He felt that that rule "imports into the consent exception a factor
akin to the concept of probable cause." Id. at 132 n.23. Furthermore, Judge Van Dusen
could not comprehend how a two-hour delay would frustrate the Bradleys' "right" to
exonerate themselves. Id. at 132-33. As Judge Dusen noted, "whatever interest
Bradley had in purging himself of any possible taint ceased to operate once Bradley
had notified the authorities of the existence of the locked box, explained the
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Since the number of judges in the plurality and the dissent was
insufficient to decide the case, Judge Gibbons' opinion was dispositive.5 1
While agreeing with the dissenters that the Bradleys did not possess the
right to consent to a warrantless search of the box's contents, Judge
Gibbons felt that because the agents were lawfully in possession of the
locked box, they could conceivably conduct an inventory search of its
interior.5 2
From a reasonableness perspective, the decision to uphold the warrant-
less search in Diggs is certainly justifiable. The actions of the FBI agents
were not outrageous or contemptible, and the conduct of the Bradleys was
similarly not unreasonable. 53 Indeed, attempting to aid law enforcement or
to prove one's innocence in criminal conduct are laudable endeavors.
However, it is submitted that the utilization of a "reasonableness under the
circumstances" test overlooks the privacy interests which the fourth
amendment was designed to protect and countenances the formulation of ad
hoc and unworkable standards.
The primary purpose of the fourth amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is to guard against arbitrary govern-
mental intrusions into the privacy of Individuals and their effects. 5
4
circumstances surrounding his possession of it, and physically turned the box over to
Government agents." Id. at 132.
In addition, the dissent took issue with the plurality's assertion that the
Bradleys' consent was motivated by a concern for their own inadvertent implication
in the defendant's crime. Id. at 127-28, 132; see note 3 supra.
51. See note 14 supra.
52. 544 F.2d at 125, citing, inter alia, Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967)
(police can conduct inventory searches of motor vehicles lawfully in their possession).
Judge Gibbons found "[n]o principled distinction ... for inventory search purposes
between lawful possession of a car and lawful possession of a box." 544 F.2d at 125
(footnotes omitted). Judge Gibbons did indicate that there may be authority
supporting such a distinction. 544 F.2d at 125 n.5, citing United States v. Chadwick,
532 F.2d 773, 781-85 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 54 (1976). Thus Judge
Gibbons concluded that since the agents were lawfully in possession of the box they
were therefore authorized to make an inventory search. 544 F.2d at 125.
Judge Gibbons then interpreted the Supreme Court's recent decision in South
Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976), as requiring that to be justified under the
inventory exception, a search must be "conducted pursuant to standard departmental
procedures" and "must in fact have been made for an inventory purpose, and not for
an investigatory purpose." 544 F.2d at 126 (footnotes omitted). Since the district court
had made no finding on this point, Judge Gibbons voted to vacate the judgment and
remand the case to the district court for further findings with respect to the agents'
purpose in searching the inside of the box. Id.
53. Focusing upon the reasonableness requirement governing searches and
seizures, one commentator has suggested that the situations where police initiate the
search should be distinguished from those cases where the search is undertaken at the
request of a private party. See Comment, supra note 19, at 134. The author of this
comment would presume the former situation to be unreasonable but would uphold
the validity of warrantless searches initiated by a private party when that party has a
"countervailing interest" sufficient to give rise to a right to consent. Id. at 134-43.
Such a "countervailing interest" test approximates the "other sufficient relationship"
strand of Matlock upon which the plurality relied. See 544 F.2d at 122, 125.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767
(1966). See also United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 180 n.1 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting), wherein Justice Douglas examined the history of the fourth amendment
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However, the plurality and Judge Adams, by focusing almost exclusively
upon the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment, endorsed the
very type of hindsight review which the warrant clause was intended to
prevent.5 5 In cases where no exigent circumstances exist and where a person
with an inferior possessory interest is attempting to waive the fourth
amendment rights of another, requiring the prior procurement of a search
warrant would, as the dissent pointed out, neither impede effective law
enforcement nor hamper citizens' rights to exonerate themselves from
criminal implication. 56
Furthermore, it is dubious whether Judge Maris' interpretation of
Botsch57 is consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Chapman.5" In
Botsch, the consenting landlord not only possessed a key to the defendant's
premises, he was also expressly authorized by the defendant to enter the
dwelling. 9 Thus, unlike the bailee in Diggs, the activities of the landlord in
Botsch were "inextricably intertwined" with the defendant's scheme.60
Indeed, the need for the landlord's exculpation in Botsch evolved out of his
joint use of the defendant's premises. 61 Furthermore, the landlord's mutual
access and control enabled the Second Circuit to distinguish Botsch from the
Supreme Court's opinion in Chapman.62 Thus, it can be contended that the
Diggs plurality strained the rationale underlying the Botsch decision by
applying its exculpation theory to a situation where the consenting party's
activities were clearly removed from the defendant's criminal conduct.6 3
and concluded that the framers' primary intent was to protect against unwarranted
invasions of individual privacy. Id.
55. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3103 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3086 (1976). In United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), the Court stated:[A] general reasonableness standard without reference to the warrant clause is
"founded on little more than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of
certain sorts of police conduct, and not on considerations relevant to Fourth
Amendment interests. Under such an unconfined analysis, Fourth Amendment
protection in this area would approach the evaporation point."
Id. at 315 n.16, quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1969).
56. 544 F.2d at 132-33; see note 49 supra.
•57. See note 37 supra.
58. See notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra.
59. 364 F.2d at 547.
60. Id. at 548.
61. Id. The Botsch court explained:
If this were a simple case of a landlord authorizing a search of his tenant's
property and no more, . . . we would be presented with an entirely different
question .... But, here, [the consenting party] was not an inactive landlord, aloof
from his tenant's activities and immune from any taint that inhered in them. ...
Because [the landlord's] activities - though innocent - were inextricably
intertwined with [the defendant's] alleged scheme and cast suspicion upon him,
we believe his authorization of the inspection when viewed in its full context
rendered the search reasonable.
Id. (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 547; see United States v. Poindexter, 325 F. Supp. 786,792 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (Chapman and Botsch distinguished on grounds that landlord in Chapman did
not possess a key to defendant's premises).
63. In Diggs, the FBI agents did not suspect that the Bradleys' possession of the
metal box was evidence of their participation in the defendant's crime. 544 F.2d at 128
n.5 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
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Judge Adams' attempt to distinguish the instant case from the
Chapman decision appears to be similarly questionable. First, he noted that
the existence of probable cause to search was much more apparent in Diggs
than it was in Chapman.6 4 However, as the dissent noted, the validity of
consent searches has never depended upon the existence or quality of
probable cause.6 5 Second, although Judge Adams stated that the decision in
Chapman rested upon the "special sanctity" accorded "houses,"6 6 any
distinction between "houses" and "effects" was eliminated by the Supreme
Court's decision in Katz v. United States.67 Lastly, Judge Adams' definition
of the Bradleys' possessory interest in the box, as a "very substantial, albeit
limited, real possessory interest,"66 and its differentiation from the interest
of the landlord in Chapman, does not provide a viable explanation of the
property interest necessary to validate a warrantless third party consent
search.69
While Judge Gibbons' analysis ° does not impose impractical or
unworkable standards, 7' his application of the inventory exception to the
facts of Diggs appears inapposite. Initially, the premise upon which the
inventory exception is based is that individuals maintain a lesser
expectation of privacy in their automobiles than they do in other repositories
of their personal effects.7 2 Moreover, the inventory search of motor vehicles
64. Id. at 123 n.3; see note 44 supra.
65. 544 F.2d at 132 n.21; see note 15 supra. The Third Circuit, in United States ex
rel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1970), impliedly acknowledged the
irrelevance of probable cause when it stated:
It is fundamental that the doctrine which recognizes the validity of a third party's
consent to a search must be applied guardedly to prevent erosion of the protection
of the fourth amendment, since it makes no requirement of the existence of
probable cause for the search and does not constitute an exception based on
necessity.
Id. at 843 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). ......
66. 544 F.2d at 123 n.3.
67. 389 U.S. 347, 351-52, 359 (1967). Katz involved an FBI electronic surveillance
of a public telephone booth from which the defendant was transmitting illegal
wagering information. Id. at 348. In holding that the fourth amendment protects
people rather than places, the Court dispelled any prior beliefs that a distinction
exists, for fourth amendment purposes, between premises and other effects. See id. at
351-52, 359.
In any event, it is arguable that Chapman does not support the distinction
between "houses" and "effects." In the Chapman case, both the district court and the
court of appeals determined that the rented property was not being used as a private
residence. Chapman v. United States, 272 F.2d 70, 71-72 n.1 (5th Cir. 1959). This
finding was not contradicted by the Supreme Court. 365 U.S. at 620 (Clark, J.,
dissenting). Thus, even though the premises in Chapman were arguably "other
effects," the Court refused to uphold the warrantless search. Id. at 615-17.
68. 544 F.2d at 123 n.3.
69. It is submitted that such a characterization invokes the type of "subtle
distinctions" specifically rejected by the Chapman Court and leads to further
confusion in an already complex fourth amendment area. See 365 U.S. at 617.
70. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
71. Presumably, application of the plurality's theory would require the Govern-
ment to demonstrate that the police had reasonable cause to believe that the consent
of the third party was motivated by a desire to prove his innocence. 544 F.2d at 132;
see notes 49 & 69 supra.
72. South Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976). In Opperman, the Supreme
Court upheld the warrantless inventory search of an automobile which had been
1976-1977]
44
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1977], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol22/iss3/8
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
is justified in part by the fact that the owner or prior occupant cannot be
located within a reasonable period of time." Neither of these considerations,
however, are applicable to the facts of the instant case.7 4 Finally, while
Judge Gibbons concluded that in order to be justified under the inventory
exception, a search must in fact have been conducted for an inventory
purpose and not for an investigatory purpose, there is nothing in the facts of
Diggs to indicate that the agents were primarily concerned with caretaking
functions.75
impounded by the police for multiple parking violations. Id. at 3095. In the course of
its opinion, the Court discussed the various factors which lead to a diminished
expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile. Id. at 3096. The Court
explained that automobiles, unlike homes or other personal effects, are under
continuing governmental regulation and control and are brought into frequent
contact with law enforcement officers. Id. The Court also noted that in most cases the
nature of this contact is distinctly noncriminal. Id. In addition, the Court stated:
"[One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its funtion is
transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal
effects .... It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents
are in plain view." Id., quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974). None of
these factors appears to compel the conclusion that one who delivers a locked, metal
box to another for safekeeping and who retains possession of the only key has a
diminished expectation of privacy with respect to the box's contents. See 544 F.2d at
133 n.26 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
73. South Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3104 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
74. In Diggs, at the time the FBI agents searched the interior of the locked box,
the defendant had already been arrested in Harrisburg. See United States v. Diggs,
396 F. Supp. 610, 612 (M.D. Pa. 1975). Diggs' absence assumes importance, because
another rationale for the inventory exception is to protect the police from potential
danger and from later claims against them for loss or theft. See South Dakota v.
Opperman, 96 S. Ct. at 3092, 3096 (1976). With Diggs already in custody, the need for
such protection was minimal. At least one court has rejected a similar claim of a valid
inventory search involving a locked suitcase. United States v. Chadwick, 532 F.2d 733
(1st Cir. 1976). In Chadwick, the Court concluded:
None of these considerations is available to justify as inventory searches the
breaking into these suitcases. It is simply not credible to suggest that a closed,
locked suitcase posed a threat to the institutional safety .... No more credible is
the theory . . . that the search was necessary to protect the agents from later
claims of theft or lost property. It is difficult to see how the integrity of agents is
safeguarded by picking the lock to a suitcase. Such forcible entry would likely
invite more, rather than fewer, claims of theft. [Such action] was an unreasonable
and, therefore, unacceptable approach to the problem.
Id. at 783, quoting United States v. Chadwick, 393 F. Supp. 763, 776 (D. Mass. 1975).
The Chadwick court further found that the agents could have protected themselves
from later claims by either sealing the suitcases with tape which the agents could
have initialed, or merely by keeping the suitcase in a locked storeroom. 532 F.2d at
783. Such alternatives were also available in Diggs.
75. 544 F.2d at 128 n.7, 133. The general requirement that the determination of
probable cause be made by a neutral judicial officer protects the individual's
legitimate expectation of privacy against the actions of zealous police officers
"engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); see, e.g., United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316-18 (1972). Thus, part of the rationale behind the inventory
exception stems from the fact that inventory searches are not conducted in order to
discover evidence of crime. South Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3103 (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring). Rather, such searches are conducted pursuant to standard
departmental procedures, there are, therefore, no special facts which must be
evaluated by a neutral magistrate. Id. However, the facts in Diggs clearly indicate
that the agents' purpose in the search was to determine whether the box contained
contraband. 544 F.2d at 128 & n.7 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting); see notes 4 & 5 and
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While the opinions of Judges Maris, Adams, and Gibbons may be
viewed simply as extensions of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, it
is submitted that the reasoning of at least five of the Third Circuit judges76
foreshadows a major shift in fourth amendment analysis. The impact of
resuscitating the reasonableness test, while comporting with the recent
trend of the Burger Court,77 may be the elimination of the warrant
requirement for all practical purposes.78 The decisions of the plurality and
Judge Adams portend that in the near future the exceptions to the warrant
requirement may indeed be "enthroned into the rule."79
Michael E. Fingerman
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEX DISCRIMINATION - MAINTENANCE OF
Two SEXUALLY SEGREGATED PUBLIC SCHOOLS OFFERING "EQUAL"
EDUCATION DOES NOT VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
Vorchheimer v. School District (1976)
Plaintiff Susan Vorchheimer was denied admission to Central High
School (Central), an all-male public institution.' In 1975, she brought a class
action suit2 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
accompanying text supra. Moreover, the Court in Diggs, by implying a possible
inventory purpose, encourages the type of "after the fact" review which the warrant
clause was designed to prevent. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
76. See notes 35-44 and accompanying text supra. Judge Gibbons explicitly
rejected the use of a reasonableness approach as the appropriate test for determining
the validity of a warrantless search. 544 F.2d at 121.
77. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976). In Opperman, the
reasonableness test was endorsed by four members of the Supreme Court. Id. at 3098-
100 (Burger, C.J. & Blackmun, Rehnquist & Stevens, J.J.).
For a discussion of how the state courts have attempted to avoid the Burger
Court's less liberal decisions in this area, see Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal
Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421, 434-36 (1974).
See also 21 VILL. L. REv. 950, 959-60 (1976).
78. See 544 F.2d at 127 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
79. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 80 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing).
1. Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1975). The
Philadelphia School System is comprised of four types of high schools: comprehen-
sive, technical, academic, and magnet. There are two academic high schools, Central
and Philadelphia High School for Girls (Girls High), both of which are sexually
segregated. The curriculum in these two schools is strictly college preparatory;
admission is by testing and previous grades, not by residence. All but three of
Philadelphia's other high schools are coeducational. Id. at 327-28.
2. Id. at 333. The class action was certified pursuant to Federal Rule 23(b)(2),
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). 400 F. Supp. at 333. Vorchheimer was certified as the
representative of those females who met the academic requirements for admission to
Central, but who have been or will be denied admission to Central because of their
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Pennsylvania against the School District of Philadelphia (School District)
and its Superintendent, 3 alleging that the denial of admission based solely
upon gender was an unconstitutional deprivation of the class's rights under
the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. 4 Plaintiffs
sought injunctive relief' to compel the School District to admit the class into
Central.' The district court, upon finding that the policy of excluding women
from the school solely due to their sex7 did not bear a fair and substantial
relationship' to any of the school district's legitimate objectives, 9 granted
sex. Id. The suit was brought by Vorchheimer's parents, as guardians ad litem. Id. at
327.
3. Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
4. Id. at 343. The district court had jurisdiction over the federal claim by reason
of section 1343 of the Judicial Code, the relevant portion of which states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any state law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any right, privilege or immunity secured
by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for
equal rights of citizens....
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970).
The district court declined to accept pendant jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim
under the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment (Pa. ERA), PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28
(Supp. 1976), "since standards governing the applicability of this amendment in the
education field had not been clearly established by the state courts." 400 F. Supp. at
333. The pertinent portion of the Pa. ERA states: "Equality of rights under the law
shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the
sex of the individual." PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28 (Supp. 1976). However, it should be noted
that on March 19, 1975, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania decided
Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 18 Pa. Commw. Ct.
45, 334 A.2d 839 (1975). This case held, in a summary judgment, that the
Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association By-Laws which prohibited girls
from competing with boys in any athletic contest violated the Pa. ERA. The court said
"the concept of 'equity [sic] rights under the law' is at least broad enough in scope to
prohibit discrimination which is practiced under the auspices of what has been
termed "state action" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution." Id. at 51, 334 A.2d at 842 (emphasis supplied by court).
5. Plaintiffs right to relief is derived from section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act,
the relevant portion of which states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
6. 400 F. Supp. at 332.
7. The district court found that it was "undisputed that plaintiff met Central's
academic admission requirement. . . . On or about February 1, 1974, plaintiffs
application for admission to Central High School was rejected solely on the basis of
her sex." Id. at 328.
8. For a discussion of the derivation and application of the fair and substantial
relationship standard, see notes 21-29 and accompanying text infra.
9. The objectives, as articulated by defendant School District were "to produce
good and constructive citizens, who are literate in every sense, and who are able to
communicate effectively .. " 400 F. Supp. at 332, quoting Constanzo Deposition, at
4, lines 16-24. The Third Circuit summarized the objectives as providing "an
education of as high quality as is feasible." Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880,
888 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 97 S. Ct. 1671 (1977).
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the injunction. 10 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit 1 reversed, holding 1) that in the furtherance of legitimate
educational objectives 12 the School District's maintenance of an all-male
high school was constitutional,' 3 where there was an equivalent girls' high
school, the two schools offered essentially equal educational opportunities,
1 4
and enrollment in either was voluntary,' 5 and 2) that the Equal Educational
Opportunity Act of 1974 did not prohibit the maintenance of two equivalent
sex-segregated public high schools.' 6 Vorchheimer v. School District, 532
F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), per curiam, 97 S. Ct. 1671 (1977).
Prior to 1971, the United States Supreme Court applied the "minimum
rationality"' 7 standard to equal protection challenges of gender-based
classifications; the classification was upheld if it bore a rational relationship to
the legitimate objectives of the legislature.' 8 That the classification might be
based upon stereotyped notions of sex roles in society or sex-based averaging' 9
10. 400 F. Supp. at 343.
11. The case was heard by Judges Weis and Gibbons of the Third Circuit and
Chief Judge Markey of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, sitting by
designation. Judge Weis wrote the opinion, with Judge Gibbons dissenting. The
decision by the Third Circuit was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in a
per curiam decision. Vorchheimer v. School Dist. 97 S. Ct. 1671 (1977). The Court split
four to four, without the participation of Justice Rehnquist. For a discussion of the
impact of this summary affirmance, see notes 102-05 and accompanying text infra.
12. The court also based its conclusions on "a controverted but respected theory
that adolescents may study more effectively in single-sex schools.... " 532 F.2d at
888.
13. Id. at 881.
14. Id. at 882; see note 49 infra. For a criticism of this finding, see notes 87-95 and
accompanying text infra.
15. 532 F.2d at 881. For a criticism of this finding, see note 75 infra.
16. 532 F.2d at 885. For a more comprehensive discussion of the statutes relating
to this case, see notes 37-43 and 49-59 and accompanying text infra.
17. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948). See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1972).
18. Chief Justice Warren described the test under the equal protection clause as
one that
permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some
groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is
offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State's objective .... A statutory discrimination will not be
set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); see Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S.
464, 467 (1948). Prior to 1971, the United States Supreme Court, using this test, had
never invalidated any law or regulation discriminating between people solely on
account of their sex. Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court - 1971-
1974, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 617 (1974)._
19. B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEx DISCRIMINATION AND
THE LAW 108 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SEx DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAw]. Sex-
based averaging is the practice of applying to all women the characteristics of a
majority of women. See, e.g., Wark v. State, 266 A.2d 62 (Me.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
952 (1970). In Wark, the court found that
[because of the] varying behavioral patterns of the two sexes ... [tihe Legislature
could on the basis of long experience conclude that women ... tend for the most
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in no way weakened the reasonableness of the classification. 20 In 1971, a new,
stricter equal protection standard emerged 21 when the Supreme Court, in Reed
v. Reed,22 found a statute discriminating against women to be unconstitu-
tional. 23 Although the Court did not expressly state that it was applying a
standard stricter than that of rational relationship, 24 the opinion in Reed has
nevertheless become the reference point for a middle level of scrutiny owing to
its statement that "a classification must . . . rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation." 25
Since its decision in Reed, the Supreme Court has applied this fair and
substantial relationship test numerous times.2 6 In 1973, in Frontiero v.
Richardson27 a plurality of the Court declared sex to be a suspect class,
part to be more amenable to discipline and custodial regulation than their male
counterparts and . .. the Legislature could logically and reasonably conclude
that a more severe penalty should be imposed upon a male prisoner escaping from
the State Prison than upon a woman confined to the "Reformatory" while serving
a State Prison sentence who escapes from that institution.
266 A.2d at 65.
20. Johnston, supra note 18, at 624-25; see Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393.U.S. 982 (1968); Clark v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.
Iowa 1966); Vintage Sec'y Wholesalers Corp. v. State Liquor Auth., 63 Misc. 2d 287,
311 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Sup. Ct. 1970). See generally SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW,
supra note 19, at 108-09 n.33.
21. One commentator has described the stricter standard as follows: "The Court
proved less willing to strain for conceivable justifications, less ready to hypothesize
imaginable facts that might underlie questionable classifications, less inclined to
tolerate substantial over- and under-inclusiveness in deference to legislative
flexibility." Gunther, supra note 17, at 33.
22. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Reed, the Court invalidated an Idaho statute, IDAHO
CODE § 15-314 (1948) (repealed 1971), which, in setting priorities for the appointment
of individuals to administer intestate estates, gave preference to males over females
within any given class of relatives. 404 U.S. at 77.
23. 404 U.S. at 77. This was the first time the Court had ever found a statute
discriminating against women to be unconstitutional.
24. The majority stated: "The Equal Protection Clause of [the Fourteenth]
Amendment does, however, deny to States the power to legislate that different
treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis
of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute." Id. at 75-76. The Reed
Court, however, clearly gave the question of sex discrimination more careful
consideration than that required by the above quote, concluding that the objective of
administrative convenience did not justify the application of an arbitrary choice of
men over women instead of an examination of the merits of the individual men and
women in each particular case. Id. at 76.
25. Id. (emphasis added). Professor Gunther describes this middle level as one of
"modest intervention" or "intensified means scrutiny," whereby the means are closely
scrutinized while the court avoids a decision as to the value of the interest being
furthered. Gunther, supra note 17, at 20-37.
26. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). For the application of
this test by a court of appeals, see Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist.,
501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1974).
27. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The issue in Frontiero was whether a female member of
the uniformed services had the same right as a male to claim her spouse as a
"dependent" for the purposes of obtaining increased benefits. Id. at 678. A male could
claim his wife as a dependent without regard to whether she actually qualified as
such, whereas a female was required to prove that her husband was in fact her
dependent. Id. The Court argued that the purpose of the statute was mere
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requiring the strictest level of scrutiny. 2 However, since then, although the
Court has each time closely and suspiciously examined the relationship of
the sex classification to the purpose of the statute in question, 29 a majority of
the Court has yet to require strict scrutiny.
administrative convenience and that the classification commanded "dissimilar
treatment for men and women who are . . . similarly situated." Id. at 690, quoting
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971). The Court also examined for the first time the
validity and the effect of sexual stereotypes, stating: "[Tihe sex characteristic
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.. . . As a
result, statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously
relegating the entire. class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the
actual capabilities of its individual members." 411 U.S. at 686-87 (citations omitted).
28. Suspect classifications receive the strictest standard of scrutiny: the
discriminatory classification must be necessary and the state interest compelling. See,
e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972) ("statutes affecting constitutional
rights must be drawn with 'precision' "); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.- 618, 634
(1969) (a strict equal protection test requires that the law be "necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest"). Examples of classifications which have been
declared suspect are race (see McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)) and national origin (see Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971)). See generally Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1124 (1969).
In Frontiero v. Richardson, Justices Brennan, Douglas, White, and Marshall,
in declaring sex to be a suspect class, emphasized that since
sex like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely
by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the members of
a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate 'the basic concept of
our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility'. . . . And. . .. the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to
4 ability to perform or contribute to society.
411 U.S. at 686 (citation omitted). However, although a plurality of the Court stated
.that sex classifications must be "subjected to strict judicial scrutiny," id. at 688, it
suggested that, had the government offered concrete evidence proving that the
different treatment had saved the government money, the demands of strict judicial
scrutiny might have been satisfied. Id. at 689. It is submitted that the saving of
money as a justification for discrimination would not be sufficient in a case of racial
discrimination and that even those justices who declared sex a suspect class were
actually suggesting a diluted application of the strict judicial scrutiny test.
In fact, one year later, the Supreme Court in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974), upheld a California statute, CAL. UNEMP.1 INS. CODE § 2626 (1974), which
excluded pregnancy-related disabilities from a state insurance program because their
exclusion would have resulted in prohibitively high cost to the program. 417 U.S. at
496. However, arguably, this case may not represent an example of diluted strict
Scrutiny with respect to sex because in its opinion, the Geduldig Court suggested that
the issue was not necessarily sex discrimination simply because only women could
become pregnant The Court argued that there was no "risk from which men [were]
protected and women [were] not and no risk from which women [were] protected and
men [were]*not." Id. at 496-97.
29. For example, in Stanton, the Court, relying on Reed, struck down a statute,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-1 (1953), which set a greater age of majority for males than
for females with regard to parent support payments. 421 U.S. at 17. In doing so, the
Court disapproved of the thrust of the statute which "coincid[ed] with the role-typing
society has long imposed." Id. at 15. In Wiesenfeld, the Court struck down a statute
which provided that social security payments based on the earnings of a deceased
husband were payable to his widow, but those of a deceased wife were not payable to
her widower. The Court relied upon its decision in Reed and Frontiero, declaring that
the "gender based distinction [was] ... indistinguishable from that invalidated in
Frontiero v. Richardson .... 420 U.S. at 642-43. The Court also disapproved of sex
generalizations which assumed that only a man's income was vital to his family's
support. Id. at 643.
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The Supreme Court has not, however, applied the substantial relation-
ship test in all cases involving sex classifications. The Court has continued
to uphold sexual classifications using the rational relationship test in those
cases in which the statute is deemed remedial in nature - i.e., where the
woman is benefited and the statute is designed to redress prior discrimina-
tory wrongs. 30 In Kahn v. Shevin,3' a state tax law that favored women for
the alleged purpose of reducing "the disparity between the economic
capabilities of a man and a woman"32 was upheld.33 The following year, in
Schlesinger v. Ballard,34 the Supreme Court upheld a military regulation
allowing women to remain in service without promotion longer than men,
before being subject to mandatory discharge.35 The Court concluded that
because women did not have the same career advancement opportunities as
the men, the extra years were effectively remedial and therefore justified.36
With respect to discrimination in education, Congress has passed two
major acts in recent years. The Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1972
(1972 Act)37 forbids discrimination by sex in schools, 38 but specifically
30. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974). But see Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (although the
Government urged that the classification was justified because it benefited widows,
the Court ruled that the purpose was not remedial, but was to keep the surviving
parent home with the children, and was therefore subject to a middle level of
scrutiny); note 29 supra.
31. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
32. Id. at 352. The tax law provided that "there shall be exempt from taxation
property to the value of two hundred dollars to every widow that has a family
dependent on her for support." Id. at 352 n.1.
33. Id. at 355-56. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, arguing that sex was
a suspect class, that no overriding and compelling state interest had been shown, and
that the classification was both over- and under-inclusive in identifying those people
who had been prejudiced economically. Id. at 357. The dissent did state, however, that
remedial legislation through a more narrowly drafted statute would be permissible. Id.
at 358.
34. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
35. Id. at 510.
36. Id. at 508, 510. Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall dissented, calling for
closer judicial scrutiny and a determination of whether there would not be a more
accurate, and hence better, way to define the classification. Id. at 511, 519.
Kahn and Ballard are factually distinguishable from those cases where sex
classifications were held to be unconstitutional. See notes 26-29 and accompanying
text supra. Kahn dealt with a state tax, an area traditionally left to the states. Cf.
Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146, 159 (1930) (the fourteenth amendment "imposes
no iron rule of equality, prohibiting the flexibility and variety that are appropriate to
schemes of [state] taxation"). Ballard may simply be an example of the sexes not
being similarly situated with respect to the object of legislation. See 419 U.S. at 508.
However, it is more likely that in fact a double standard has emerged in the area of
sex discrimination. When the injury to the female is clear, the standard of scrutiny to
be applied falls somewhere between the rational relationship test and the strict
scrutiny test. When the female benefits, the easier, rational relationship test suffices.
See Note, The Emerging Bifurcated Standard for Classifications Based on Sex, 1975
DUKE L. J. 163-187. For another interpretation of the conflicting Supreme Court
decisions, see note 85 infra.
37. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (Supp. V 1975).
38. Id. § 1681. The relevant portion of this statute is as follows: "No person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
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excludes, among other categories, public secondary schools.3 9 The Equal
Education Opportunities Act of 1974 (1974 Act),40 which does apply to public
secondary schools,41 was motivated by the busing controversy, and aimed at
limiting the assignment of students to different schools in order to obtain
racial balance.42 A portion of this Act expressly prohibits the creation of dual
school systems in which students are segregated by sex.43
The Third Circuit began its analysis of the propriety of single-sex high
schools by citing plaintiffs stipulations that separate sex education was a
respected educational process, 44 and that there was some evidence that
students performed better in sexually segregated schools. 45 Then, looking to
39. 20 U.S.C. § 168.(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975). The House version of this bill (H.R.
13915, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. (1972)), contained no exceptions. The Senate inserted the
exceptions because, according to United States Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, there
had not been sufficient time to check carefully the effect of a bill which would
eliminate all sex-segregated public schools. 118 CONG. REc. 5803-15 (1972).
40. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 (Supp. V 1975).
41. Section 1701(a) provides the following: "The Congress declares it to be the
policy of the United States that - (1) all children enrolled in public schools are
entitled to equal education opportunity without regard to race, color, sex, or national
origin." Id.
42. 118 CONG. REC. 28836 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Pucinski).
43. Section 1702(a)(1) provides in pertinent part: "(a)-The Congress finds that (1)
the maintenance of dual school systems in which students are assigned to schools
solely on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin denies to those students the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1702(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
Section 1703(a) provides in pertinent part: "No state shall deny equal
educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or her race, color, sex, or
national origin, by - (a) the deliberate segregation by an educational agency of
students on the basis of race, color, or national origin among or within the schools."
Id. § 1703(a).
44. 532 F.2d at 882. The pros and cons of single-sex education have been the
subject of much debate. Those who argue for coeducation emphasize the right to
equality, the unfairness of defining and limiting the options of all women through sex
sterotypes, and the benefit to both sexes through greater freedom of expression and a
wider range of choice. C. JENCKS & D. RIESMAN, THE ACADEMIC REVOLUTION 291-311
(1968). Those men who support the notion of sex segregation do so from a male
separatist and often elitest perspective, "preserving tacit assumptions of male
superiority." Id. at 297-98. Those women who favor women's schools most often refer
to the need for women to compete, to excel, and to emulate female role models, without
the presence of men to play on their inbred sense of inferiority. CARNEGIE
COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN IN HIGHER
EDUCATION 70-75 (1973). For an interesting discussion of this question, see SEX
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAw, supra note 19, at 1000-20.
45. 532 F.2d at 882. The evidence consisted of a study conducted in New Zealand
by Dr. J. Charles Jones, an expert in the field of education, which revealed that
students in sexually segregated schools had a higher regard for scholastic
achievement and devoted more time to homework than those in coeducational
institutions. Id. The court then quoted the district court's statement that this study
alone would. have been sufficient to validate the sex-segregated school. Id., quoting
Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 335 (E.D. Pa 1975). However, the
district court's statement referred hypothetically to the result that would have
followed had a simple rational relationship test been the proper standard to apply. 400
F. Supp. at 335. The district court concluded that more than a rational relationship
would have to be shown between the practice of segregation and the school district's
objectives, thereby implying the need for not less, but more evidence. Id. The Circuit
Court also referred to a study made by Dr. M. Elizabeth Tidball, who found that the
percentage of women listed in Who's Who of American Women from 1910-1959 was
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the lower court's findings that the courses at Central and Philadelphia's all-
female academic secondary school, Girls High, were of equal quality,46 the
court stated that the two schools were "comparable in quality, academic
standing, and prestige; ' 47 that enrollment at either school was voluntary;48
and that plaintiffs desire to attend the boys' school was due to personal
preference, not to objective evaluation. 49
From this factual foundation, the court turned first to federal statutory
pronouncements on the issue at bar. Initially, the court rejected any
authority for plaintiffs position that the 1972 Act was applicable.50 The
court then argued that the 1974 Act 5' was at best ambiguous and therefore
not controlling.52 The legislature, according to the court, enacted the 1974
Act to curb racial segregation and student busing5 3 - specifically to
eliminate the "dual school system" 54 but also to eliminate the assignment of
students to non-neighborhood schools solely for the achievement of racial
balance. 5 The act was not designed, the court contended, to apply to a
situation, as in the principal case, where a student voluntarily withdrew
from a sexually integrated neighborhood school in order to attend an
academic school. 56 By viewing the legislative intent in this light, the court
was able to explain the anomaly of the Act's express prohibition against sex
higher for graduates of women's colleges than for those of coeducational colleges. 532
F.2d at 882 n.2. For a criticism of these studies as they apply to the case at bar, see
note 100 infra.
• 46. The district court found the two schools comparable educationally - in terms
of courses, facilities (with the exception of science) and preparation for college. 400 F.
Supp. at 329. However, it noted that Central had a more influential and prestigious
alumni association, a national reputation, and a substantial private endowment. Id.
at 328-29. Girls High, in contrast, had "a large number of graduates of note" in
business, the professions, and academics. Id. at 329.
47. 532 F.2d at 882.
48. Id. at 881.
49. Id. For a criticism of the court's statement, see notes 87-95 and accompanying
text infra.
. 50. 532 F.2d at 883. For a discussion of this Act, see notes 37-39 and
accompanying text supra. The 1972 Act exempts public secondary schools. In
addition, the Third Circuit emphasized Congress' fear that the elimination of all sex-
segregated schools was too drastic a step to take without specific hearings - a fear
which the court shared and which was influential in its decision. 532 F.2d at 881; see
note 98 and accompanying text infra.
.51. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 (Supp. V 1975).
52. 532 F.2d at 885. The Third Circuit raised the question of the applicability of
the 1974 Act sua sponte. The court examined the original 1972 House bill, H.R. 13915,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), which did not, however, pass the Senate. 532 F.2d at 883.
Although this bill at times included sex, and at times did not, sex was omitted from
the final version as passed by the House. 532 F.2d at 883-84. The court, pointing to
the apparently random insertion and deletion of sex and the absence of any debate on
sex discrimination by the 92nd Congress (see 118 CONG. REc. 28,834-916 (1972); id. at
33996-5330), concluded that the inclusion of sex in the 1974 Act by a different
Congress must have been inadvertent, because the 1974 Act was based in part upon
the 1972 House bill. 532 F.2d at 884.
53. 532 F.2d at 884.
54. Id. at 885; see 20 U.S.C. at § 1702(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975) (quoted in full in note 43
supra).
55. 532 F.2d at 885; see 20 U.S.C. § 1703(c) (Supp. V 1975) (quoted in full in note 75
infra).
56. 532 F.2d at 885.
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discrimination57 together with the absence of a corresponding prohibition
against sex segregation.58 Furthermore, having already established that the
two schools were "essentially equal,"59 the Third Circuit was unable to find
any inequality of "educational opportunity" in contravention of the Act's
policy declaration.60
Turning then to the constitutional issue presented, the Third Circuit
concluded that the case at bar was different from those decided under Reed's
fair and substantial relationship standard,61 since the principal case did not
involve a clear deprivation or loss of benefit to the female.6 2 Rather, the
court stated that there was evidence showing that segregation was perhaps
beneficial to the female, and in any event, whatever the benefits or
detriments in the system, they fell equally on both sexes. 63 According to the
court, Vorchheimer was perhaps not a case of discrimination at all.64 As for
plaintiff's contention, based upon Brown v. Board of Education,65 that
separate could never be equal, the court simply noted that sex, unlike race,
was not a suspect class.
66
Instead, the court relied upon Williams v. McNair,67 a case which
predated Reed by a few months, and in which the Supreme Court summarily
affirmed a three-judge court which upheld sex-based college admissions
standards against a male plaintiffs attack. The Third Circuit concluded
that Williams was "strong, if not controlling authority" 68 in cases where the
benefit and detriments in education were equal for both sexes. 69 The three-
judge court in Williams had applied the rational relationship test and the
M7. Id.; see 20-U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975) (quoted in full in note 41 supra).
58. 532 F.2d at 885; see 20 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (Supp. V 1975) (quoted in full in note 43
supra).
59. 532 F.2d at 882. For a discussion of this issue, see notes 47-49 and
accompanying text supra.
60. 532 F.2d at 885; see 20 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975) (quoted in full in note
43 supra).
61. 532 F.2d at 886. For a discussion of this standard, see notes 21-29 and
accompanying text supra.
62. The court again distinguished the Kahn and Ballard line of cases, see notes
30-36 supra, in which the female benefited and the looser rational relationship test
was applied. See notes 17-20 and accompanying text supra.
63. 532 F.2d at 886.
64. Id.
65. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
66. 532 F.2d at 886. The court further asserted: "[T]here are differences between
the sexes which may, in limited circumstances, justify disparity in law." Id. In its
argument to the contrary, counsel for the plaintiff had urged that factors such as
prestige were inherently unequal between the two groups - one dominant and one
excluded - and that therefore Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was
in point. 400 F. Supp. at 334 n.1.
67. 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 951 (1971). In Williams, the only
case dealing with the constitutionality of gender classifications in school admissions
to reach the Supreme Court, a male sought admission to an all-girl's college. The
district court, using the rational relationship test, found that the segregation was not
"wholly wanting in reason," 316 F. Supp. at 137, and thus concluded that in a system
which included many. coeducational schools, the existence of some sexually.
segregated schools was constitutional. Id. at 138-39.
68. 532 F.2d at 887.
69. Id. Although in Williams the plaintiff was a male seeking admission to a
girl's school, the Third Circuit argued that the case provided a fact situation parallel
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Third Circuit approved that use of the test, even in light of Reed, because the
restrictive admissions policy applied equally to both sexes. 0 However, the
court did not expressly decide whether to apply the rational or the fair and
substantial test to the instant case, concluding that either test was
satisfied.7 Thus, finding that the plaintiff had not been denied the equal
protection of the laws,7 2 the Third Circuit reversed the district court.73
Judge Gibbons heatedly dissented,74 criticizing both the statutory and
constitutional basis for the majority's holding. The 1974 Act, he insisted,
prohibited on its face precisely the kind of sex segregation in a public school
presented in Vorchheimer.75 With reference to the constitutional claim,
Judge Gibbons argued for the application of the fair and substantial
relationship test enunciated in Reed7 6 and concluded that the exclusion of
to Vorchheimer because neither case was remedial - in both equal education was
being offered to both sexes, now and in the past. Id. These facts also distinguished
Williams, as they had Vorchheimer, from the line of cases decided by the substantial
relationship test. Id.; see note 61 supra.
70. 532 F.2d at 887.
71. Id. at 888.
72. Id. at 885.
73. Id. at 888.
74. Quoting from the 1896 Supreme Court opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896), which had upheld the segregation of whites and blacks, Judge Gibbons
substituted the word "sex" for the word "race" in Plessy, concluding: "I was under the
distinct impression, however, that 'separate but equal' analysis, especially in the field
of public education, passed from the fourteenth amendment jurisprudential scene over
twenty years ago." 532 F.2d at 888 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
75. 532 F.2d at 890-91. The 1974 Act prohibits
the assignment by an educational agency of a student to a school, other than the
one closest to his or her place of residence within the school district in which he or
she resides, if the assignment results in a greater degree of segregation of
students on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin among the schools of
such agency than would result if such student were assigned to the school closest
to his or her place of residence within the school district of such agency providing
the appropriate grade level and type of education for such student.
20 U.S.C. § 1703(c) (Supp. V 1975). Turning to section 1705 of the Act, Judge Gibbons
refuted the majority's suggestion that Philadelphia's academic schools did not fit
within the neighborhood school concept referred to in the Act. This section, Judge
Gibbons asserted, defines the neighborhood school as the school nearest the student's
place of residence "which provides the appropriate grade level and type of education
for such student . . . unless such assignment is for the purpose of segregating
students on the basis of ... sex." 532 F.2d at 890, citing 20 U.S.C. § 1705 (Supp. V
1975). Therefore, Judge Gibbons concluded that "[tihe Philadelphia dual system for
scholastically superior students not only falls within the legislative finding of the
denial of equal protection of the laws, but is also a specified unlawful practice under
[section 1703(c)]." 532 F.2d at 891.
In addition, Judge Gibbons labeled the majority's legislative history
"legislative non-history." Id. at 891. Absence of debate by a previous Congress was
not relevant to the interpretation of the 1974 Act. Judge Gibbons noted that, in 1974,
when the legislature was faced with a choice of amendments on which to vote - one
which included the word "sex" and one which did not - they voted for the
amendment which included "sex." Id. at 893. This, insisted Gibbons, was the only
legislative history relevant to an interpretation of the 1974 Act.
76. 532 F.2d at 896. The dissent did not address the issue of a double standard for
sex discrimination challenges depending on whether or not the female benefits. See
notes 30-36 and accompanying text supra. Citing a line of cases including Ballard,
Kahn, Frontiero, and Reed, the dissent concluded that "certainly there appears to be a
majority consensus against the mere rational relationship test." 532 F.2d at 896 n.15.
This line of cases, according to the dissent, severely undermined the precedential
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females from Central did not bear such a relationship to the school board's
legitimate objectives. 77
The Third Circuit's analysis in Vorchheimer is deficient in several
respects. In examining the 1974 Act,78 the court made use of lapses in the
legislative history to support its disregard of express language in the Act
itself. Unable to find any deliberation by Congress on the issue of sex
segregation, the majority concluded that Congress could not have meant sex
when they said sex in the act.7 9 It is submitted, as the dissent insisted, that
such absence of deliberation should not have been used to contradict what
otherwise would appear to be the clear language of the statute.80
value of Williams v. McNair, 401 U.S. 951 (1971), the case relied upon by the majority.
See notes 69-71 and accompanying text supra.
77. 532 F.2d at 896. In this conclusion, Judge Gibbons agreed with the district
court. 400 F. Supp. at 342.
Furthermore, Judge Gibbons stated, even if Williams were of precedential
value, once enacted, the 1974 Act superseded any Supreme Court rejection of an
identical challenge. 532 F.2d at 895. Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment provides
that "[tihe Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. In Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641 (1966), the Supreme Court upheld Congress' right to determine that a
state law violated the fourteenth amendment and to set it aside, even though the
Supreme Court had previously rejected an identical challenge. Id. at 648-49.
Therefore, even if the majority's constitutional interpretation were correct, the sexual
segregation of students in Philadelphia's academic schools would be illegal. Judge
Gibbons noted that the majority expressly declined to discuss this issue. 532 F.2d at
885, 893.
78. See notes 51-60 and accompanying text supra.
79. Id. Whether or not Congress intended that this act be applied to cases of sex
discrimination may not be controlling. It has been argued, with reference to title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that when Representative Smith offered an
amendment to add "sex" to the prohibited areas of discrimination, he did so in an
attempt to sabotage the entire Civil Rights Act, against which he voted. 110 CONG.
REC. 2804 (1964); see Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 62, 79 (1964); Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination
in American Law, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 305, 311 (1968); Miller, Sex Discrimination and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 879-80 (1967); Note,
Classification of the Basis of Sex and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 50 IOWA L. REV. 778,
789 (1965). But see Berger, Equal Pay, Equal Employment Opportunity and Equal
Enforcement of the Law for Women, 5 VALPARAIso L. REV. 326, 335-38 (1971).
80. 532 F.2d at 892 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). When the provisions of a statute are
"clear and unequivocal on their face, [there is] no need to resort to the legislative
history of the act." United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961); see Ex parte
Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949). Since the 1974 Act prohibits "the maintenance of dual
school systems," 20 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added), the definition
of the "system" is crucial. The majority looked to the entire Philadelphia school
system. 532 F.2d at 881. The court in support of its definition of "system" might have
argued that in the context of busing students en masse to achieve racial balance, the
words "assignment" and "dual school system" applied to pervasive, large scale
discrimination. The dissent, on the other hand, defined "system" as Philadelphia's
two academic high schools. 532 F.2d at 891. As Justice Gibbons so vividly stated:
The train Vorchheimer wants to ride is that of a rigorous academic program
among her intellectual peers. Philadelphia, like the state of Louisiana in 1896,
offers the service but only if Vorchheimer is willing to submit to segregation. Her
choice ... is to submit to that segregation or refrain from availing herself of the
service.
Id. at 889. If the "system" consists of Central and Girls High, then students are
plainly assigned on the basis of their sex, thereby promoting segregation which has
been statutorily outlawed.
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Additionally, the court's treatment of both the statutory and constitu-
tional challenge to the sex-segregated schools was premised upon its initial
finding of equality between the two schools.8' The court approached the 1974
Act skeptically,8 2 focusing upon the Act's policy which provides for equality
of opportunity, as opposed to total equality.83 The finding that equality
existed enabled the court to conclude that the operation of two sex-
segregated schools did not violate congressional policy. 84 Similarly, the
finding of equality was at the heart of the court's constitutional analysis.
Only by assuming that there was no injury to the female could the Third
Circuit avoid express application of the substantial relationship test,85 and
only by assuming no injury could this stricter test be satisfied, as the Third
81. See note 46 supra.
82. For the court's analysis of this issue, see notes 51-60 and accompanying text
supra.
83. 532 F.2d at 885, construing 20 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
84. 532 F.2d at 885.
85. Id. at 886-87; see notes 61-63 and accompanying text supra.
An alternative interpretation of the apparently contradictory decisions by the
Supreme Court since Reed was. suggested by Judge Newcomer of the district court in
Vorchheimer: "sexual classifications cannot be used merely to achieve administrative
efficiency or economy, but they may be used to further other, more substantive state
interests." 400 F. Supp. at 341. This, Judge Newcomer asserted, on the one hand, fit
the holdings in Reed v. Reed and Frontiero v. Richardson, where the purpose was
essentially the administrative convenience of an easily applied classification (see
notes 22 & 28 supra); and on the other hand echoed dicta in Kahn v. Shevin and
Schlesinger v. Ballard, where the Court suggested that a valid state interest in
helping or protecting women was at stake. See notes 37-42 and accompanying text
supra. However, according to Judge Newcomer, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975), does not fit this interpretation because in that case the Court struck down
a sex-classification despite "admitted ... empirical evidence that it furthered a state
interest." 400 F. Supp. at 341.
To expand Judge Newcomer's test, administrative convenience is a way of
describing the purpose of sex-based generalizations. If an easily identifiable group
has, for the most part, the characteristics that the legislation attempts to isolate, then
it is easier to draw the classification by sex than to define the characteristics
specifically. Although the Court in Reed did not actually discuss sex-based
generalizations, this was exactly the a~sumption on which the state's classification
rested - that women in most instances knew less about estate management than
men. 93 Idaho 511, 514, 465 P.2d 635, 638 (1970). In Frontiero, the sex-based
generalization was that wives in most instances are dependents while husbands are
not, 411 U.S. at 688-89; in Stanton, that the men need more training and schooling
than women, 421 U.S. at 10; in Wiesenfeld, that a man's income is crucial to his
family's support, while a woman's is not, 420 U.S. at 645. In each instance the
classification was intended to save the time of identifying the real group for which the
legislation was intended. In each of these, the actual state interest was not directly
furthered by the classifications, but was merely simplified.
On the other hand, Ballard, in which the sex classification was upheld, dealt
with a statute meant to help women in the military, all of whom fit the characteristics
which the legislation aimed to remedy. 419 U.S. at 508. This classification, unlike the
others, was not clearly over- or under-inclusive nor based upon a generalization about
sex. From this perspective, the Court in Kahn, should have invalidated the state law
- the category of widows clearly serving only to simplify the identification of those in
need.
In all of the above cases a close scrutiny of the means was used to determine
whether the classification was directly tailored to the purpose. This is, in effect,
Professor Gunther's description of the substantial relationship test. See note 26 supra.
The advantage of such a test is that, by looking to the means and not to the end, the
result does not hinge upon whether the female benefits or is hurt. In Vorchheimer, the
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Circuit concluded it would be.86 However, it can be forcefully argued that
this assumption of equality is incorrect.
The Third Circuit borrowed from the district court the conclusion that
"in general. . . the education available to the female students at Girls High
is comparable to that available to the male students at Central.' 8 7 By thus
ignoring the numerous distinctions between the two schools in the district
court's findings of fact,8 8 the Third Circuit turned the above statement,
relating to courses and facilities,8 9 into a statement to be applied to the
entire school experience. The fact that Central, unlike Girls High, has an
influential, loyal, and generous body of alumni;90 that many of its graduates
are prominent in the professional, political, and cultural life of Philadelphia
and Pennsylvania;91 that it has a national reputation 92 - none of these
factors were considered material by the court in its finding of equality
between the two schools. As the Third Circuit itself so aptly stated:
graduates of Central "have made notable contributions to the professions,
business, government and academe... [the graduates of Girls High] have
distinguished themselves in their chosen diverse fields. '93 Although the girl
who attends Girls High will receive an excellent education, she will not meet
the bulk of tomorrow's influential people or share in an atmosphere of
anticipated leadership and importance. 94 These factors, although difficult to
measure, are an integral part of what the graduate from Central takes with
him when he leaves school. It is therefore submitted that Central and Girls
High are not equal - that there is a desire among girls to go to Central
without a corresponding desire among boys to go to Girls and that these
"preferences" are neither irrelevant nor irrational.9 5
Taking this analysis one step further, the question arises whether
sexually segregated schools could ever be equal. In raising Brown v. Board
of Education,96 both the plaintiff and dissenting Judge Gibbons implied
evidence seemed inadequate to demonstrate that all'males benefit from male schools
and all females from female schools.
86. 532 F.2d at 888.
87. 400 F. Supp. at 329.
88. Id. at 328-29.
89. Id. at 329. In a sense, Judge Newcomer of the district court may have made it
easier for the Third Circuit to gloss over many of his findings. Although differences
between the two schools are stated in his opinion (findings 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26,
28), id. at 328-29, the advantages of Central are not presented in conjunction with
their absence at Girls High and nowhere are the separate facts considered as a whole
so as to facilitate a conclusion of inequality.
90. The district court stated this in its Findings of Fact, nos. 21 & 22. Id. at 329.
91. This formed the basis of the district court's Finding of Fact no. 19. Id. at 328.
92. The district court stated this in its Finding of Fact no. 20. Id. at 328-29.
93. 532 F.2d at 881.
94. To paraphrase Chief Justice Vinson, Central possesses to a "greater degree
[than Girls] those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which
make for greatness in a school." Sweatt v. Painter, 399 U.S. 629, 634 (1950); see
Vorchheimer's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit at 12-13.
95. The district court had found that "males and not females are the intended
beneficiaries of the defendant's exclusionary policy." 400 F. Supp. at 342.
96. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Vorchheimer v. School
Dist., 532 F.2d at 886, 888-89.
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that, as with race, the separation of the sexes perpetuates the inequalities
between the dominant group and the excluded group. 97 Indeed, the majority
appeared to be influenced by their fear that affirmance of the lower court
would mean abolishing all single-sex schools. 98 The specter of such far-
reaching reform proved a weighty factor in both their statutory and their
constitutional analysis. However, the Vorchheimer court need not have
faced the broader question of whether separate-sex schools could ever be
equal. Instead, it should have recognized the factual situation in Philadel-
phia and the existence there of two unequal schools. Had the court gone
beyond a narrow interpretation of education, had it gone beyond a finding of
"essential equality" in courses, facilities, and admission to college, it would
have been forced to apply explicitly the stricter substantial relationship test
to the segregation at hand.99 It is submitted that, in the face of a test more
stringent than minimal scrutiny, the evidence presented in favor of sex-
segregated high schools was inadequate.100
On April 19, 1977, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Third
Circuit's decision in Vorchheimer.'0 1 The affirmance resulted from an evenly
split Court, however, and it sets no legal precedent. The holding by the Third
Circuit is the final ruling.
If the Third Circuit's decision implies the application of the rational
relationship test unless there is a clearly adverse impact on women, then the
scope of the test suggested in Reed has been severely narrowed.102 If, on the
97. 532 F.2d at 889 n.1 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). If there is inherent inequality
between the two groups, then any division would be per se unconstitutional.
98. The opinion opens with the question "Do the Constitution and laws of the
United States require that every public school in every public school system in the
Nation, be coeducational?" 532 F.2d at 881 (emphasis added). It concludes on the
same note - "[i]f she were to prevail, then all public single-sex schools would have to
be abolished." Id. at 888 (emphasis added).
99. The district court applied the substantial relationship test without expressly
holding that the two schools were unequal. 400 F. Supp. at 342. The court, however,
stated that it "seems obvious [that] keeping women out of Central High has an
adverse impact on them." Id.
100. The evidence consisted in part of a New Zealand study which is purely
attitudinal. 532 F.2d at 882; see note 45 supra. There are no statistics on actual
performance by students in coeducational as opposed to sex-segregated schools.
Furthermore, the applicability of New Zealand teenage attitudes to American society
is not immediately apparent. The balance of the evidence, a study by Dr. Tidball
which showed that a majority of the women in Who's Who of American Women were
graduates of women's colleges, was conducted from 1910 to 1959. Id. The study makes
no attempt to differentiate the colleges qualitatively, 400 F.2d at 329-30, and therefore
makes no allowance for the fact that a large number of the superior colleges open to
women have traditionally been women's colleges. The district court found both studies
to be inapplicable to the Philadelphia school situation and irrelevant to the
defendant's stated educational objectives. Id. at 333.
101. Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 97 S. Ct. 1671 (1977).
102. This "favoritism" towards women is a common theme in discussions about
women's rights. In the 1950 and 1953 Senate debates, Senator Hayden amended the
United States Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to provide that "[t]he provisions of
this article shall not be construed to impair rights, benefits, or exemptions conferred
by law upon persons of the female sex." 96 CONG. REC. 738 (1950). The Senate passed
the ERA as amended; the House did not. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The
Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80
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other hand, the Third Circuit's decision is interpreted as an application of
the substantial relationship test, on the basis of so little, and such tenuously
relevant evidence, then only an extremely diluted version of that test
remains.10 3 Whatever the test, in the final analysis, Vorchheimer rejects the
notion that in separation of the sexes in high school there is constitutional
inequality, and permits the different treatment of men and women at law.104
Jane Landes Foster
YALE L.J. 871, 886-88 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brown]. It has been a common
theme in discussions for equal rights, as illustrated by Senator Hayden's amendment,
that women may need special treatment in some circumstances. The argument made
in opposition is well stated in the Brown article:[WIhatever the motivation for different treatment, the result is to create a dual
system of rights and responsibilities in which the rights of each group are
governed by a different set of values. History and experience have taught us that
in such a dual system one group is always dominant and the other subordinate.
As long as a woman's place is defined as separate, a male-dominated society will
define her place as inferior.
Brown, supra at 873-74.
103. See text accompanying note 71 supra. For a related discussion, see notes 99 &
100 and accompanying text supra. For a variety of views on whether or not a middle
tier test under Equal Protection exists, as expressed by Justices of the United States
Supreme Court, see Craig v. Boren, 45 U.S.L.W. 4057 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1976) (No. 75-628).
104. It has been forcefully argued that the Supreme Court should leave such
fundamental decisions to the democratic process. In Frontiero, Justice Powell, who
disagreed with the plurality's definition of sex as a suspect class, argued that the
submission of the ERA to the states for ratification was a "compelling" reason for
postponing a decision on whether or not to treat sex as a suspect class. 411 U.S. at
692. He characterized the plurality's determination that sex was a suspect class as
"reaching out to preempt by judicial action a major political decision." Id. at 692.
The basic arguments against waiting for passage or defeat of the ERA are the
following: 1) the ERA does not repeal the fourteenth amendment which continues to
operate to protect citizens, and which for two years after passage of the ERA would
continue to be the primary avenue to combat sex discrimination; 2) the notion that thejudiciary should defer to the future actions of the legislature contradicts a tradition of
judicial adjudication in the area of individual rights. See Johnston, supra note 18 at
641.
The following is the text of the proposed Amendment to the United States
Constitution:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of
ratification.
H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). One
commentator has noted, "There is no doubt that the Equal Rights Amendment...
would eliminate differentiation on account of sex in the public schools and public
university systems." Brown, supra note 102, at 906.
1976-1977] 665
60
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1977], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol22/iss3/8
666 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SIXTH AMENDMENT - FEBERAL HABEAS
CORPUS PETITIONER NOT ENTITLED TO A JURY COMPOSED OF RESIDENTS
OF THE COUNTY WHERE THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED - Stone v. Powell
MANDATES INTENSE SCRUTINY OF EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENTS.
Zicarelli v. Gray (1976)
Joseph Zicarelli was convicted by a New Jersey court of conspiracy and
of aiding and abetting the bribery of a public official.' Although the alleged
offenses were committed in urban Hudson County,2 trial was held in rural
Burlington County with a jury drawn solely from that county.3 After
unsuccessfully appealing his convictions through the New Jersey courts,'
Zicarelli sought a writ of habeas corpus 5 from the United. States District
Court for the District of New Jersey. His petition alleged that the sixth
amendment gave him the right to be tried by a jury composed of the
residents of Hudson County and that the jury selection procedure employed
by New Jersey violated the sixth amendment's implicit requirement that the
jury pool represent a cross-section of the community.6 The district court
refused to grant the writ.7 Zicarelli's appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reiterated the claims he had made in the district court and
responded to a proposition raised for the first time during oral argument
1. Zicarelli v. Gray, 543 F.2d 466, 468 n.7 (3d Cir. 1976).
2. Id. at 468-69. A statewide grand jury had returned seven indictments against
Zicarelli. All seven charged him with offenses occurring in Hudson County; one
specified offenses in Hudson and Mercer Counties and one specified offenses in
Hudson, Bergen, and Burlington Counties. Id. Zicarelli was brought to trial on
indictments charging crimes in Hudson County alone. Zicarelli v. Gray, No. 75-1173,
slip op. at 3 n.5 (3d Cir., Nov. 18, 1975).3. 543 F.2d at 469. Venue of the first indictment was initially laid in Hudson
County but, pursuant to an ex parte petition to the assignment judge by the Attorney
General of New Jersey, venue was moved to Mercer County without notice to
defendant. Id. at 468-69. Venue was changed to Burlington County after the next five
indictments were returned, again upon the ex parte petition of the Attorney General
and without notice to defendant. Id. at 469. Venue for the seventh indictment was laid
in Burlington County. Id. Defendant moved for an order to redesignate venue in
Hudson Ciunty. The motion was denied, without a hearing by the assigned trialjudge. Id. Defendant appealed and the New Jersey Supreme Court remanded to the
original assignment judge who held that Burlington County was a proper county for
purposes of venue. Id. Among the various reasons supporting the holding was the
assertion that the sixth amendment to the Constitution did not prohibit laying of
venue in Burlington County. Id.
4. Zicarelli's first conviction was affirmed by the Superior Court of New Jersey.
State v. Zicarelli, 122 N.J. Super. 225, 300 A.2d 154, certif. denied, 63 N.J. 252, 306
A.2d 445, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973). His second conviction was upheld by the
Supreme Court of New Jersey. State v. Louf, 64 N.J. 172, 313 A.2d 793 (per curiam),
aff'g 126 N.J. Super. 321, 314 A.2d 376 (1973).
5. The federal habeas statute is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970). The Habeas
Corpus Act of 1867 extended the privilege of the writ to state prisoners. Act of Feb. 5,
1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385-86.
6. 543 F.2d at 469-70. Zicarelli also alleged in his petition to the district court 1)
that the ex parte procedure for allocating venue had violated his due process rights, 2)
that his jurors had not been asked about exposure to publicity as the result of an
improper ruling by the trial court, 3) that he had been denied due process by being
tried twice for the same conspiracy, and 4) that the absence of opportunity to be heard
prior to, rather than after, the designation of venue had also constituted a denial of
due process. Id. at 469 n.14a.
7. Id. at 470.
61
Zeitlin: Constitutional Law
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
that the sixth amendment was violated when the district from which the
jury was drawn had not been previously ascertained by law.8 The Third
Circuit,9 sitting en banc, rejected Zicarelli's claims and refused to issue the
writ of habeas corpus, holding 1) that the sixth amendment did not
guarantee the right to trial by a jury drawn from the county in which the
crimes were committed, 2) that with respect to petitioner's cross-section
claim, mere reference to another case involving a similar claim, when
coupled with petitioner's failure to provide factual allegations in support of
his claim, did not satisfy the exhaustion requirements of the federal habeas
corpus statute, and 3) that the claim that trial was held in a district not
previously ascertained by law must be heard first in a state court. Zicarelli v.
Gray, 543 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1976).
The sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides:
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law .... ,,10 Although the sixth amendment's "State and
8. Id. at 470-71; see text accompanying note 69 infra. A panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit ordered the writ to be used unless Zicarelli was granted
a new trial. Zicarelli v. Gray, No. 75-1173 (3d Cir., Nov. 18, 1975). The State of New
York petitioned for a rehearing and an amicus brief in support of its petition was filed
by the United States. 543 F.2d at 470.
9. Judge Adams wrote the majority opinion. Judges Van Dusen, Hunter, and
Gibbons all filed separate opinions, concurring in part and dissenting in part. See
note 66 infra.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE
.CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1951). The right to a jury trial in criminal
cases in the United States was established and implemented by article III (Judiciary
Article), the sixth amendment, and the Judiciary Act of 1789. The Judiciary Article
contained only a simple provision for venue "in the State where the said crimes shall
have been committed . . ." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. This generated "grave fears"
which led to "violent attacks" on the "inequity" of the omission of a requirement that
the jury be drawn from the vicinage or neighborhood. See Blume, The Place of Trial of
Criminal Cases; Constitutional Vicinage and Venue, 43 MICH. L. REV. 59, 60 (1944);
Warren, New Light on The History of The Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV L.
REV. 49, 105 (1923).
The sixth amendment was proposed, at least in part, to allay those fears and
pacify attackers of the Constitution. See F. HELLER, supra at 27, for an explanation of
the generalized "clamor" for a Bill of Rights and the particularly vociferous demand
for a vicinage provision. An unenacted amendment introduced by James Madison in
the House would have required "an impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage."
While records of the Senate debates which resulted in the deletion of this phrase are
not available, Madison viewed the Senate's objections to be reflective of the lack of
uniformity of vicinage provisions then found in the various states. 1 LETTERS AND
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 493 (1865). The ultimate version of the sixth
amendment requiring "an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed" represented a compromise between "broad and narrow
definitions of [vicinage] and ... left Congress the power to determine the actual size
of the 'vicinage' by its creation of judicial districts." Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,
96 (1969). This was accomplished by the First Congress' establishment of judicial
districts in the Judiciary Act of 1789. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 2, 1 Stat. 73.
Professor Heller carefully distinguishes between the sixth amendment and
article III:
[Tihis provision [the sixth amendment] dps not constitute a limitation on the
venue; it does not regulate the place at which trial may be held. Only in the
Judiciary Article does the Constitution purport to restrict the venue of criminal
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district" language is commonly referred to as a venue provision, i.e.,
designating the place where trial is to be held, technically the amendment
designates only the locale from which the jury members may come. The
sixth amendment's geographic limitation of the source of the jury pool is
more accurately termed a vicinage provision. The colonial concept of the
parameters of vicinage was as narrow as the neighborhood of the crime,
certainly no wider than the county, and it may be supposed that the lack of
a provision commensurate with the popular perception of vicinage
accounted for the characterization of the sixth amendment as a venue
provision.
Legal historians" and early cases 12 agree that the "State and district"
language of the sixth amendment was implemented by the Judiciary Act's
establishment of federal judicial districts 13 which were, with two exceptions,
consistent with state boundary lines.' 4 When, in 1968, the United States
Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana,15 held that the fourteenth
amendment 6 guaranteed a right to trial by jury in all state criminal cases
which, had they been federal, would have come within the sixth amendment,
it became necessary to define the sixth amendment's "State and district"
language for purposes of state criminal prosecutions. In so doing, few state
cases. The Sixth Amendment's provision . . . pertains only to the locality from
which the jury is to be selected; in other words, it defines the outer limits of the
vicinage from which the jury must be summoned.
F. HELLER, supra at 92 (emphasis in the original) (footnotes omitted).
11. See note 10 supra.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 28 F. Cas. 699 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1830) (No.
16,730), appeal dismissed, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 149 (1833) (trials may be held in county
other than one in which crime was committed to avoid inconvenience but jurors must
come from place of crime); United States v. Stowell, 27 F. Cas. 1350 (C.C.D. Mass.
1854) (No. 16,409) (a jury from the vicinage was an axiom of the common law); United
States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 650 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 14,868) (special sessions for
criminal trials to be held in county where crime was committed).
13. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 2, 1 Stat. 73. Further, section 29 of the
Judiciary Act stated: "That in cases punishable with death, the trial shall be had in
the county where the offense was committed, or where that cannot be done without
great inconvenience, twelve petit jurors at least shall be summoned from thence." Id.
§ 29. This provision and the one establishing federal judicial districts, which were
considered by Congress concurrently with the constitutional amendments which
became the Bill of Rights, were thought to be sufficiently specific about vicinage to
relieve the fears about inadequate protection of the accused and to enable the passage
of the sixth amendment even though it did not contain a narrowly drawn vicinage
provision. 1 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 493 (1865); see
Warren, supra note 10, at 105. Professor Heller has asserted that by "tying the concept
of vicinage to a system of judicial districts subject to Congressional determination"
the First Congress in effect passed the hot potato of vicinage on to its successors. F.
HELLER, supra note 10, at 93.
14. Professor Blume has concluded that since the consideration of the Bill of
Rights and the Judiciary Act coincided, the word "district" was meant to convey the
meaning that the Judiciary Act gave to it. Blume, supra note 10, at 65-66. At that
time, with the exceptions of Massachusetts and Virginia which each had two judicial
districts, the state and district boundaries were identical. Id. at 66. Courts which have
considered the meaning of the "State and district" language in the sixth amendment
have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480
(1918); Barrett v. United States, 169 U.S. 218 (1898); Lafoon 4. United States, 250 F.2d
958 (5th Cir. 1958); McNealy v. Johnston, 100 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1938).
15. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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courts have looked beyond their own venue statutes. 7 Those courts which
have addressed the issue have concluded either that "district" means the
federal judicial district"8 or some smaller unit roughly equivalent to a county
or municipal district. 19 However, the issues in these cases are frequently
framed in the context of alleged discrimination in jury composition or
selection, and many courts, therefore, resolve the sixth amendment dispute
on grounds other than venue or vicinage.20
The contentions in a petition for habeas corpus2' that venue was
improper and that the jury did not represent a cross-section of the
community have often coalesced. 22 For example, in People v. Jones, 23 the
defendant was accused of crimes committed in the central district, one of
nine judicial districts in Los Angeles, but tried in the southwest district
because of the availability there of judges and courtrooms. The jury was
drawn solely from the district in which the trial was held. In a close
decision, the California Supreme Court held the defendant's sixth amend-
ment rights were violated because "a criminal defendant in a state criminal
prosecution has a constitutional right to be tried by a jury drawn from, and
comprising a representative cross-section of, the residents of the district
wherein the crime shall have been committed. '24
17. See, e.g., People v. McDowell, 27 Cal. App. 3d 864, 104 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1972).
The dearth of precedent interpreting this "operative portion" of the sixth amendment
was noted by the Zicarelli court. 543 F.2d at 478.
18. See generally Maryland v. Brown, 295 F. Supp. 63 (D. Md. 1969).
19. See Bradley v. Judges of Superior Court, 531 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1976) (district
held to be the municipal judicial district); People v. Jones, 9 Cal. 3d 546, 510 P.2d 705,
108 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1973) ("a jury drawn from only a portion of a county, exclusive of
the place of the commission of the crime will not satisfy the [constitutional]
requirement"); People v. Scher, 76 Misc. 2d 71, 349 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1973) (under New
York practice, district was interpreted as county). See 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 415 (1974), in
which it was argued that vicinage no longer serves a necessary function and must
yield to venue changes motivated by impartiality considerations. Accord, F. HELLER,
supra note 10, at 95.
20. See Bradley v. Judges of Superior Court, 531 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970); Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891 (Alas.
1971).
21. See note 5 supra.
22. The United States Supreme Courthas found constitutional violations in trials
where the jury does not represent a fair cross-section of the community. Systematic
exclusion of large or distinct groups from jury pools has been held contrary to the
fundamental purposes and functions of juries. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975) (women); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (plurality opinion) (blacks); Thiel v.
Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (wage earners); cf. United States v. Butera, 420
F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970) (constitution requires only that a jury selection procedure be
free of discrimination); United States v. Brown, 281 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. La. 1968)
(deliberate discrimination against blacks not demonstrated by random selection from
voter registration lists); People v. McDowell, 27 Cal. App. 3d 864, 104 Cal. Rptr. 181
(1972) (geographical exclusion not invalid absent showing of discrimination).
23. 9 Cal. 3d 546, 510 P.2d 705, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1973) (4-3 decision).
24. Id. at 551, 510 P.2d at 709, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 349. The Jones court relied upon
Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891 (Alas. 1971). 9 Cal. 3d at 552, 510 P.2d at 709, 108 Cal.
Rptr. at 349. Alvarado involved the trial of an Aleutian, accused of committing a
crime in his native village, by a jury drawn exclusively from Anchorage. The Alaska
Supreme Court held that "[it is the community in which the crime was committed
that the jury must represent." 486 P.2d at 902.
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When a state prisoner raises a sixth amendment claim in the context of
a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus, it must be shown that he or she
has exhausted available state remedies before the court will reach the merits
of the claim. 25 The requirement of exhaustion, which was judicially
developed prior to its statutory enactment,26 represents a federal policy of
promoting comity between federal and state courts 27 by according state
courts the first opportunity to correct their own constitutional errors.2 In
Picard v. Connor,29 a leading example of the application of the exhaustion
requirement, the petitioner challenged the validity of an indictment,
claiming in his federal habeas corpus petition that "the method by which he
was brought to trial denied him equal protection of the laws. ' '30 In state
court, petitioner had argued only that the fifth amendment requiring grand
jury indictments for capital offenses was made applicable to the states by
the fourteenth amendment. 31 The Supreme Court found that the absence in
state court proceedings of "any indication of an attack upon the prosecution
under the indictment as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment" 32 failed to satisfy the exhaustion requirements of
section 2254 of the federal habeas corpus statute.33 The court observed that
"[olbviously there are instances in which 'the ultimate question for
25. Section 2254 of the Judicial Code provides in pertinent part:
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it
appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of
the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or
the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the
rights of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has
the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the
question presented.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (1970); see United States ex rel. Boodie v. Herold, 349 F.2d 372
(2d Cir. 1965).
26. See, e.g., Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944) (per curiam); Ex parte Royall, 117
U.S. 241 (1886).
27. See Developments in the Law - Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV.
1038 (1970), which identifies two significant interests protected by the exhaustion
requirement. First, "exhaustion preserves the role of the state courts in the application
and enforcement of federal law," whereas "early federal intervention" into state
proceedings would "isolate those courts from constitutional issues" and decrease their
"understanding of' and "hospitality" to those issues. Id. at 1094. Second, exhaustion
preserves the "orderly administration of state judicial business" enabling state
appellate courts to consider federal issues and "supervise and impose uniformity on
trial courts." Id.
28. The doctrine of exhaustion is not a restriction of federal jurisdiction, but
rather, represents a federal policy predicated upon the promotion of comity. See
Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Darr v.
Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950); Zicarelli v. Gray, 543 F.2d 466, 489 (3d Cir. 1976)
(Gibbons, J., concurring); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Vincent, 507 F.2d 1309 (2d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 994 (1975) (requirements of section 2254(b) and (c) are
not jurisdictional).
29. 404 U.S. 270 (1971).
30. Id. at 276-77.
31. Id. at 277.
32. Id. at 274.
33. Id. at 274-78. For the text of section 2254, see note 25 supra.
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disposition,' . . . will be the same despite variations in the legal theory or
factual allegations urged in its support. . . . We simply hold that the
substance of a federal habeas corpus claim must first be presented to the
state courts.13 4 The Picard Court was heir to and generated various tests
for determining whether the "substance" of a claim had been presented in
state courts. Courts have required that the issue advanced in the federal
habeas corpus petition be the substantial equivalent 3 of a claim already
litigated in the state courts or that the claim shall have been fairly
presented36 to the state courts. The Supreme Court has clarified the scope of
a claim by observing that the "method of analysis" asserted in the federal
court must have been "readily available to the state court."
37
The most recent Supreme Court statement concerning the availability of
federal habeas corpus relief is found in Stone v. Powell.3" Stone involved a
petition grounded upon a claimed violation of the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule. The Court held that when the state has "provided an
opportunity for full and fair litigation" of such a claim, collateral review via
a habeas corpus proceeding will not be afforded to the petitioner.
39
Mindful of the demands of the habeas corpus statute40 and of its own
interpretation of Stone as mandating "searching scrutiny" of the issues
raised in the state courts, 41 the Third Circuit first examined Zicarelli's three
sixth amendment claims 42 to determine whether he had exhausted his state
remedies. The court rejected the position that raising a "single sixth-
amendment jury-related argument in the state courts allows the federal
courts to review claims based upon any sixth amendment jury contention. 43
Application of the Picard test of substantial equivalency
44 to two of
Zicarelli's sixth amendment claims presented no difficulty. The venue claim,
that trial by a Burlington County jury violated Zicarelli's right to a trial by
34. 404 U.S. at 277-78.
35. See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950); United States ex rel. Johnson v.
Johnson, 531 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Kemp v. Pate, 359 F.2d 749
(7th Cir. 1966); Daugharty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1958).
36. See Slayton v. Smith, 404 U.S. 53 (1971); Mayer v. Moeykens, 494 F.2d 855 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 926 (1974); Kirby v. Warden, 296 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1961)(per curiam):
37. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658, n.10 (1972) (dictum).
38. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
39. Id. at 482. Several circuits have interpreted Stone to bar review particularly
for fourth amendment search and seizure claims. See United States v. Ceccolini, 542
F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1976) (dictum) (Stone inapposite to direct appeals); Roach v. Parratt,
541 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1976) (collateral review isnkot available once fourth amendment
claim has been fully and fairly litigated in state,.courts); Chavez v. Rodriguez, 540
F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1976) (Stone applies to appeal f6m denial of habeas corpus relief
as long as fourth amendment claim was fully and fairly litigated in state courts);
Bracco v. Reed, 540 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1976) (fourth amendment claim was fully and
fairly litigated in state court); Wright v. Wainwright, 537 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976)
(fourth amendment claim barred by Stone); Stead v. Link, 540 F.2d 923 (8th Cir. 1976)
(exhaustion is not required where futile). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's
interpretation of Stone, see notes 85-90 and accompanying text infra.
40. See note 25 supra.
41. 543 F.2d 472.
42. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
43. 543 F.2d at 472 (emphasis supplied by the court).
44. See text accompanying notes 29-34 supra.
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a jury composed of residents of Hudson County where the crime took place,
was conceded by the court to have been exhausted.45 The claim that the
"'district' from which the trial jury was chosen had not been previously
ascertained by law" had not been raised in the state courts at all and thus,
according to the court, could not have been exhausted. 46
The court encountered more difficulty with Zicarelli's third claim, that
"procedures employed by the state in assembling the jury violated the cross-
section concept" of the sixth amendment.47 Although the court distinguished
the venue and cross-section claims for purposes of requiring exhaustion, it
did recognize that both claims "have areas of intersection and trace their
roots, in some respects, to the same historical sources." 41 Chief among the
distinctions found between the two claims was the nature of the inquiry
required by each: the venue claim necessitated a broadly geographic
"method of analysis" while the cross-section claim called for an "essentially
demographic" examination4 9 The court resolved the issue of exhaustion of
the cross-section claim by determining whether petitioner's reference in oral
argument before the New Jersey Supreme Court to People v. Jones,50 which
opinion had been transmitted to that court and relied upon by Zicarelli in a
companion case, 51 constituted a fair presentation of the issue. The court
concluded that the "mere reference" 52 to People v. Jones, when Zicarelli's
state court briefs dealt "with the venue issue while wholly ignoring the
cross-section contention,"5 3 failed to meet the Picard test of fair presentation
of the federal claim to the state courts.54 The Third Circuit, therefore, held
that Zicarelli had failed to exhaust his state court remedies with respect to
both the cross-section and previously-ascertained-by-law claims.55
45. 543 F.2d at 470, 473-74.
46. Id. at 471. This claim was "raised for the first time during oral argument
before the en banc court." Id. at 470. The court noted that there were additional
reasons for declining to decide the claim. The court felt that comity considerations
required that the state court have the first opportunity to address the "novel
constitutional issue" of whether the previously-ascertained-by-law segment of the
sixth amendment was fundamental and essential to the concept of a jury trial in
accordance with the guidelines set up by the Supreme Court to evaluate which
components of the sixth amendment are made applicable to the states. Id. at 475 n.44.
47. 543 F.2d at 470, 473-74; see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Williams
v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); note 22 and accompanying text supra.
48. Id. at 473.
49. Id.; see notes 77 & 81 infra.
50. 543 F.2d at 474; see notes 23 & 24 and accompanying text supra.
51. People v. Jones was decided by the California Supreme Court between the
time of the Superior Court decisions in State v. Zicarelli, 122 N.J. Super. 225, 300 A.2d
154, certif. denied, 63 N.J. 252, 306 A.2d 445, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 875 (1973), and
State v. Louf, 126 N.J. Super. 321, 314 A.2d 376 (1973), and the argument before the
New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Louf, 64 N.J. 172, 313 A.2d 793 (1973) (per
curiam). Zicarelli was a defendant in both cases. The Jones opinion was trans-
mitted to the New Jersey Supreme Court by Louf's counsel who discussed it during
oral argument and was questioned on it by a member of the court. Zicarelli v. Gray,
543 F.2d 466, 485-86 (appendices II & III) (3d Cir. 1976).
52. 543 F.2d at 474.
53. Id. (footnote omitted).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 474-75.
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Addressing the one claim held to have been exhausted, the venue claim,
the court first assumed without discussion 56 that the sixth amendment's
requirement that a criminal defendant be tried "by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed" 57 was
fundamental to the purposes of a jury trial and, therefore, applicable to the
states. 5 The court then found that the state courts which had addressed the
constitutionality of the exclusion of residents of the place of the crime had
divided upon the question whether a constitutional violation resulted, 59 but
that the "clear majority, of federal court decisions had found no violation. 60
The examination by the Third Circuit of the historical background of
trial by jury in England and colonial America, and of the deliberations of
the framers of the Constitution intended to guarantee the "inestimable
safeguard" 61 of the jury trial verified the accuracy of the federal court
decisions. 62 The court noted that the First Congress had refused to adopt a
specific vicinage requirement 63 and that an early case had construed section
29 of the Judiciary Act to allow exclusion of residents of remote interior
towns from petit jury rolls.64 The Third Circuit therefore affirmed the district
56. Id. at 479. Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that the
sixth amendment command that the jury be drawn from the state and district is
applicable to the states, the Third Circuit's characterization of this phrase as the
"operative portion" of the sixth amendment presupposes that it is fundamental and
thus incorporated. Id. at 478.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. VI
58. 543 F.2d at 479. In Apodaca v. Oregon, Justice Powell stated that the test of a
particular feature should be whether it is "so fundamental to the essentials of jury
trial that this particular requirement of the Sixth Amendment is necessarily binding
on the States under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 406 U.S.
at 373 (the opinion of Justice Powell concurring in the judgment in Apodaca v.
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), is printed with his concurring opinion in Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972)). In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), Justice
White stated: "The relevant inquiry, as we see it, must be the function that the
particular feature performs and its relation to the purposes of the jury trial." Id. at 99-
100. Similarly, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), held that a representative
cross-section of community is "fundamental" and an "essential component" of the
jury trial right.
59. The court cited People v. Jones as the "leading state-court decision upholding
an argument that exclusion of jurors from the area of the crime violated a defendant's
constitutional rights." 543 F.2d at 480; see text accompanying notes 23 & 24 supra.
60. The court cited United States v. Florence, 456 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1972), as
representative of federal court treatment. 543 F.2d at 480. In Florence, the Fourth
Circuit had held the defendant had "neither a constitutional nor statutory right to a
district-wide jury nor to a jury selected from" the division in which the crime took
place but only to a jury "within the district." 456 F.2d at 49.
However, the appellant in Florence does not appear to have framed his
contentions in a sixth amendment context. The court's opinion states that appellant
Florence "requested the trial court to allow him to have a jury panel which included
persons 'that would be his peers and representative of his home-town area as well as
representative of the ... District."' Id. at 48 (emphasis in defendant's motion). The
Fourth Circuit interpreted West Virginia's venue statute as allowing trial anywhere
within the district. 456 F.2d at 50.
61. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 155-56 (1968); see note 10 and accompany-
ing text supra.
62. 543 F.2d at 475-80.
63. 543 F.2d at 476-78; see note 10 and accompanying text supra.
64. 543 F.2d at 478, citing United States v. Stowell, 27 F. Cas. 1350 (C.C.D. Mass.
1854) (No. 16,409); see note 10 supra.
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court,6 5 finding that Zicarelli's trial in Burlington County by a jury drawn
solely from that county pursuant to an indictment charging offenses in
Hudson County was not in violation of his federal constitutional rights.
66
Zicarelli's "venue" claim, the only one treated substantively, presented
the Third Circuit with a question which Duncan left unresolved: In applying
the sixth amendment to the states, what was to be the equivalent unit in
state cases to the "State and district" in federal cases? A court faced with
that question might have found that since the nation was divided into
judicial districts, each state, after Duncan, was required to divide itself into
judicial districts, county divisions being an obvious choice. The Third
Circuit chose to apply the language of the amendment literally by finding
that a state complied with the amendment's mandate by holding trial in the
state or federal judicial district in which the crime took place. Certainly,
absent a directive from the post-Duncan Supreme Court to the contrary,
67
the Third Circuit's choice was eminently reasonable. Moreover, there is
strong historical support for the court's finding that the colonial concept of
vicinage was not incorporated in its pure and narrow form into any federal
statute concerning jury trial.68
65. 543 F.2d at 482.
66. 543 F.2d at 482. Zicarelli was sent back to pursue his cross-section and
previously-ascertained-by-law claims in the state courts. See note 82 infra.
Judge Van Dusen filed an opinion, dissenting in-part and concurring in part.
He concluded that Zicarelli's reliance on People v. Jones satisfied the statutory
requirement of exhaustion and that Picard v. Connor was inapplicable to the case. 543
F.2d at 486-87. Judge Van Dusen would have vacated the district court's judgment
and remanded the cross-section claim to that court for a hearing and "findings on the
factual basis" for that claim. Id. at 488. He concurred in the disposition of the venue
claim and the previously-ascertained-by-law issue. Id.
Judge Hunter also concurred in part and dissented in part. In his opinion, the
threshhold question was the definition of the "perimeter of the 'community'" in view
of the sixth amendment guarantee of a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the
coummunity. Id. at 488-89.
Judge Gibbons concurred, agreeing with Judge Van Dusen that exhaustion
was satisfied but finding no violation of the fair cross-section requirement in the
selection of Burlington County or in the methods used to select Burlington County
jurors. Id. at 489. He agreed with Judge Adams' conclusion that the previously-
ascertained-by-law issue required state court determination and saw this issue as
involving a "substantial claim of a due process violation." Id.; see note 46 and
accompanying text supra.
67. See notes 17-22 & 56 and accompanying text supra. The two major sixth
amendment cases decided by the United States Supreme Court since Duncan dealt
largely with jury selection discrimination problems. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522 (1975) (discrimination against women); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972)
(plurality opinion) (discrimination against blacks). Two issues left open by Duncan
were resolved by Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (unanimity not fundamental
to state verdict), and Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (12 person jury not
essential to concept of jury trial).
68. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. at 93-97; see F. HELLER, supra note 10, at 31-33,
93; Warren, supra note 10, at 105, 124-29; notes 10, 11, 14 & 15 supra.
Professor Blume has argued that a careful reading of the history of the
colonies' struggles with England over the implementation of the infamous statute
under which accused Massachusetts offenders were transported to England for trial,
14 Geo. 3, c. 39 (1774), supports the theory that the term "vicinage" as used by the
colonists referred not to the neighborhood, as commonly believed, but rather to the
colony and later to the state. See Blume, supra note 10, at 59, 60.
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The court's decision to require exhaustion of the previously-ascertained-
by-law issue which was "raised sua sponte by [the] court, '6 9 which did not
form any part of the petition for habeas corpus,70 and which has not been the
basis of any claimed sixth amendment violation in any case in the past,71 is
far less supportable.7 2 Since the court chose to consider the previously-
ascertained-by-law language on its own motion, logic should have directed it
to the same respected sources it relied upon for its historical analysis of
vicinage and venue. Research of the history surrounding the enactment of
the sixth amendment would have revealed that the "previously ascertained
by law" provision was merely intended to require congressional determina-
tion of judicial districts, a process accomplished through the enactment of
the Judiciary Act of 1789. 71 Further, it is questionable whether Zicarelli
could have made such a claim in the New Jersey courts since he had been
indicted by a grand jury which had statutory statewide jurisdiction.74
The validity of the court's decision that Zicarelli had not exhausted his
cross-section claim is dependent upon the correctness of its reading of Picard
v. Connor.75 The petitioner in Picard had made two very different claims -
the one made in state court was essentially a fifth amendment claim
involving the fourteenth amendment's incorporation feature, while the claim
in federal court alleged a denial of equal protection. 76 In an attempt to fit
Zicarelli into the Picard mold, Judge Adams, writing for the en banc court,
repeatedly stressed that Zicarelli had failed to present factual allegations
showing the differing demographic compositions of Burlington and Hudson
69. 543 F.2d at 471.
70. Id. at 470; see note 46 supra.
71. Id. at 475 n.44.
72. There was, arguably, an alternative holding in Zicarelli. The court stated:
"[E]ven assuming arguendo that Zicarelli has exhausted his state remedies on the
cross-section claim" that, because the previously-ascertained-by-law claim had not
been exhausted and would thus have to be presented to the state courts, "it would best
serve the interests of judicial economy and efficiency" to present both claims at the
same time. Id. at 475. The court's refusal to examine substantively an issue raised sua
sponte seems unnecessarily harsh. In view of the possible alternative holding, it is
submitted that the court appended a possibly exhausted claim to a court-created claim
in order to satisfy what it perceived as the Stone v. Powell exhaustion test. See text
accompanying notes 38, 39 & 41 supra and 85-90 infra.
73. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 95-97 (1970); see Blume, supra note 10, at 66,
73. Professor Heller says that the requirement of the sixth amendment is complied
with if, prior to the crime's commission, the district in which it was committed was
ascertained by law. F. HELLER, supra note 10, at 101.
74. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:73A-1 to -9 (West 1976). The statewide grand jury was
required to "function in the same manner as a county grand jury." Id. § 2A:73A-3.
New Jersey's venue rules require that an "offense shall be prosecuted in the
county in which it was committed." N.J.R. CRiM. P. 3:14-1. Previously rule 3:14-1
listed 10 exceptions, none of which applied then to statewide grand juries. In 1975, the
rule was amended to add to the listed exceptions, (k), which stated, in pertinent part,
that "[tihe county of venue for purposes of trial of indictments returned by a State
Grand Jury shall be designated by the Assignment Judges.... N.J.R. CRIM. P. 3:14-
1(k), as amended Sept. 8, 1975. The contention that rule 3:14-1 should have required
the laying of venue in Hudson County was the first point raised by Zicarelli's counsel
in his brief in the Superior Court of New Jersey. Brief for Appellant at 20-23, State v.
Zicarelli, 122 N.J. Super. 225, 300 A.2d 154 (1973).
75. See text accompanying notes 29-34, 43 & 44 supra.
76. See text accompanying notes 29-34 supra.
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Counties" and that the absence of such data, when coupled with the "mere
reference" to Jones,7" did not fairly present the cross-section claim to the
New Jersey courts. 79 However, a reading of Zicarelli's New Jersey Superior
Court brief revealed, as the court noted obliquely, 80 the presence .of
demographic data within the venue section.81 It would seem that while the
brief failed to distinguish between a venue claim and a cross-section claim in
demographic terms, the method of analysis and the necessary factual data
had certainly been available to the New Jersey courts.8 2 Further, petitioner's
failure to analyze separately the venue and cross-section claims is not
77. Zicarelli's brief in New Jersey Superior Court began with a section entitled
"The venue of the within indictment was improperly laid in Burlington County"; the
first subsection analyzed rule 3:14 (see note 74 supra) and included the demographic
data; the next subsection comprised a sixth amendment vicinage argument which
stressed the Duncan "insistence upon community participation" in jury trials, citing
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968); the third subsection challenged the
allocation of venue procedure; and the final subsection argued that the decisions
below were incorrect. Brief for Appellant at 17-42, State v. Zicarelli, 122 N.J. Super.
225, 300 A.2d 154 (1973).
Although Judge Adams repeatedly stated that Zicarelli presented no factual
allegations in support of his cross-section claim, 543 F.2d at 474-75, the three
concurring opinions felt otherwise and the earlier panel opinion had gone even
further:
[T]he fair cross-section argument presented to us presents the same ultimate
question for disposition as the appellant's contention, both here and in the state
courts, that the Sixth Amendment required him to be tried by a jury drawn from
Hudson County.. . . The ultimate question under both legal theories is whether
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments invalidate appellant's conviction by a
jury drawn exclusively from an area other than that in which the crime was
alleged to have been committed.
Zicarelli v. Gray, No. 75-1173, slip op. at 8 n.13 (3d Cir., Nov. 18, 1975); see note 81
infra.
78. See notes 50-52 and accompanying text supra.
79. 543 F.2d at 474-75.
80. Id. at 471 n.17.
81. See Brief for Appellant at 22-23, State v. Zicarelli, 122 N.J. Super. 225, 300
A.2d 154 (1973). The brief states that Burlington County is the largest county (11% of
total area), sparsely populated (3.7% of population), devoted to agriculture, and has
few foreign born residents whereas Hudson County is the smallest and most densely
populated county with no rural population and large numbers of foreign-born
residents. Id. For a fascinating study of the difference in jury verdicts in two New
Jersey counties, one urban and one suburban, see Botter, Jury Bias in Hudson and
Bergen Counties: A View from the Bench, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1972).
82. It should be noted that New Jersey, the respondent in the instant case,
thought that petitioner had exhausted available state remedies with respect to his
cross-section claim. 543 F.2d at 471. It is submitted that rejection of an unequivocal
demonstration by the state court system that petitioner has fully litigated his federal
claims promotes neither coordination nor friction-free relations between state and
federal courts, as the exhaustion requirement is designed to do. The practical effect
upon Zicarelli of the Third Circuit's decision is to force his attempted return to a New
Jersey trial court from which he may be barred by the five-year statute of limitations
contained in New Jersey's post-conviction relief statute. N.J.R. CRiM. P. § 3:22-12. The
bar may be lifted on a showing that delay was caused by defendant's excusable
neglect. Id. A question arises of whether the failure to obtain collateral relief by way
of a federal habeas corpus petition constitutes excusable neglect. The Third Circuit
did not address the issue of current availability of state court relief as required by
section 2254(b) and (c) in the course of its discussion of exhaustion. For the text of
section 2254(c), see note 25 supra. At least arguably, it is doubtful that New Jersey
state courts had available any procedure in which to raise the questions.
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remarkable since these claims generally have been dealt with as a unit8 3 and
since the Third Circuit's only authority for analytical disparity was its own
opinion in the instant case.84
The Third Circuit's exacting, if not impossible, standard of what
constitutes exhaustion is attributable to its interpretation of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Stone v. Powell.85 The court's conclusion that "Stone
highlights the necessity for a searching scrutiny by the Federal habeas
court of the points that were raised in the state tribunals" 86 was based upon
a footnote in the Stone opinion, which was cited without reference to the text
which preceded it.87 In the text, the Court had quoted Justice Black as
saying that an illegal search and seizure claim was "crucially different from
many other constitutional rights"8 in relation to the ultimate question of
guilt or innocence. The footnote cited by the Zicarelli bourt began by saying
that "[riesort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to assure
that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty, results in
serious intrusions" on important governmental values such as judicial
economy and friction-free federal-state justice systems. 89 However, in the
same footnote, neither quoted nor referred to by the Zicarelli court, the Court
stated: "We nevertheless afford broad habeas corpus relief."'9 The Third
Circuit may have read far more into Stone than was intended by the
Supreme Court.
Unfortunately, the Third Circuit's approach to exhaustion portends
unfair surprise for future claimants. The conscientious attorney, having
presented all of the claims raised in prior cases dealing with similar issues,91
may find, nevertheless, that precise location and designation of supporting
data in a brief or, more unexpectedly, failure to discuss a phrase of
constitutional language never before the subject of judicial scrutiny 92 has
become the basis for denial of a writ of habeas corpus. The Third Circuit, the
first to interpret Stone v. Powell in the context of the sixth amendment, 93
83. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 9 Cal. 3d 546, 510 P.2d 705, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1973).
For a discussion of Jones, see notes 23 & 24 and accompanying text supra.
84. 543 F.2d at 474.
85. See notes 38, 39 & 41 and accompanying text supra.
86. 543 F.2d at 472 (emphasis added). The kind of scrutiny mandated by this
reading of Stone would seem to apply, by the Third Circuit's own words, to the points
actually raised in the state courts. Since the previously-ascertained-by-law claim was
never raised by petitioner prior to the instant case, a question arises as to what kind
of scrutiny, if any, is required by the exhaustion doctrine of points not raised in state
courts.
87. Id. at 472 n.25, citing Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3050 n.31 (1976).
88. 428 U.S. at 490, quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 237 (1969).
89. 428 U.S. at 490 n.31. Other values included the necessity of finality in
criminal trials and the maintenance of constitutional balance in the federalist system.
Id.
90. Id.
91. 543 F.2d at 473 n.33, 475 n.44.
92. See note 46 supra.
93. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
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thus substantiates the forecast of withdrawal of habeas corpus jurisdiction
predicted by Justice Brennan's dissent in Stone in which he stated:
Much in the Court's opinion suggests that a construction of the habeas
statutes to deny relief for non- "guilt-related" constitutional violations
based on this Court's vague notions of comity and federalism . . . is the
actual premise for today's decision, and . . . mark this case as a
harbinger of future eviscerations of the -habeas statutes . . . I am
therefore justified in apprehending that the groundwork is being laid
today for a drastic withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction. 94
Lynn G. Zeitlin
94. 428 U.S. at 516-17. Justice Brennan also enumerated claims of non-guilt-
related constitutional violations including double jeopardy, entrapment, self-
incrimination, Miranda violations, use of invalid identification procedures, and denial
of the right to a speedy trial or to a jury trial. Id.
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